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In 1994, nearly one million Men, women, and children were slaughtered because of
their ethnicity.  The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide has caused many to question the
international community’s choice not to intervene.  I use the Rwandan genocide as a
means of discussing international morality and the role of morality in international
relations.
The first half of my project focuses on humanitarian intervention as an issue of global
ethics.  I argue that the international community, as a collection of duty-bearing states,
had a moral obligation to intervene in Rwanda.  To defend this proposition I must first
establish the conceptual possibility of global ethics.  In that vein, I begin by arguing
against various skeptical arguments made by communitarians, relativists, and political
realists.  Having made the conceptual room for global ethics, I then develop a weak moral
principle in support of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention by identifying
the set of conditions under which no one could reasonably deny that such an obligation
exists.  I next explain how states can and why they on occasion do bear that obligation. 
Lastly, I argue that the Rwandan genocide fulfilled such conditions; as a consequence, not
only was intervention permissible, it was obligatory. 
The second half of my project is concerned with the role moral demands should play
in the practical deliberations of states.  Many international relations scholars contend that
questions of intervention are largely determined by the right of nonintervention which
precludes other states from considering reasons for action that would require intervention. 
Against such scholars I argue that the role the right of nonintervention played in the
practical deliberations of states during the Rwandan genocide was, and remains,
unjustified.  In the alternative, I argue that we ought to adopt a rebuttable presumption in
favor of nonintervention.  Such a rule would serve the same goals as the right of
nonintervention, but without the unjustified preclusion of moral reasons for action.  I
conclude that the presumption of nonintervention would have been rebutted during the
Rwandan genocide, and that the international community ought to have intervened.
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THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RWANDA
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
1.1 Introduction
In 1994, nearly one million Rwandans were sought out and killed simply because
they were Tutsis or Tutsi sympathizers.  They were the victims of genocide.  The tragedy
of the Rwandan genocide has since caused many to question the international
community’s choice not to intervene.  Much of the discussion has revolved around the
moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention.  My focus, however, is on the
identification of the conditions under which there is a moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention.  I argue that the Rwandan genocide fulfilled such conditions, and gave rise
to a moral obligation to intervene.  I also contend that the rules governing the practical
deliberations of states precluded such moral obligations from consideration, and as such
were a determinative reason for the international community’s choice not to intervene.  I
argue that such rules lack sufficient justification, and I offer a reconstructed deliberative
framework under which states ought to consider such moral obligations in their practical
deliberations.  Applying the reconstructed deliberative framework to the Rwandan
genocide results in a judgment that, all things considered, the international community
ought to have intervened.
1.2 The Rwandan Genocide
Before turning to the substantive discussion, I want to offer a brief historical
account of the Rwandan genocide.  Between April and July of 1994, approximately
 See, Samantha Powers, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of1
Genocide (New York: Perennial, 2003); Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that
Tomorrow We Will be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998); and L. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the
Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003).
 See, Gourevitch, pp. 294-298.  See also, Dallaire, p. 518.2
 Gourevitch, pp. 26-28.3
 Gourevitch, pp. 26-28.4
 The Rwandan Patriotic Front was a rebel army comprised of Tutsis and5
moderate Hutus under the leadership of Paul Kagame.
 Dallaire, p. 53.6
 Ibid., pp. 54-55.  See also, Powers, pp. 340-341.7
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800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered because they were Tutsis or Tutsi-sympathizers.   L.1
Gen. Romeo Dallaire and Philip Gourevitch add to that number countless others who
were forced into refugee camps where they were subjected to violence, starvation, and
disease.   Most of the killing was carried out, not by the military, but by citizens in2
machete-wielding mobs.  Individuals were betrayed, and in some situations actually
sought out and killed, by those whom they knew.  For example, in one particularly
egregious instance, a physician, Dr. Gerard, betrayed the Tutsis under his care.   Gerard3
led a group of Hutu militiamen to his Tutsi patients, knowing and intending that the
patients would be killed by the militia.4
In August of 1993, prior to the outbreak of violence, the Rwandan government
and the Rwandan Patriotic Front  (RPF) entered into a power-sharing agreement, the5
Arusha Accords.    The Arusha Accords were intended to bring an end to a bloody civil6
war.   On October 5, 1993 the United Nations approved a mandate for the deployment of7
 Dallaire, p. 96.8
 See Dallaire, pp. 141-144, 146.9
 Ibid., p. 146.10
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a peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) to aid in the implementation of the Arusha Accords.  8
Despite the international community’s ostensible support for the mandate, UNAMIR
never received the political, logistical, or military backing necessary to accomplish its
mission.  And, while the implementation of the Arusha Accords dragged on, Hutu
extremists consolidated their power. 
By April of 1994, UNAMIR had received numerous warnings from an informant
within the interahamwe, a civilian militia with close ties to the Hutu extremists in the
Rwandan government, that a campaign of violence against the Tutsi was about to begin.  9
One particularly relevant piece of information provided by the informant was the
identification of hidden caches of weapons.  Dallaire contacted the United Nations and
sought permission to raid the weapons caches, the very existence of which was a violation
of the Arusha Accords.  Instead of being given permission, Dallaire was chastised for
“even thinking about raiding the weapons caches.”  10
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwanda’s President, Habyarimana, exploded in
mid-air over the Rwandan capital Kigali.  Almost immediately, violence broke out
throughout Kigali.  The Hutu extremists used this event and its chaotic aftermath as an
excuse to seize control of the government and put the implementation of the Arusha
Accords on hold.  The interahamwe put the weapons they had hidden and that Dallaire
had sought to confiscate to their intended use – the eradication of Tutsis.  
At the request of the United Nations, Dallaire outlined a plan to halt the killing. 
 Ibid., p. 359.  See also, Powers, p. 378. 11
 Dallaire, pp. 374-376.12
 See Dallaire, pp. 222-225.13
 Ibid., pp. 145, 195.14
 U. N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide15
(1948).
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He claimed that if he were provided with a force of about 5000 well-equipped soldiers he
would be able to provide safety and security to the Rwandan people, and get the
implementation of the Arusha Accords back on track.   However, even after the killing11
had begun, the United Nations refused to give the peacekeepers the support necessary to
protect the Rwandan people.  Though many at the United Nations expressed shock at
what was happening in Rwanda, they did nothing to halt the killing.  12
Numerous reasons were offered for the persistent refusal to intervene.  One reason
pressed by the Hutu-led interim government was based on the claim that Rwanda, like
any other sovereign state, was presumed to enjoy the right of non-intervention.  The
international community could justifiably interfere in the internal affairs of Rwanda only
under certain prescribed circumstances.  The interim government claimed that the
violence was an internal matter, and that it would soon be under control.   This argument13
against intervention was pressed in the United Nations’ Security Council, where Rwanda
held one of the rotating seats at the time.14
Humanitarian crises are not generally recognized as providing the necessary
justification for violating a sovereign state’s right of non-intervention; however, under the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948
(“Convention”), intervention is, at the very least, permitted to prevent or stop genocide.  15
 See Powers, pp. 358-364.16
 See Powers, p. 359; quoting from a memo authored by someone in the Office of17
the Secretary of Defense, “1. Genocide Investigation: Language that calls for an
international investigation of human rights abuses and possible violations of the genocide
convention.  Be Careful.  Legal at State was worried about this yesterday – Genocide
finding could commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something’” Office of the
Secretary of Defense, “Secret Discussion Paper: Rwanda,” May 1, 1994; emphasis added
by Powers.
 See, Powers, p. 364.18
 See, Powers, pp. 377-380.19
 See, Dallaire, pp. 431-436.20
-5-
Despite this legal permission, while Tutsis died, those in the international community
argued over whether the violence in Rwanda counted as genocide.   The refusal of the16
United States to use the word “genocide” to describe the events in Rwanda was, at least
in part, an intentional effort to avoid the possible demands of the Convention.  17
Eventually, the violence in Rwanda was recognized as genocide.   This, however,18
did not result in an intervention, rather many claimed that the recognition of genocide
merely made intervention permissible, but did not require action.  This position was
captured in PPD-25, under which the United States would only intervene if the national
interests of the United States were at stake.   The killing of Tutsis continued.19
By July of 1994 the RPF had gained control of Kigali and most of Rwanda, and
had put an end to the ethnic slaughter in the areas under their control.  At about that same
time, under a mandate from the United Nations, the French deployed a sizeable military
force, known as “Operation Turquoise,” to provide secure areas for refugees.   The Hutu20
extremists and the genocidaires were fleeing to the French safe areas, where, due to
failures on the part of the French to screen the incoming refugees – making no distinction
 See, Dallaire, pp. 463-464, 471-472, 488.21
 See L. R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s22
Genocide (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2004), pp. 210-211.
 See, Powers, pp. 380-382.  See also, Melvern, p. 214. 23
 U. N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide24
(1948).
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between innocent refugee and genocidaire – the violence would continue.   The21
justifications for Operation Turquoise were not based on the genocidal actions that had
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent Rwandans.  Rather it was the
claimed danger to international peace and security caused by the resultant refugee crisis
that the French and the United Nations relied upon to justify the intervention.   In22
addition, rather than protecting refugees, the intervention had the effect of protecting the
genocidaires as they fled.  23
1.3 My Project: The International Community’s Failure to Fulfill 
the Moral Obligation to Intervene in Rwanda
Before discussing my project I would like to explain my interest in the Rwandan
genocide.  In 1948, in the aftermath of World War II and with the horror of the Holocaust
known to the world, the United Nations sponsored the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which states, 
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or time of war, is a crime under international law
which they undertake to prevent and to punish.24
Yet, less than fifty years later, the most powerful states in the world allowed nearly a
million innocent men, women, and children to be slaughtered in a most brutal fashion.
In some cases it wasn’t even the commitment of troops or direct military action
 See, Powers, pp. 370-371.  See also, Gourevitch, pp. 99-100.25
 See, Powers, pp. 370-373.26
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that was at issue.  For example, in May of 1994, the United States’ military contemplated
jamming the radio signal of Radio RTLM – a radio station broadcasting anti-Tutsi
propaganda and exhorting the civilian population to kill Tutsis.   Jamming the radio25
signal would have involved little more that flying a U.S. military plane over Rwandan
airspace.  The United States, however, decided against such action, claiming it would be
too costly, and that such action contravened certain international legal conventions.   If26
jamming a radio signal was outside the range of appropriate action, it is not clear what
commitment to the Convention meant, or required. 
In addition to the visceral reaction I had to the international community’s apathy
in the face of such atrocity, my interest in this project is motivated by my general interest
in international morality and the role it should play in the practical deliberations of states
and the international community.  In seeking insight into this subject, focusing on a
particular historical event has a number of advantages.  First, it allows me to touch upon
the major issues in, and questions associated with, international morality and its
relationship to the normative framework governing the practical deliberations of states,
without having to provide a complete accounting of either. 
Second, using a past event as a case-in-point is advantageous because historical
study renders the deliberations engaged in by the relevant actors more readily open to
critical assessment.  In recent years, there has been much written about the Rwandan
genocide.  These accounts paint a clear picture of the events which led to, and occurred
during, the genocide, as well as the deliberative process engaged in by those deciding
 I would like to thank Samuel Kerstein for pointing this out to me.  See, Thomas27
Pogge’s discussion of an obligation to act in cases of poverty in his collected works,
World Poverty and Human Rights (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 14-17, Chs.
1- 4, and 8.
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what ought to be done about the killing. 
Another reason I have for evaluating the moral obligations states and the
international community owed to the Rwandan people is directly related to my belief that
there are circumstances under which humanitarian intervention is not only permissible,
but obligatory.  The Rwandan genocide presents an interesting case because it would
seem that if we are ever to have duties or obligations to distant others that give rise to an
obligation to intervene it would be to prevent and protect against genocide. 
It might be contended that an obligation of intervention to prevent death from
starvation and extreme poverty is just as likely a candidate for general acceptance as the
obligation of intervention to prevent genocide.   I would agree that we have an obligation27
to aid distant others when preventable starvation or extreme poverty threatens their lives,
and I would agree that in certain cases where the starvation and impoverishment is due to
government corruption or the theft of foreign aid (“famine through corruption”) we may
have an obligation to intervene.  I also believe, however, that there are a number of
morally significant differences between genocide, on the one hand, and famine through
corruption, on the other, that make an obligation to intervene in the case of genocide more
readily defensible.  
First, if we assume that famine through corruption is the result of a desire for
wealth or power on the part of those in control, then the motivation is one that can be
dealt with through incentives, both positive and negative.  In cases of genocide, however,
 See Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism,28
and the Rwandan Genocide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 17-18.
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the motivation likely involves an element of hate and/or ignorance.  Incentives are
unlikely to be effective as the underlying motivation is not susceptible to methods of
influence that appeal to the rational self-interest of the offending party(ies).  In the
Rwandan genocide, the slaughter was carried out by civilians.   Consequently, in28
Rwanda, it is not clear to whom such incentives would or could have been offered. 
Second, the intentions of the genocidaires and the motivation underlying their
actions, are morally distinct from the intentions and motivation of those responsible for
famine through corruption.  Stealing food from a starving person in order to gain power
or wealth with the knowledge that your act is likely to cause the death of the person from
whom the food was stolen is certainly wrong, but stealing someone’s food for the sole
purpose of starving them to death for no other reason than that they are not like you is
worse.  It is the latter case that is morally comparable to overt and violent efforts to
commit genocide.  This difference may only be a matter of degree, but all that I am
claiming is that an obligation to intervene to prevent or stop genocide is easier to defend
than other possible sources of the obligation to intervene.
In considering the Rwandan genocide, it is easy to get lost in the sheer enormity of
the tragedy.  The senseless and brutal murder of an individual is swallowed by the
slaughter of an entire ethnic minority.  It is important, due to the circumstances of the
Rwandan genocide, to be conscious of the plight of the individual victims.  In Rwanda,
there were no gas chambers, no machinery of death to kill large numbers at a single time. 
Instead, most of the victims were “murdered, not by automatic weapons but by machetes
 See, Clea Koff, The Bone Woman: A Forensic Anthropologist’s Search for29
Truth in the Mass Graves of Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo (New York: Random
House, 2004), p. 21.
 Michael Mann offers such an account.  For an overview of his project, see30
Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 2-10.  Mann offers a theory explaining why
genocide occurs, and deals with a number of specific instances of genocide, including the
Rwandan genocide. 
 Prudence Bushnell, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,31
would call the Rwandan military chief to let him know that President Clinton was going
to “hold him accountable for the killings.”  Powers, p. 370. 
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and clubs wielded by soldiers, mayors, police, and neighbors.”  29
Many have sought to understand how people could and why they would commit
such atrocities.   I am interested, however, in understanding why the international30
community chose not to intervene in Rwanda, and whether that choice was justified. 
Thus, my project is both descriptive and normative.  What reasons for and against
intervention were considered by states individually, and the international community
collectively?  What were the international community’s moral obligations?  What role did
those obligations play in the practical deliberations of states, and what role should those
obligations have played in those deliberations?  Was the international community
justified in limiting its efforts to threats of diplomatic sanctions and future
consequences?  31
I identify the conditions under which no one could reasonably deny that an
obligation of humanitarian intervention exists, and I contend that the international
community, as a collection of duty-bearing states, was under such an obligation to
intervene in Rwanda.  This moral obligation does not, however, necessarily imply that the
international community ought, all things considered, to have intervened in Rwanda. 
 Stanley Hoffmann provides a brief accounting of these issues.  See Stanley32
Hoffmann, “Intervention: Should It Go On, Can It Go On?” from Ethics and Foreign
Intervention, eds. Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), pp. 21-30.
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There may have been countervailing reasons that, when included in the practical
deliberations of states and the international community, defeated the reasons in support of
intervention.  In sum, my project is comprised of the following components:
(1) Discussing the Moral Obligation of Humanitarian Intervention: (A) The
identification of the conditions under which no none could reasonably deny that a
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention exists; and (B) a defense of the
claim that such an obligation existed in the case of the Rwandan genocide; and
(2) Discussing the Normative Framework of International Relations: © A
discussion of the role moral obligations played in the practical deliberation of
states in 1994; (D) a discussion of the role such obligations ought to have played
in the practical deliberations of states; and (E) a defense of the claim that the
international community ought, all things considered, to have intervened in
Rwanda.
1.4 Overview
I turn now to a more detailed overview of how, in the succeeding chapters, I will
answer these questions. 
1.4.1 Chapter 2 - The Current Debate over Humanitarian Intervention
In Chapter 2, I provide an account of the current state of the debate over
humanitarian intervention.  Two fundamental questions define this debate.   First, is32
 Ibid., pp. 23-24.33
 Ibid., pp. 24-28.34
 For a thorough discussion of such skeptical accounts, see Marshall Cohen,35
“Moral Skepticism and International Relations,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 13,
No. 4 (Autumn, 1984), pp. 299-346.
 Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue,” The History of the Peloponnesian War36
(London: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 400-408.
 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc.,37
1947).
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humanitarian intervention ever morally justified?   Second, if humanitarian intervention33
can be justified, one must still determine “what should be done” to effect the
intervention.   My claim regarding an obligation to intervene is most directly related to34
the threshold question of the justifiability of humanitarian intervention. 
The debate over justifiability may seem straightforward.  There are arguments
seeking to justify humanitarian intervention, and there are arguments intended to
demonstrate that it is morally impermissible.  The debate is, however, complicated by the
existence of a variety of skeptical arguments in support of the claim that morality has
little or no relevance to international relations.  35
I will focus on three of the most widely discussed skeptical accounts.  The first
two come from the realist tradition.  The philosophical foundations for the realist
perspective on the relationship between morality and international relations can be found
in Thucydides  and Machiavelli.   Its more contemporary proponents are international36 37
 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 4  Ed. (New York: Alfred A.38 th
Knopf, Inc., 1967).
 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading, MA: Addison-39
Wesley Publishing Co., 1979).
 The official position of the United States’ government during the Rwandan40
genocide was that the United States would intervene only if it had a national interest at
stake.  Specifically, PPD 25 required U.S. interests to be at stake before support for
intervention would be allowed.  See, Powers, pp. 344-346, 377-380.  For a discussion of
this understanding of international relations and its implications for the obligations borne
by states, see Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 28-34.  See also, David Hume’s
discussion of “Justice”.  David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
Section III (1751) (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 15-38. 
It is important to note that I am avoiding the use of terms like “Realist” or “Neo-
Realist.”  My understanding is that the Neo-realist is committed to the study of
international relations as a matter of scientific or descriptive inquiry, and that the
champion of this trend in realism is Kenneth Waltz, and that Hans Morgenthau and
Hedley Bull are the arch-Realists.  However, the division I am concerned with is related
to the understanding of realism as either a descriptive or a normative project, and the
wide array of realist accounts has caused me some confusion.  So to avoid spreading the
confusion, I have chosen to use more straightforward descriptive terms for the realist
traditions I am discussing.  I apologize to any international relations scholars who may
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relations scholars like Hans Morgenthau  and Kenneth Waltz.   The positions of these38 39
scholars will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
First, under one strand of political realism, the realist argues that international
relations is a descriptive and predictive enterprise, and that the goal of international
relations scholarship should be the understanding of relationships of power and how they
affect world politics.  In understanding the actions of states, normative demands on the
practical deliberations of states, including moral obligations owed to distant others that
are borne by states, are irrelevant.    
Second, unlike the descriptive realist, the normative realist concedes that
normative theory has a role to play in international relations, but what states ought to do
is a matter of strategic advantage, not moral obligation.   The normative realist contends40
find my terminology unnecessarily cumbersome.
 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 3.2.2 (1737) (Oxford: Oxford University41
Press, 2000), p. 315.  See also Hume, An Enquiry Section III (that there is no justice in a
society of ruffians), pp. 18, 19.
 Hume, A Treatise, 3.2.1, p. 307.  See also Hume, An Enquiry Section III, p. 19.42
 Ibid.43
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that the international arena is like a Hobbesian state of nature.  Since there is no world
sovereign, states are in a constant state of war.  As such there is no justice, and no
normative demand on the actions of states other than prudence.  
One final and more moderate form of skepticism over international morality is
found in the work of David Hume.  If the normative realist is correct, and international
relations is like a Hobbesian state of nature, then Hume would likely agree that in
international relations there is no justice and no moral obligations borne by states.  41
Justice, for Hume, is artificial and instrumental to the welfare of men, and justice only
arises through the conventions that establish society.   Hume concedes that there is no42
world sovereign, but claims that there is an international society.   As such, Hume43
contends that there is an international morality, but that it is concerned only with the
relations between princes or sovereigns.
After offering reasons for why such skeptical accounts are not determinative of
the matter, I will focus on the ongoing debate over intervention that centers around the
claim that there are moral reasons that weigh decisively against intervention.  As
Fernando Teson points out, in these arguments the noninterventionists recognize that an
injustice is being done, and may even agree that something ought to be done to alleviate
the suffering of those whose rights are being violated, but they claim that military
 Fernando Teson, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention” from J. L.44
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and
Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 95.
 See Teson, pp. 108-111.  See also Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to45
International Law, 3  Ed. (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 1999) (that article 2 ofrd
the Charter of the United Nations forbids intervention into the internal affairs of another
state), pp. 185, 257.
 See Teson, p. 100.46
 Michael Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States,” Philosophy and Public47
Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring, 1980), 209-229.  See also, Teson, p. 104.
 Janis, pp. 159-160.48
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intervention is morally impermissible.  44
Under one argument, it is claimed that states are under a moral obligation to obey
international law, and the right of nonintervention and its correlative duty to refrain from
intervening into the internal affairs of another state are mandated by international law.  45
Others offer relativist objections, claiming that intervention is based on the arbitrary
priority given to Western values over those of the culture of the target state.   Michael46
Walzer, offering a communitarian argument, contends that intervention actually violates
the rights of political communities to self-determination.   Lastly, it is often claimed that47
non-intervention is instrumentally valuable as a means to achieving certain goals of
international morality.48
1.4.2 Chapter 3 - The Moral Obligation of Humanitarian Intervention Defined
In Chapter 3, I will identify what I believe are the conditions under which no one
could reasonably deny that a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention exists.  In
identifying such conditions I am seeking to establish the conditions under which
humanitarian intervention is clearly obligatory.  With an account of such conditions in
 See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights.  See also Pogge,49
“Human Rights and Human Responsibilities,” from, Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran Cronin,
eds., Global Justice & Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and Political
Challenges of Globalization (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002).  Another
possible principle supporting intervention could be Peter Singer’s consequentialist equal
consideration of interests which he advocates in “Famine Affluence and Morality.”  Peter
Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:2 (1972), pp.
231-232. See also Peter Singer, “Outsiders: Our Obligations to Those Beyond Our
Borders,” The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 11-32.  
 Melvern, p. 5.50
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hand, I will assess the degree to which the circumstances of the Rwandan genocide
fulfilled those conditions. 
If I was only concerned with establishing a moral obligation to intervene in
Rwanda, there are a number of principles upon which I could rely to make such an
argument.  For example, Thomas Pogge discusses how the principle of rectification can
give rise to reparative obligations to act.   There is ample evidence that the ability of the49
genocidaires to perpetrate the genocide in Rwanda was due in large part to actions by
France, Belgium, and Egypt.   Thus, at the very least, the principle of rectification could50
arguably provide the basis for a moral obligation to intervene borne by those who violated
their duty not to harm the Rwandan Tutsis.
While I acknowledge the promising nature of such an approach, it makes it
necessary that the bearer of the obligation have contributed to the present suffering which
gives rise to the obligation.  I am concerned with defending a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention that is not dependent on anything other than the plight of
individuals - a distinctively humanitarian moral obligation.  I will argue that the violation
of the basic human right to physical security can, under certain conditions, give rise to a
-17-
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention.  If correct, the obligation of humanitarian
intervention would depend on nothing other than the duties correlative to the basic human
right to physical security.  
It is important to the success of my project that one have an understanding of the
task I have set for myself.  I am seeking to identify that set of conditions under which no
one could reasonably deny that a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention exists. 
But, what do I mean by that set of conditions under which no one could reasonably deny
that such an obligation exists?  This is not simply a matter of identifying the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the obligation to exist, though the identification of those
conditions does play a part.  Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
something identify the threshold for the object’s existence.  No more is required, and no
less will fulfill the conditions.  However, identifying the conditions under which no one
could reasonably deny that such an obligation exists requires more.
The moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is a reason for action.  As such,
depending on the circumstances, it can exist in a number of different forms.  First, it may
exist as a reason for action to be entered in to the practical deliberations of an agent - one
amongst many moral reasons for action relevant to one’s determination of what ought to
be done in a particular circumstance.  Second, it may exist as an all things considered
reason for action - as an outcome of practical deliberation.  In which case it is
determinative of what an individual ought to do.  In the end, ascertaining the conditions
under which no one could reasonably deny that a moral obligation exists is a matter of
identifying the existence conditions for both a reason for action and those conditions
under which it would be the all things considered reason for action.
 Sumner (discussing the constitutive elements of a right), pp. 11, 13.51
 Ibid., p. 11.52
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In light of the preceding discussion, the first step in identifying the conditions
under which no one could reasonably deny that a moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention exists involves the identification of the conditions for the existence of such a
moral obligation as a reason for action.  As with any obligation, what must be first
understood is what it is an obligation to – what is the content of the obligation?   Is it an51
obligation to do something, or to refrain from doing something?  Second, one must
determine the scope of the obligation.  Much like the scope of a right, the scope of an
obligation “consists of the class of things whose normative positions are stipulated by the
[obligation].”   Who are the bearers of the obligation and to whom is the obligation52
owed?  In identifying the content and scope of an obligation we will have identified the
normative relationship that exists between the obligation bearers and those to whom the
obligation is owed.   
In addition, an obligation is supposed to play a particular role in our practical
deliberations.  In many instances our obligations may contradict one another, or be met by
countervailing reasons which direct us to act against the obligation.  Thus, it is also
important to understand the nature and strength of the obligation in question.  The nature
and strength of the obligation will depend on the basis for and content of the obligation. 
For example, an individual might make two promises.  The first is a promise to meet
someone for lunch at a particular time, and the other is an oath to serve the community as
a firefighter.  The time arrives for the lunch date, but at the exact same time a fire is
raging and the individual is called to fight the fire.  Though both obligations are
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promissory the content of the promise to the community to fight fires outweighs the
content of the promise to meet someone for lunch.
The basis for the obligation can also have a determinative effect on the nature and
strength of the obligation.  Take, for example, an obligation to refrain from stealing.  One
can have an obligation to refrain from stealing that has both a moral and a legal basis. 
The obligations have the same content.  They both demand that one not steal; however, in
weighing the various reasons for action the legal obligation could be defeated by either
moral or non-moral countervailing reasons, but the moral obligation could only be
defeated by morally weightier countervailing reasons.  
After identifying the existence conditions for a moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention as a reason for action, I will identify the circumstances under which the
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention would be an all-things-considered reason
for action.  In identifying those circumstances I evaluate and incorporate relevant aspects
of various objections to the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention discussed in
Chapter 2.  Specifically, I will seek to identify the concerns underlying such objections
which could serve as bases for the reasonable rejection of the moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention, and incorporate such objections into the conditions which
must be met for the obligation to be an all-things-considered reason for action. 
Lastly in Chapter 3, with the conditions under which no one could reasonably
deny that an obligation of humanitarian intervention exists identified, I will assess
whether the circumstances of the Rwandan genocide fulfilled such conditions and thus
gave rise to a moral obligation to intervene.  I argue that the circumstances of the
Rwandan genocide fulfilled those conditions, and was a paradigm case for the obligation
 Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid refer to this as the “normative context of53
international relations.”  See, Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, “Introduction”,
from, Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, Ethics and Foreign Intervention
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 4.
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of humanitarian intervention. 
1.4.3 Chapter 4 – The Normative Framework of International Relations Operative in
1994: A Critical Assessment
In Chapter 4, I turn to the second component of my project, the normative
framework of international relations.  The normative framework of international relations
is that set of rules that governs the practical deliberations of states in their deliberations
about what actions they ought to take when acting in the international arena.   Its  use53
determines what reasons are relevant for consideration by states and the international
community. 
It is through the application of the normative framework of international relations
that states arrive at their all things considered “ought” judgments.  It is through our
understanding of the practical deliberations of states that we will understand why the
international community chose not to intervene in Rwanda.  The international community
and the individual states of which it is comprised may have failed to deliberate about
Rwanda.  Assuming the accounts provided by Gourevitch, Powers, and Dallaire are
accurate, it is clear that some deliberation occurred.  Even if such deliberation had not
occurred, this would not undermine the claim that intervention should have occurred. 
Rather, it would be an additional failure of the international community, not an objection
to the claim that the normative framework of international relations operative in 1994 was
flawed.  Second, the international community may have determined that it ought to
intervene, but chose not to against its, collective, better judgment.  Again, the historical
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facts of the matter belie such an explanation.
 Lastly, the practical deliberations of individual states and the international
community may have been flawed.  Inappropriate weight may have been given to the
reasons relevant to the deliberations, or the very structure of the reasoning may have been
flawed.  Both possibilities seem to have occurred, but I will focus on the latter as it was
likely a cause of the former.  I will provide a descriptive account of the normative
framework of international relations operative in 1994, and an explanation of how the
application of that framework led to the decision by the international community not to
intervene in Rwanda.  I will then critically assess the various arguments that might be
offered in defense of the normative framework, so understood.
 Two aspects of the normative framework of international relations operative in
1994 are relevant to the critical assessment and must be understood for this critical
project to begin.  Specifically, one must have an understanding of the structure of the
framework, and the implications that structure had for the reasons relevant to the practical
deliberations of states at the time.  Discussion of the implications will occur throughout;
however, with regard to the structure, there are at least two questions that must be
addressed.  What is the scope of the framework?  And, what are the substantive rules and
presumptions governing the framework? 
The scope of the normative framework of international relations operative in 1994
was limited to those political institutions that possessed sovereignty.  This understanding
of the scope of the normative framework of international relations has its historical
 Janis, p. 157.  See also Treaties of Peace Between Sweden and the Holy Roman54
Empire and Between France and the Holy Roman Empire (Peace of Westphalia, October
14, 1648), 1 C.T.S. 119-356.
 U.N. Charter art.2, para. 1.  See also Declaration on Principles of International55
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970.
 See, Beitz, pp. 36-37.56
 Janis, pp. 157, 159-160.  See also Beitz, pp. 65-66.57
 See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical58
Illustrations, 3  Ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000) (that the right of a people to self-rd
determination is protected by the right of nonintervention), pp. 87-91.  See also, Mill, “A
Few Words on Nonintervention,” Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. III (London:
Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1867).  Alternative versions are identified by
Michael J. Smith and Stanley Hoffmann.  See Michael J. Smith, “Humanitarian
Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues” from, Joel H. Rosenthal, ed., Ethics &
International Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999), p. 274;
and see Stanley Hoffmann, “Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention” from, Stanley
Hoffmann, ed., The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 23.
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origins in the Treaty of Westphalia,  and is currently acknowledged in numerous54
instruments of international law.   The claim of the normative realist, who contends that55
international relations is like a Hobbesian state of nature, is dependent on this
understanding of the scope of the normative framework of international relations.  56
With regards to the substantive rules and presumptions governing the normative
framework of international relations operative in 1994, sovereign states were (and to a
great extent are) presumed to have a right of nonintervention.   This means that states57
have a protected liberty to deal with their internal affairs as they see fit.  There are at least
four types of justificatory arguments proffered in support of the right of nonintervention:
that the right is implied by the possession of sovereignty; that the right is instrumental to
the provision and protection of other rights;  that the right is based upon the principle of58
 See S. I. Benn and R. I. Peters, The Principles of Political Thought: Social59
Principles and the Democratic State (New York: Free Press, 1965) (right of
nonintervention based upon a Millian understanding of the value of autonomy), pp. 429-
431.  And see R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 345. 
 See Benn and Peters (analogy between the principle of anti-paternalism for60
individuals, and a principle of anti-paternalism for states in the international arena), p.
431.  See also William Hall, International Law (analogy between individuals and states);
and see Jovan Babic, “Foreign Armed Intervention: Between Justified Aid and Illegal
Violence” from Alexander Jokic, ed., Humanitarian Intervention: Moral and
Philosophical Issues (Petersborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003) (aggregative
version), pp. 45-70.
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autonomy;  that the right is based on principle of anti-paternalism.59 60
Each of these arguments claim, at the very least, to justify a strong presumption
against intervention.  The presumption is rebuttable if, but only if, the actions of a state
are a threat to international peace and security.  Intervention to alleviate a humanitarian
crisis may be permitted under this rule, but not because of the humanitarian crisis itself. 
Rather intervention would be allowed if the humanitarian crisis posed a sufficient threat
to international peace and security.  The violation of human rights is only a contingent
matter in such circumstances.  Thus, the effect of the right of nonintervention is to
preclude from consideration moral reasons for action that are based on
humanitarian/moral concerns internal to another state.
Lastly, I offer a critical assessment of the normative framework of international
relations operative in 1994.  With regard to the scope, the claim that only sovereign states
are the subjects of and actors in the framework can be understood in both descriptive and
normative terms.  It may be claimed that, as a matter of fact, sovereign states are the only
relevant actors within and subjects of the normative framework of international relations. 
This claim fails.  As Charles Beitz has pointed out, there are “coalitions [of states],
 Beitz, pp. 36-40.61
 I have found David Luban’s discussion of the nature of sovereignty very62
illuminating, although I believe that he and I take different tacks in our criticism of the
traditional legalist understanding of sovereignty and its anti-cosmopolitan basis.  See
David Luban, “The Romance of the Nation-State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 9,
No. 4 (Summer, 1980), pp. 392-397.  See also David Luban, “Just War and Human
Rights” reprinted in Charles R. Beitz, et. al., A Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader:
International Ethics, pp. 199-202.
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alliances [between states] and secondary associations” such as nongovernmental
organizations that are treated as actors in international relations.  61
It may, however, be argued that the scope of the normative framework of
international relations ought to be limited to sovereign states.  One such argument would
be that international relations, and by implication the normative framework of
international relations, should only be concerned with the provision and protection of
international peace and security, and that a necessary means to the provision and
protection of international peace and security is that international relations be limited to
sovereign states.  Thus, it ought to be the case that the scope of the normative framework
of international relations is limited to sovereign states.
That sovereignty was intended to be a means of achieving certain goals of
international relations, specifically, international peace and security seems to be
historically correct.  I disagree, however, with the contention that sovereignty as the
defining characteristic of the scope of the normative framework of international relations
is either necessary or sufficient for the provision and protection of international peace and
security.   Nor do I agree with the underlying contention that international peace and62
security is the only concern of international relations.  Sovereignty does not, in and of
itself, entail that states and only states are the subjects of, and actors in, the normative
 It is at this juncture that I part ways with Luban.  He contends that “we should63
be able to define jus ad bellum directly in terms of human rights, without the needless
detour of talk about states.”  Luban, “Just War and Human Rights,” p. 201.  Luban seems
to render states irrelevant if they fail the test of legitimacy.  Though I do not necessarily
disagree with Luban, I am not so sure that one needs to make such a strong claim to
demonstrate the weakness of our current understanding of state sovereignty and the right
of nonintervention.  
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framework of international relations. 
I turn next to the right of nonintervention and the supposed rule against
intervention for humanitarian reasons to which the right of nonintervention is taken to
give rise.  Some contend that the right of nonintervention is implied by the possession of
sovereignty.  As a consequence, it is claimed that sovereign states enjoy the right of
nonintervention.  I argue that the relationship between sovereignty and the right of
nonintervention is not an inherent and necessary logical implication, but rather is the
result of legal or conventional design intended to effect or is justified by its instrumental
value in effecting particular purposes.63
I then critically assess various arguments offered as justifications for the right of
nonintervention that do not rely on the claimed intrinsic relationship between sovereignty
and the right of nonintervention.  I contend that only the instrumental justification
succeeds, but that it does not give rise to a rule against humanitarian intervention.  Rather,
the rule governing humanitarian intervention must be based on the degree to which
adhering to the demands of the right would protect international peace and security, and
that it is merely one consideration among many to be weighed in the deliberations of a
state when determining whether to intervene in the internal affairs of another state. 
Perhaps most important to my project, I contend that it does not preclude from
consideration reasons for intervention based on moral obligations borne by states and
 Powers, pp. 460-473.64
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owed to individuals.
1.4.4 Chapter 5 - A Reconstruction of the Normative Framework of International
Relations 
In Chapter 5, I offer a reconstruction of the normative framework of international
relations.  The reconstructed version of the framework will build upon the discussion in
Chapter 4 of the criticisms levied against the normative framework of international
relations operative in 1994.  Under the reconstructed account neither sovereignty nor the
right of nonintervention stand as a bar against the inclusion of moral obligations owed to
individuals in the practical deliberations of states and the international community.
Even assuming that the critical assessment of the normative framework of
international relations operative in 1994 offered in Chapter 4 is valid and the
reconstructed version of the framework is generally correct, it might be argued that under
the reconstructed account the choice not to intervene in Rwanda was permissible or even
that the international community ought all things considered to not have intervened. 
There are a number of concerns that many would claim made nonintervention, at the very
least, permissible.  Samantha Powers identified at least three concerns raised by those in
the international community opposed to intervention – futility, perversity, and perfidy.64
The concern over futility is straightforward.  Intervening in the internal affairs of
another state to alleviate a humanitarian crisis may be futile.  The concern over perversity
is based upon the claim that an intervention may produce more suffering and human
rights violations than it would prevent.  Finally, as to the concern over perfidy, it has been
contended that disgruntled minorities might provoke a state to use violence so that they,
 It is important to note that I am assuming a Razian account of practical65
reasoning. Under the classical account, we are balancing reasons of the same order
against one another.  Under the Razian account, there are first order reasons for and
against the performance of an action, but there are also second-order exclusionary
reasons.  Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), pp. 35-42.  Second-order exclusionary reasons are reasons for excluding certain
first-order reasons.  Raz, pp. 35-40.
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the minority, could entice an intervention to aid in their cause.
In Chapter 5, I will explain the role such concerns play in the practical
deliberations of states and the international community.  They are reasons against
intervention to be weighed against the reasons for intervention.  They do not, however,
preclude interventions in all cases.  I shall demonstrate below that the nature of the
reasons for intervention, when given their proper due in the reconstructed version of the
normative framework of international relations and weighed against the countervailing
reasons against intervention, render the choice not to intervene in Rwanda unjustified.65
1.4.5 Chapter 6 - Conclusion: An All Things Considered Obligation to 
Intervene in Rwanda
The purposes of Chapter 6 are quite simple and straightforward.  First, I provide
an account of what has been accomplished with regard to our understanding of the role
international morality, and specifically the obligation of humanitarian intervention,
should have played in the deliberations of the international community over what to do
about the genocide in Rwanda.  In addition, Chapter 6 also includes an assessment of the
possible implications this project has for international morality and international relations
more generally. 
1.5 Conclusion
In summary, my hypothesis is that the international community, as a collection of
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duty-bearing states, ought to have intervened to prevent or halt the genocide in Rwanda. 
This all things considered ought judgment is based upon the duty we bear, individually
and collectively, to protect each individual’s basic right to security.  In the case of the
Rwandan genocide, fulfillment of this duty required that the international community
intervene to prevent or stop the genocide and the circumstances were such that there was
an obligation to do so.  The normative framework of international relations should have
allowed states to take such moral obligations into consideration, but did not.  As a result,
while the international community stood idly by, the Hutu extremists were allowed to
slaughter hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women, and children. 
 Stephen A. Garrett, Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of66
Humanitarian Intervention (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1999), p. 1.
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CHAPTER 2 – THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
2.1 Introduction
Are there any circumstances under which humanitarian intervention is an all
things considered moral obligation?  Normatively prior to any such obligation, however,
is permissibility.  If humanitarian intervention is not morally permissible, then the
discussion of obligation is moot.  In this chapter I will focus on the debate over the moral
permissibility of humanitarian intervention.  The identification and explication of various
objections to the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention serves two purposes: 
1. To provide background information for the succeeding discussion; and 
2. To identify the relevant aspects of various objections to be incorporated
in the identification of the conditions under which no one could reasonably
deny that an obligation of humanitarian intervention exists.
What do I mean by humanitarian intervention?  As Stephen A. Garret has pointed
out, 
The terms “humanitarian” and “intervention” are typically embued
with such a variety of nuances and differing interpretations that to
join them together into a single concept almost inevitably produces
ambiguity and perhaps even tension, especially since both words
inherently carry a lot of emotional baggage.66
For the purpose of my project, I will accept a definition offered by J. L. Holzgrefe.
Humanitarian intervention is
the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave
violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other
than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within
 J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” from Holzgrefe and67
Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, p. 18.
 Roger D. Spegele, Political Realism in International Theory (Cambridge:68
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 19.
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whose territory force is applied.67
It is important to note that the definition offered does not require that the only motivation
for intervention is humanitarian.  It would be disingenuous, however, to call an
intervention humanitarian if humanitarian considerations were not determinative of the
choice to intervene. 
2.2 Skepticism Over International Morality
One additional matter that must be addressed before I can turn my attention to the
current state of the debate over the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention is
skepticism over the possibility of international morality.  Such skeptical arguments rest
on the proposition that morality doesn’t apply (normatively or descriptively) to states or
the international community, or at least not in the same way it does to individuals.  If such
arguments are correct, then discussion of the moral permissibility of humanitarian
intervention is chimerical.  I need not, nor do I intend to, demonstrate that such arguments
are flawed; I need only demonstrate that such arguments do not preclude the possibility of
an international morality.
2.2.1 Descriptive Political Realism
The descriptive political realist is the most skeptical over the relevance of
international morality to international relations.  The skepticism of the political realist is
based on the proposition that all forms of prescriptive normative theory are inapplicable
to the relations between states.   The philosophical foundations for descriptive political68
 Thucydides, pp. 400-408.  See also Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International69
Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.
53-54.
 Morgenthau, p. 5.  See also Frost, p. 53.70
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realism are found in Thucydides’ “Melian Dialogue” where it is claimed that the relations
between states are defined by each state’s desire for power and promotion of its self-
interest.  It is the hierarchical relations of power that determine what will or will not
happen in the international arena.   Thus, according to the descriptive political realist,69
international relations is a descriptive enterprise that should be focused on understanding
these power relationships and the behavior they cause and ought not be concerned with
what states ought or ought not do.  70
Since the skepticism of the descriptive realist is based upon the claim that
normative theory is irrelevant to understanding international relations, if states are
capable of acting on the outcomes of practical deliberation which are normative
judgments, the skepticism fails.  The actual behavior of states in the international arena
would seem to indicate that states can and often do engage in practical deliberation and
act on normative judgments.  The realist bears the burden of explaining why normative
theory is in actuality irrelevant to our understanding of this phenomena.  
It may be claimed that this apparent capacity to act on the outcome of practical
deliberation is nothing more than epiphenomena - the babbling of the brook.  For the
descriptive realist to be correct, however, it must be the case that states are incapable of
doing anything but acting in accordance with the imperatives of power.  Failures to do so
are an indication that states are capable of acting in ways other than in accordance with
such imperatives.  The fact that states do often fail to act according to the imperatives of
 Frost, p. 54 (that Kenneth Waltz argues that international relations is a71
“spontaneous system” beyond the control of individual agents and states).  See also
Morgenthau, p. 245 (that the rejection of normative theory is inevitable).
 Gerald Elfstrom, Ethics for a Shrinking World (New York: St. Martin’s Press,72
1990), (that agents that comprise institutions can change the goals, policies, and actions
of the institution),  p. 31.
See Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2  ed. (New York:73 nd
Wiley, 1963). 
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power undermines the claim of the descriptive realist.  
In addition, for the skepticism of the descriptive realist to be correct, the
imperatives of power must govern the actions of states much like the laws of physics
govern the interactions of physical objects.   However, when we talk about the actions of71
states we are talking about the actions of  governments that control such states, and not
about natural forces.  Governments are comprised of individuals making decisions.   The72
actions of governments are based upon those decisions which involve the weighing and
balancing of reasons for action.  Thus, to the extent that individuals are capable of acting
for reasons, so too are governments.  It may be the case that more often than not states do
act according to the imperatives of power, but they only do so after it has been determined
that this is how they ought to act.  The stringent skepticism of the realist fails to preclude
the possibility of international morality.
It should be noted that what I am arguing for is not a matter of determining
preferences.  The importance of this disclaimer is derived from the strength of Kenneth
Arrow’s “Impossibility Theorem.”   States can act on normative reasons even if such73
reasons are not based on the determination of a social preference.  In addition, Arrow’s
theorem was intended to demonstrate the impossibility of devising a method of
aggregating individual preferences into a social preference.  I am concerned with our
I want to thank Joe Oppenheimer.  His identification of the ambiguity in my74
claim brought to light a potentially troubling confusion.
 Spegele, p. 19.75
 Cohen, p. 319.  See also Gordon Graham, Ethics and International Relations76
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997).
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996),77
Ch. 13, pp. 82-85.
 Ibid., Ch. 14 p. 86-89.78
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moral obligations, not our preferences.  However, if the determination of a preference is
required for an agent to act, and I am not making a claim about whether it is or not, one
might contend that our inability to identify the preference of a state undermines the claim
that states can act and deliberate in ways similar to individuals.   I am not, however,74
making the claim that states act and deliberate like individuals; rather, the decision to act
by a state is made by individuals, and as such, is capable of being influenced by
normative considerations.
2.2.2 Normative Realism
The normative realist concedes that normative theory has an important role to play
in the relations between states.   However, the normative realist argues that, due to the75
fact that international relations is like a Hobbesian state of nature, the demands of
morality are not applicable to states in the international arena.   For Hobbes, the state of76
nature is a pre-societal condition in which the inhabitants are in a constant state of war.  77
Individuals would do better if they would all adhere to the demands of justice; however, it
would be irrational for an individual to act on such demands without assurance that others
would do so as well.   What is needed, according to Hobbes, is a common power to78
 Ibid., Ch. 13, p. 84.79
 Ibid., Ch. 14, pp. 86-89.80
 Ibid., Ch. 14, p. 87.81
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enforce the demands of justice.   Without such a common power each individual’s79
liberty right to self-preservation is paramount.   Thus, the fundamental prescriptive norm80
in the state of nature is prudence, and the demands of justice and morality are
inapplicable until a common power is established that can enforce such demands.81
Since there is no world sovereign to enforce the demands of justice and morality
the international arena is like a Hobbesian state of nature.   As Hobbes notes in his82
discussion of international relations, “The notions of Right and Wrong.  Justice and
Injustice have there no place.  Where there is no Common Power, there is no Law, no
Injustice.  Force and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall Vertues.”  83
Two conditions must be met for the normative realist’s skeptical argument to
succeed.  First, it must be the case that the Hobbesian argument about the role of morality
in the state of nature is correct.  Second, for the analogy to hold it must be the case that
states in the international arena are analogous to individuals in the state of nature.  The
normative realist fails on both accounts.  First, the Hobbesian argument is supposed to
demonstrate either that the demands of justice don’t exist in the state of nature, or that
such demands are perpetually ineffective without the assurance of a common power. 
Regarding the claim that assurance is a necessary condition for the existence of justice,
the possibility that the demands of justice might conflict with the liberty right of self-
 Ibid., Ch. 14, pp. 86-87.84
 Ibid.85
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preservation does not demonstrate that such demands don’t exist.  All that can be claimed
is that self-preservation trumps or outweighs such demands if and when they conflict.
As to the argument that Hobbes has demonstrated the demands of justice to be
perpetually ineffective in the state of nature, this argument is based upon the proposition
that for the demands of justice to be effective one needs to be assured that others will also
adhere to the demands of justice.  For Hobbes, the fundamental right of nature is the right
of self-preservation – “By all means we can, to defend ourselves.”   It is this right that,84
depending on the circumstances, either leads to or trumps the fundamental law of nature,
“to seek Peace, and to follow it.”   For Hobbes, what needs to be assured before the85
demands of justice are practically effective is self-preservation.  If such assurance is
required, for it to be the case that morality is ineffective in the state of nature it must be
the case that such assurance cannot be attained in any instance in which the demands of
justice would arise, and that the only way to have such assurance is through the
establishment and maintenance of a common power.
Regarding the former condition, the assurance required is too demanding.  It is
highly unlikely that even a common power could provide such assurance.  However, if
Hobbes means something less, it does not follow that such lesser assurance could never
be had in the state of nature.  It is certainly possible, and I would contend reasonable, to
expect that on at least one occasion in the state of nature two individuals could meet and
be assured that neither was a threat to the self-preservation of the other.  As to the latter
condition, Hobbes’s argument demonstrates how a common power might be good at
 Beitz, p. 36.86
 Ibid.87
 Ibid., p. 37.88
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delivering the requisite assurance, but Hobbes fails to demonstrate that a common power
is necessary or sufficient for such assurance. 
Lastly, even if the Hobbesian argument regarding the role of justice and morality
in the state of nature is correct, for the skepticism of the normative realist to be correct the
analogy between individuals in the state of nature and states in the international arena
must hold.  Charles Beitz has identified four criteria which must be met for “this analogy
to be acceptable”.   Specifically, Beitz claims that, 86
1. The actors in international relations are states.
2. States have relatively equal power (the weakest can defeat the
strongest).
3. States are independent of each other in the sense that they can
order their internal (i.e., nonsecurity) affairs independently of the
internal policies of other actors.
4. There are no reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance by
the actors with rules of cooperation in the absence of a superior
power capable of enforcing these rules.87
It is important to note that for the analogy to hold it must be the case that as a matter of
fact the four conditions identified by Beitz are met, and not just that they could be met.
Beitz notes that the “radical individualism of Hobbes’s state of nature helps to
make plausible the prediction of a resulting state of war because it denies the existence of
any other actors ... that might mediate interpersonal conflict, coordinate individuals’
actions, insulate individuals from the competition of others, share risks, or encourage the
formation of less competitive attitudes.”   States, however, are not the only actors in the88
 Ibid., p. 37 (that it is obvious that there have been “coalitions, alliances, and89
secondary associations”). 
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international arena; consequently, the first condition is not met.   Beitz points out that the89
second condition, that states “have relatively equal power”, is also unsupported by
empirical facts.   Even the proliferation of nuclear weapons has failed to render the90
power states have sufficiently equal.   Beitz points to the economic interdependence of91
states to demonstrate how the third condition is not fulfilled, and specifically to how the
domestic economy of one state can be drastically affected by the domestic economic and
political affairs of another state.    Lastly, regarding the condition that there must be “no92
reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance by the actors with rules of cooperation in
the absence of a superior power capable of enforcing these rules,” Beitz notes that
international relations are “characterized by high degrees of voluntary compliance with
customary norms and institutionalized rules.”   Such compliance and the expectations93
that underlie it are had without a common power.  The skeptical argument of the
normative realist fails. 
2.2.3 The Humeian Objection
Justice for Hume is instrumental and conventional.   Like Hobbes, Hume94
 Hume, A Treatise 3.2.3, p. 322.  See also Hume, An Enquiry Section III, pp. 18,95
19 (that there is no justice in a society of ruffians).
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contends that there is no justice or injustice in the state of nature.   However, for Hume,95
justice does not require a sovereign or common power, rather justice requires a
conventional agreement providing protection for private property, and the stability of
possessions.   The agreement is binding because having such stability of possessions is96
better for everyone involved.   97
It is not clear whether Hume intends his argument to be about the existence
conditions for justice or an argument about the necessary conditions for justice to be
applicable.  If the former the following must be true.  First, it must be the case that justice
does not arise unless there exists the stability of possessions.  Second, that such stability
can only be attained through conventional agreement.  It is not clear that Hume has
provided the necessary support for either proposition.  Even if Hume is correct, Hume’s
argument only applies to distributive justice.  Thus, it remains to be demonstrated either
that distributive justice exhausts the domain of justice or that the existence of justice as it
relates to the harm to or help owed to others is dependent on a similar conventional
agreement.
On the other hand, Hume states, “[b]y rendering justice totally useless, you
thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation on mankind.”   This is a98
claim about the practical effectiveness of justice, and not whether it exists.  The claim
must be that for justice and the moral demands it makes to be applicable, there must be a
 Hume, A Treatise 3.2.11, pp. 362-364.  See also Cohen, pp. 329-331.99
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convention which provides for the stability of possessions.  At best, Hume has
demonstrated that distributive justice requires a conventional basis: he has not, however,
demonstrated that distributive justice exhausts justice.  He has also failed to argue that we
are morally permitted to harm others or not help them unless there is a conventional
agreement to the contrary.  It may be the case that having a convention makes it more
likely that individuals will respect justice and the moral demands it makes, but it is not
clear that a conventional agreement is necessary for justice to be applicable.
Hume, however, denies that the international arena is like a Hobbesian state of
nature.  Rather, Hume contends that the international arena is a society governed by a set
of conventional rules.   However, as Marshall Cohen points out, Hume contends that the99
moral demands implied by justice that apply in international morality are weaker.  100
Specifically, Cohen states, 
Since the mutual interest in abiding by the fundamental rules of
justice is weaker, the moral obligation arising from it must partake
of this weakness and we must necessarily give greater indulgence
of a prince or minister who deceives another than to a private
gentleman who breaks his word of honor.101
Hume allows for international morality.  However, as Hume’s understanding of justice is
conventional, the scope of justice under Hume’s understanding is determined by the
convention upon which justice is based.  Justice in the international arena, according to
Hume, is based upon a conventional agreement amongst sovereigns.  Even if Hume is
correct in claiming that justice in the international arena is not as stringent as in domestic
 Teson, p. 95.102
 In this particular case, international law is intended to provide international103
peace and security. It is claimed that such goals are best served by a prohibition on
intervention.  See Smith, p. 274.
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society, this fails to preclude the possibility of an international morality.  
2.3 The Debate Over Humanitarian Intervention
Returning to the question whether humanitarian intervention is ever morally
justified, the noninterventionist argues that there are moral considerations that weigh
decisively against intervention.  This is not to say that noninterventionists deny that an
injustice is being done, nor do they claim that no action should be taken.  Rather, the
contention is that even if an injustice that demands action is occurring, military
intervention is impermissible.  102
In the discussion that follows I will address and outline a number of
noninterventionist objections and arguments.  Though I do not answer these arguments I
do explain why I take certain objections and their underlying arguments to be irrelevant to
the debate over the moral justifiability of humanitarian intervention.  
2.3.1 The Obligation to Obey International Law as an 
Objection to Humanitarian Intervention
It is claimed by some that states have a legal obligation to refrain from interfering
in the internal affairs of other states, and since there is a moral obligation to obey the law,
there is an obligation to refrain from humanitarian intervention.  There are three distinct
arguments upon which this contention may rely.  I will deal with two of these arguments
in this section, and bracket a discussion of the third argument until later as it is an
instrumental argument, and I will discuss such arguments below.  103
 Teson, p. 111.104
 See Leslie Green, "Legal Obligation and Authority", The Stanford105
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
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H.L.A. Hart, “Legal and Moral Obligation,” in A.I. Melden, ed., Essays in Moral
Philosophy. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), pp. 82-107; and see Hart,
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discussed in greater detail below.  However, it should suffice for my present purposes to
note that such reasons preclude the consideration of other reasons.  More importantly, the
reasons precluded may be, in isolation from the exclusionary reason, relevant to the
practical issue being decided.
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The first argument is one alluded to by Fernando Teson, but not fully explored in
his discussion.   The argument is based on the claim of certain legal positivists that there104
is an inherent obligation borne by the subjects of a system of laws to obey the laws of that
system.   It is important to note that the positivist argument with which I am presently105
concerned is but one positivist account, as understood by Teson, amongst many.  The
obligation to obey in this instance is not a moral obligation, but an explicitly legal one. 
The legal obligation is a second-order exclusionary reason.   More importantly, it is106
claimed that legal obligations are content-independent and that “they require the subject
to set aside his own view of the merits and comply nonetheless.”   In the case of107
humanitarian intervention, it is contended that international law prohibits humanitarian
intervention, and from this it is concluded that states should abide by the legal demand
that they not intervene for humanitarian reasons rather than consider each case on its own
merits.
There are a number of problems with this argument.  First, as Leslie Green points
out, that legal obligations should supplant the reasoning of the subjects of the law is a
 Ibid., p. 3.108
 Teson, p. 111.109
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claim of the law.   But, is the claim justified?  To answer this question one must engage108
in an evaluation of the merits of the law’s claim that it ought to be followed simply
because it is the law.  In so doing, one evaluates the underlying substantive bases for the
law’s claimed authority, thus undermining the claimed content-independence of legal
obligations.  If the positivist is correct, and legal obligations are pre-emptive, it is a
descriptive fact about existing law.  The question of the moral justifiability of
humanitarian intervention is left unaddressed.  Humanitarian intervention is only
contingently legally impermissible.  If the law were otherwise, then humanitarian
intervention might be permissible.  If, in particular cases, there is a moral obligation to
intervene for humanitarian reasons then perhaps the law should be changed.   109
Lastly, the argument requires that the law is clear on the matter of humanitarian
intervention.  This is far from the truth.  Looking first to treaty law as a source of
international law, though the U.N. Charter and other instruments of international law
express a prohibition on intervention, many other treaties and conventions – the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide – emphasize the importance of human rights and expressly permit
action for humanitarian reasons.
The second argument is based upon the claim that states have a moral obligation
to obey international law and that international law prohibits such intervention.  As Teson
notes, this argument “locates the obligation to obey the law outside international law
itself: there is a moral reason to comply with international law where doing so leads to
 Ibid., pp. 108-109.110
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sometimes undesirable or even immoral outcomes.”   Here the moral obligation to obey110
the law is grounded in political authority and political obligation.  
Thus, the question becomes, are states obligated to obey international law as a
matter of political obligation?  One might contend that states are under such obligations
in much the same way an individual in domestic society might be.  The most widely
discussed theories of political obligation come in two forms – non-voluntarist and
voluntarist theories.   The non-voluntarist theories share one common feature that111
makes them an unlikely source of political obligations for states in the international arena. 
As Green notes, “[a] theory of political obligation is non-voluntarist if its principles
justifying legal authority do not invoke the choice or will of the subjects among its
reasons for thinking they are bound to obey.”   International law is grounded in the112
express or tacit consent of states – the laws themselves depend for their existence on
specific consent to the demands of particular laws or the expression of such consent
through the treatment of custom and practice as law.  For this reason I will not discuss
non-voluntarist arguments further.
Alternatively, voluntarist theories are based on the proposition that political
obligations could be grounded in the subjects’ voluntary assumption of such obligations. 
Two of the most prominent theories are the consent theories of Hobbes  and Locke.  113 114
 H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” The Philosophical Review, Vol.115
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The common feature of such theories is that the subject agrees to give up its rights to a
sovereign for regulation and adjudication.  It is this aspect of consent theory that renders
it inapplicable for international law.  There is no such sovereign of the appropriate sort in
international law.  
A more promising approach would be one based upon H.L.A. Hart’s claim that
“when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus
restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a
right to a similar submission from those who have benefitted by their submission.”   As115
Leslie Green points out, however, this is not enough to give rise to an obligation, for it
may be the case that the beneficiary was either an unwilling beneficiary or unaware of the
enterprise, in which case it would be unreasonable to require that the beneficiary
contribute to or adhere to the rules of the enterprise.   For this reason, Green notes that116
such benefits must be accepted if they are to give rise to an obligation.
I will assume that states in the international arena are engaged in a joint enterprise
governed by rules, that the enterprise provides states with benefits that they accept, and
that one of the rules governing the enterprise is a prohibition on intervention.  For the
sake of argument, I am ignoring the changing and ever-evolving character of the “they”
who are members of the enterprise.   I am seeking to present the argument in its117
strongest form.  In so doing, I hope that my criticisms carry greater weight.  Even making
such assumptions, the argument still fails to demonstrate that intervention for
-45-
humanitarian reasons is morally impermissible.  Even if states do bear political
obligations to adhere to the demands of international law as a matter of fairness, this
again assumes that the law on humanitarian intervention is clear.  Second, fairness would
only seem to demand adherence to those rules related to the benefit provided.  The
ostensible benefit provided by international law is international order.  At first glance, it
may seem that nonintervention is related to the provision of international order; however,
if we assume that one of the reasons for seeking international order is that it is necessary
for individuals to enjoy their human rights or that international order is instrumental to
human flourishing, refraining from intervening in cases where mass violations of basic
human rights are occurring would undermine, not promote, those goals.
Third, unlike the positivist argument discussed above, the political obligation
from fairness is but one moral obligation amongst many.  It does not supplant the agent’s
evaluation of the merits of the case; rather the moral obligation to obey the law is merely
an additional moral obligation to be taken into consideration by the agent in its practical
deliberations.  For it to be the case that such an obligation renders intervention for
humanitarian reasons morally impermissible, it must be the case that such obligations
exhaust the moral space, or that they always outweigh other competing moral obligations. 
It is doubtful that obligations of fairness that arise between states exhaust the relevant
moral space especially when it comes to the treatment of individuals.  Such an obligation
does not preclude from consideration countervailing moral considerations weighing in
favor of humanitarian intervention.  
In addition, the strength of the obligation to which the principle of fairness gives
rise must depend on the value of the purpose or goal of the enterprise.  A conspiracy to
 See James Rachels, The Elements of Philosophy, 3  Ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill118 rd
College, 1999), pp. 22-25.  See also Chris Gowans, "Moral Relativism", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
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commit murder may provide each member of the conspiracy with some obligation owed
to others in the conspiracy who have already carried out their obligations according to the
rules of the conspiracy, but the strength of that obligation is weakened by the very
purpose of the enterprise.  So, even if we assume that international order is the benefit to
be provided by international law, the strength of the obligation to obey the law will
depend on the value of promoting international order in any particular instance. 
In the end, we can concede that states can have political obligations, and that they
are demands of fairness; yet it is not the case that such demands render intervention for
humanitarian reasons morally impermissible.  The question of the moral permissibility of
humanitarian intervention can not be circumvented by arguments in support of the claim
that there is a legal obligation borne by states to obey international law.  
2.3.2 Relativism, Communitarianism, and the Instrumental Argument as Objections to
the Moral Justifiability of Humanitarian Intervention. 
I turn now to an explication of the relativist, communitarian, and instrumental
objections to the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention.  The relevant notion
of relativism is based upon the proposition that there are no moral principles accepted by
all cultures (cultural relativism), and the further proposition that the validity of moral
claims is dependent on cultural acceptance.   From these two premises the relativist118
concludes that there are no universal moral principles, and that morality is simply what
the relevant society or culture says is right or wrong, good or bad.  
The relativist objection would run as follows: The rationale underlying
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humanitarian intervention involves an external moral judgment about the immoral or
unjust nature of certain internal practices being engaged in by a state or society. 
Therefore, to be morally justified, humanitarian intervention requires that the moral
judgment be based on moral principles that are culturally neutral.  This condition could be
fulfilled by principles that are based on an overlapping consensus, or it could be fulfilled
by principles that are universally valid.  According to the moral relativist, however,
cultural relativism is true, and there is no overlapping consensus upon which culturally
neutral principles could be found.  Validity for the relativist depends on cultural
acceptance; consequently, if there is no overlapping consensus, the possibility of
universal validity is precluded.  As a consequence, there is no possibility of a moral
justification for humanitarian intervention.
There are numerous reasons for rejecting the claims of the moral relativist.  First,
the implications of the relativist argument are uninviting.  There would be no basis for
cross-cultural dialogue about the morality of particular practices.  More importantly, there
would be no basis for moral judgment regarding violations of individual freedom and
security, provided the underlying practices are culturally accepted.  For example, if the
slavery of a minority is culturally accepted, or the culture accepts forced female genital
mutilation of twelve year old girls, then those practices are beyond moral reproach both
internally and externally.  More pertinent to this project, it seems absurd to think that
cultural acceptance could make genocide moral.
There are also numerous conceptual problems with moral relativism, many of
which the reader is no doubt familiar.  Here I will mention only one – What is required
for cultural acceptance?  It can’t be enough that the practices engaged in by the state,
 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University119
Press, 1994), pp. 56-57.
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and/or the empowered are not met with open resistance.  If that were the case, a brutal
dictator with a small but efficient military could terrorize a people into submission
through violent oppression, and such coercive actions would morally justify themselves. 
But what counts?  A bare majority of the population?  A consensus?  In a pluralist society
is a single individual’s choice of what is moral or immoral, right or wrong, sufficient?
Does the acceptance have to be informed or rational?  At the very least, it would seem to
be necessary that all affected by the practice are informed, uncoerced, and maintain an
internal perspective with regards to the practice – meaning that they acknowledge the
rightness of the practice and that they would criticize others for not adhering to the
practice.119
In addition, both premises upon which the moral relativist objection is based are
open to criticism.  Cultural relativism is not uncontroversial.  Some point to the fact that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed without a single dissenting vote. 
Others claim that the relativist position is often raised by those in power who benefit from
the very practices being scrutinized, and that there is much greater consensus than the
oppressors would have us believe.  Lastly, cultural relativism is an empirical claim about
the comparative situation of various moral codes throughout the world.  If overlap
between those codes exists then cultural relativism fails to preclude shared moral beliefs.
The second premise is also highly suspect.  It is a claim about the nature of
morality and justice.  Unlike cultural relativism which is either true as a matter of
descriptive fact or it is not, the claim that moral validity depends on cultural acceptance
 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Massachusetts:120
Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 191-197.  A more detailed explication of my use of
reasonable rejection to will be provided in the succeeding chapters.
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requires an argument.  Simply relying on the descriptive fact of cultural relativism,
assuming it is true, is not enough.  The argument for the second premise must
demonstrate that the truth of a theory or explanation relies on the acceptance of the
culture in which the theory or explanation is proposed.  We would never accept such a
claim in the sciences.  For example, string theory is either true or it is not.  Neither
agreement nor disagreement on its validity settles the issue.  
The relativist might object that science provides us with a method for determining
the truth or falsity of the claims made by those in the field, but that there is no such
analog in ethics.  Such a claim, however, would rely on the very conclusion the relativist
is seeking to prove – that there are no universal moral truths, only culturally valid moral
truths, and thus no possibility of cross-cultural criticism and dialogue.  It is through the
proffering, criticism, and defense of moral judgments that we test our moral judgments. 
The relativist cannot rely on the truth of relativism to prove the truth of an underlying
premise.
But what can we learn from relativism?  There is diversity and disagreement
amongst the moral codes of the world.  The fact that such disagreement exists is relevant
because it raises doubts about the correctness of our moral judgments.  However, it would
be impractical and inappropriate to require certainty in such matters.  Rather, in cases of
disagreement over a moral principle or its application we should test its validity by
assessing whether anyone could reasonably reject the principle at issue.   In the end, I120
believe this will provide an account of what Michael Walzer has called “thin” morality –
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the moral minimum that we owe to one another.   121
Turning now to the communitarian objection, there are a variety of communitarian
arguments, but they share at least two things in common.  Communitarians contend that
the emphasis of liberal theorists on individual liberty as the paramount moral and political
concern is misplaced, and that the value of community and communal rights should be
given greater weight in our moral and political reasoning.    The second shared122
characteristic is that the value of community is based upon the claim that community is
necessary to individual human flourishing.123
Michael Walzer contends that the “state is presumptively, though by no means
always in practice, the arena within which self determination is worked out and from
which, therefore, foreign armies have to be excluded.”   The underlying argument124
offered to justify the presumption is based upon Walzer’s contention that individuals have
a right to develop or determine the community in which they live,  and that for the125
purposes of international relations the state should be presumed to fit with the community
 Ibid., p. 228.126
 Ibid., p. 212.127
 Ibid.128
 Ibid.129
 Ibid., p. 214.130
 Ibid., pp. 216-218.131
-51-
and thus be a result of the exercise of the rights of individuals.   The presumption of fit126
between the state and the community is justified, according to Walzer, because foreigners
have “no direct experience” of the development of the community.   Walzer further127
contends that this presumption leads to another which also weighs against intervention –
that if an intervention were attempted those residing in the state would feel obligated to
defend the state.128
As Walzer admits, his argument fails to support an absolute prohibition on
humanitarian intervention.   If I was not so concerned with explaining the deficiencies129
in his argument, I might agree with much of Walzer’s conclusion.  Humanitarian
intervention is impermissible, according to Walzer, due to the presumptive fit between
the people as a community and the government.  If there is no fit then intervention for
humanitarian reasons could be morally permissible.  However, since we in the outside
world don’t have “direct experience” of the cultural, moral and historical development of
the community we must presume that such fit exists unless it is “radically apparent” that
it does not.   For Walzer, such a lack of fit is radically apparent when any one of his130
three “rules of disregard” are applicable.   Most relevant to the debate over humanitarian131
intervention is Walzer’s rule that “interventions can be justified whenever a government
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is engaged in the massacre or enslavement of its own citizens or subjects.”  132
David Luban has pointed out many of the gaps in and flaws of Walzer’s
reasoning, as well as the problematic nature of many of Walzer’s empirical and historical
assumptions.   For the purposes of the present discussion I would like to focus on133
Luban’s concession to Walzer that “the lack of fit between government and people should
be ‘radically apparent’ to justify intervening, because intervention based on misperception
is horribly wrong.”  134
Walzer and Luban agree that community is important, and that if there does exist
a fit between the individuals as a community and the government that this is at least a
weighty, if not pre-emptive, reason weighing against intervention.  They further agree that
the lack of fit which might permit humanitarian intervention has to be known to a great
degree of certainty.  
Walzer and Luban disagree, however, over Walzer’s epistemic justification for the
presumption that the requisite fit exists between the community and the government. 
Walzer contends that the international community must presume the fit exists.  Luban
accepts that in some circumstances under which we do not have access to information
about a particular community and its relation to its government we should give the
government the benefit of the doubt, but this is not the same as a general presumption that
we are always ignorant.   As Luban points out, in most cases we do have access to the135
 Janis, p. 161 (“that the key actor on the world’s stage was the sovereign state”).136
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information relevant to the determination of fit, thus Walzer’s presumption is unjustified. 
For that reason, whether or not such fit exists should be treated as an open question.
The last objection to the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention that I
would like to address is instrumental in nature.  It is claimed that achieving and
maintaining international peace and security requires a rule against intervention.  To
understand this objection one must first understand what is meant by international peace
and security.  
Understanding international relations as essentially concerned with the relations
between states helps to understand the relevant notions of peace and security.   A broad136
notion of peace could include peace internal to a state.  This understanding of peace,
however, is too broad.  The relevant notion of peace presumes that the only relevant
actors are sovereign states, and threats to the peace, are threats to the peace between states
– “international peace.”  Similarly, international security refers to the security of a state
from aggression or intervention.  A state is secure if other states, individually or
collectively, refrain or are prevented from engaging in either aggressive action toward the
state or intervention into the internal affairs of the state. 
If we understand the goal of international peace and security as essentially
concerned with peace and security between sovereign states, it becomes readily apparent
how a rule of nonintervention may be instrumental to achieving and maintaining
international peace and security.  In light of this understanding of international peace and
security, the instrumental argument such as that found in Kant’s claim that peace between
states requires that “[n]o state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government
 Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace from Immanuel Kant, Practical137
Philosophy, Mary J. Gregor, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.
311-351, p. 319.
 U.N. Charter Ch. I, art.1, para. 1.138
 U.N. Charter Ch. I, art.2, para. 4.139
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of another state”  seems incontrovertible.   Intervention into the internal affairs of137
another state is by its very nature a threat to the peace between and the security of states.
This argument is institutionalized in the Charter of the United Nations.  Article 1
of Chapter I of the Charter identifies as one of the purposes of the United Nations the
maintenance of international peace and security.    Article 2 of that same chapter138
identifies as one of the principles which serves the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security, a rule requiring each state to “refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State” – a rule of nonintervention.  139
There are a number of questions begged by the instrumental argument.  First, are
the only relevant actors in the international arena sovereign states?  If not, then
international peace and security ought not be limited to the peace between and security of
states.  A second question comes from the fact that there are at least two possible
interpretations of the argument, one strong and one weak.  Is the relationship between the
rule of nonintervention and international peace and security one of necessity or one of
efficacy?  The strong claim, which seems to be implied by Kant’s statement, is that
international peace and security is not possible without a rule against intervention.  The
weak claim is that a rule against intervention makes international peace and security more
likely. 
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No matter how we answer the second question there are a number of questions
related to the value of international peace and security.  The rule of nonintervention,
assuming that it is either weakly or strongly instrumental to international peace and
security, is justified by the instrumental role it plays in achieving and maintaining the goal
of international peace and security.  Thus, the value of the rule of nonintervention is
dependent on the value of international peace and security. 
It is unlikely that either the weak or the strong interpretation of the instrumental
argument will support an absolute moral prohibition on humanitarian intervention.  Under
the weak interpretation, there may be instances in which the goal of international peace
and security could be served, or at least not be hindered, by intervention.  Consequently,
if we know that nonintervention will not serve international peace and security in a
particular case and there are other moral considerations weighing in favor of intervention
it would be morally permissible to intervene.  
On the other hand, if the strong interpretation is adopted it needs to be
demonstrated that international peace and security is the paramount moral consideration
in the international arena and /or that it either precludes from consideration all reasons for
intervention or invariably outweighs such considerations.  This is an unlikely proposition
that needs to be defended by the instrumentalist.  It is far more likely that international
peace and security is itself instrumental to other values such as the provision and
protection of human rights, individual human flourishing, and communal rights. The best
that the instrumentalist can hope for is a presumption of nonintervention not a
prohibition.  Nonetheless, what we do learn from the instrumentalist is that there is value
in the state system. 
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2.4 Conclusion
The underlying moral claim of this project is that there are circumstances under
which no one could reasonably deny that a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention
exists.  However, for there to exist a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention it
must be the case that humanitarian intervention is not morally prohibited.  In this chapter
various accounts ranging from the skepticism of the realists to a number of prominent
objections to the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention have been discussed.  I
have endeavored to demonstrate that none of these arguments support the conclusion that
humanitarian intervention is either chimerical or morally prohibited.  I have also sought
to identify those salient features of such objections which will serve as the basis for the
identification of considerations to be taken into account in the next chapter.  Such
features will be employed in the identification of the conditions under which no one could
reasonably deny that a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention exists. 
 Ernest J. Weinrib, “The Case for a Duty to Rescue,” 90 Yale Law Journal 247140
(1980).
 Sumner (discussing the constitutive elements of a right), pp. 11, 13.141
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CHAPTER 3 - THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DEFINED
3.1 Introduction
Having demonstrated that none of the arguments discussed in Chapter 2 show that
humanitarian intervention is morally impermissible, I turn now to the identification of the
conditions under which no one could reasonably deny that a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention exists.  The argument and methodology employed is not unlike
that used by Ernest J. Weinrib in his defense of a duty of easy rescue, wherein Weinrib
sought to demonstrate that under certain circumstances an individual is under a duty to
perform a rescue.140
The strength of this approach is found in the weakness of the principle defended. 
If we are ever to have an all things considered moral obligation to intervene it will be
under the conditions I identify.  If successfully defended, the resultant principle serves at
least two important purposes.   It would have implications for what states can be morally
obligated to do in the international arena.  In addition, it would serve as the gateway for
broadening the debate over humanitarian intervention to include questions of the limits of
the obligation to intervene.
In identifying the conditions under which no one could reasonably deny that a
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention exists, I first identify the constitutive
elements of the moral obligation at issue.  In identifying the constitutive elements of an
obligation one identifies the existence conditions for the obligation in question.   The141
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identification of the constitutive elements is not intended as a set of sufficient conditions
for the existence of an all-things-considered moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention; rather they define the set of conditions sufficient for such an obligation to
exist as a reason for action to be considered in the practical deliberations of states. 
Having delineated the constitutive elements of a moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention and provided a basis for the existence of such an obligation, I shift my focus
to the determination of those additional conditions which may be required if, due to areas
of reasonable disagreement, the obligation of humanitarian intervention is to be an all
things considered moral obligation.  Lastly, there are a number of objections that, though
not raised as objections to the permissibility of humanitarian intervention, could provide
the basis for an objection to a moral obligation to intervene in any particular instance. 
3.2 Why a Standard of Reasonable Deniability      
Before proceeding with a discussion of the constitutive elements of a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention, I think it prudent to discuss why I have chosen to
employ a standard of reasonable deniability.  Before explicating those reasons, it must be
understood that the standard of reasonable deniability has both a weak and a strong
implication for the resolution of a debate over a matter of moral disagreement.  If we
adopt the perspective of an individual defending their position, one need only be sure that
one’s position is not unreasonable.  If this can be accomplished then one need not give up
his position.  This is a burden that is more easily overcome.  However, if one is concerned
with demonstrating that another’s objection to one’s position is unreasonable, one must
demonstrate the unreasonableness of the objection, a much more difficult task.
One might contend that very little is gained by employing a standard of reasonable
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deniability.  Specifically, one might contend that the proposed standard of reasonable
deniability is merely a “stand-in” for a standard of wrongness, and that as a pragmatic
matter there is nothing that distinguishes the one from the other.  There is certainly some
truth to this charge as reasonable deniability is intended to serve as a threshold for the
justified rejection of a position held by another.  Thus, reasonable deniability could be
understood as a standard for determining when we are justified in claiming that another’s
position is wrong.  
There are important differences, however, between a standard of wrongness
simpliciter and a standard of reasonable deniability.  If what we mean by a standard of
wrongness is that the objector is objectively wrong, such a standard requires too much.  I
would certainly agree that if we know the other to be wrong, then we are justified in
rejecting or ignoring their objection.  However, we rarely have such epistemic certainty
about a disputed matter of morality.  Thus, if we were to employ a standard of wrongness
we would not likely ever be justified in rejecting another’s position. 
Reasonable deniability, on the other hand, focuses instead on whether one’s
detractors and/or objectors are entitled to hold the position they do for the reasons they
do.  Such a standard does not require that we discern substantive wrongness to be
justified in rejecting our detractors’ or objectors’ position.  A standard of reasonable
deniability is a matter of rationality, not objective truth.  This should not be confused with
the claim that reasonableness upon which the standard of reasonable deniability is based
is the same as rationality.  I will explain the difference below.  
The fact that a standard of reasonable deniability is broader than a standard of
wrongness does not undermine its strength.  If an individual is not justified, for reasons of
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theoretical rationality or intersubjective justification, in holding the beliefs he / she does,
it seems clear to me that we are justified in rejecting his / her position or objection.  In
other words, if one does not have good reason for believing  X or for believing certain
implications one takes X to have, then we are justified in rejecting his / her position based
on X.
There are two reasons for my decision to employ this standard, one rhetorical and
the other philosophical, both of which derive from the following considerations:  
First, I presume that reasonable disagreement over the rightness or wrongness of
humanitarian intervention exists; and, 
Second, one of the core purposes of this project is to make a case for an all things
considered moral obligation to intervene which would convince skeptics who
doubt the possibility of such an obligation. 
Though certainly not a weighty analytic reason for employing a standard of reasonable
deniability, there is good rhetorical reason for employing such a standard.  As noted, one
of the goals of this project is to justify the existence of a moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention to skeptics.  How the discussion over the existence of such an obligation is
framed can have a dramatic effect on the nature of the dialogue.  To claim that those who
disagree with me are simply wrong because they disagree with me about certain
fundamental matters turns the discussion into a confrontation. 
The philosophical reason for employing a standard of reasonable deniability is
grounded in the justificatory aspect of the project.  It is apparent that there is significant,
and often reasonable, disagreement over matters of morality.  Recognizing the existence
of such disagreement does not commit one to moral relativism.  The existence of such
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disagreement does, however, heighten the importance of the burden of justification.  In
the case of actions that interfere with the lives of others, the intervener must be able to
justify their action to those who would deny its moral permissibility, and to justify their
action to those affected by the intervention. 
I am well aware that this standard may simply beg the question as to what is
reasonable or what counts as an unreasonable rejection or denial.  I do not intend to
answer that question fully here.  However, to remove as much ambiguity as I can, I offer
the following skeletal outline of the standard of reasonable deniability.  Recalling the dual
aspects of the standard - a reasonable basis for one’s own position and a demonstration of
that one’s detractors have failed to be reasonable - one must understand what it means to
be reasonable.  First, though related to one another, the reasonable is not the same as the
rational.  As a standard of evaluation, the rational is a matter of understanding.  In other
words, to act rationally, or be rational in one’s beliefs, there need only be the right sort of
connection between one’s bases for those beliefs or actions.
Reasonableness is a standard of evaluation that applies to both the beliefs that one
holds and the implications that one takes those beliefs to have, including actions based on
such beliefs.  Whereas rationality is a matter of understanding others given their beliefs,
reasonableness is a matter of justification that applies even to those beliefs that serve as
the starting point for one’s theoretical and practical deliberations.  Rationality does have a
role to play in assessing reasonableness.  One way in which one can fail to be reasonable
is if he / she is failing to be rational.  The beliefs an individual holds, and the implications
they take those beliefs to have, must meet certain minimum standards of theoretic
rationality.  
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In assessing the rationality of one’s actions or beliefs, the question we are asking
is whether in light of one’s beliefs do their actions or other beliefs make sense?  Take for
example the following:
A believes: If X, then Y*;
X; 
Therefore Y
*Y could be an action or a belief.
However, in reality, it could be the case that:
1. It is not the case that the claimed sufficient relationship between X and 
Y exists; and/or
2. It is not the case that X.
In either case Y does not follow as a matter of substantive truth, but A could be rational in
both cases, provided A is not aware of 1. or 2.  We could understand A’s contention that
Y.  Nonetheless, A’s belief that Y would be unreasonable.  
Reasonable claims, beliefs, or actions are those that can be intersubjectively
justified.  What this means is that to be holding a reasonable belief we must be able to
offer good reasons for our beliefs (upon which our actions and other beliefs are rationally
based).  This obviously begs the question as to what counts as a good reason.  First, it
must meet minimum standards of theoretic rationality.  All that I intend this to mean is
that the reason is coherent in relation to, and consistent with other reasonable beliefs; and
that it is sensitive to new information - that it is subject to change if new information
demonstrates that it is not a good reason.  
In addition, due to the intersubjective nature of the standard of reasonableness, a
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good reason must be a reason that could be accepted by others.  Here, “could” is not
intended as mere possibility.  An agent could accept any reason.  Rather, what is meant is
that one could accept the reason in light of their prior reasonably held commitments and
beliefs.  I am aware of the circle here, but I believe it to be a virtuous and not a vicious
circle.  What counts as reasonable, and offering reasons for our actions and beliefs,
should be thought of as an ever-evolving process.  The circular reasoning invoked here is
both self-reinforcing and self-critical.  To be reasonable one must offer reasons that
others could accept given their own reasonable commitments.
Perhaps a more concrete example may help to explain what I mean by a standard
of reasonable deniability.  Imagine that Frank is a fan of his college football team.  He
always wears the same sweatshirt when he watches his team play.  He believes that they
will win if he puts on the sweatshirt at just the right time before the game starts.  Frank’s
actions are rational because one could make sense of his actions based upon his
subjective beliefs about his sweatshirt-wearing ritual.  But Frank’s actions are not
reasonable.  One need not accept Frank’s underlying beliefs because they fail minimum
conditions of theoretical rationality.  In this particular instance his belief that his
sweatshirt-wearing ritual affects the game is irrational, and for that reason his actions are
unreasonable.
A more distinctively moral example may be in order to help explain how one
might be unreasonable due to a failure to deliberate rationally.  Such failures could
include improper weighting of the options available, proper weighting but miscalculation,
proper weighting and calculation but weakness of the will, or internal inconsistency. 
Imagine that an individual, Gertrude, is faced with a choice between saving her favorite
 Peter Singer employs a similar example to demonstrate that an individual ought142
to sacrifice their expensive car to save a child, and as a consequence, ought to donate to
poverty and famine relief.  See Peter Singer, One World (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 2002), pp. 186-187.
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car and saving a red-headed child.   If she chooses the car because she believes her car is142
simply more valuable than the child’s life, then one could reasonably reject her claim
because her assessment of the relative weight of the competing values is unjustified.  
What if Gertrude responds that she believes her evaluation to be correct.  Is she
being reasonable?  Or, can you reject her position as unreasonable?  One might contend
that with regard to values it is impossible to make such determinations.  Though I am not
able to provide a determinative argument against this objection, there are a number of
reasons which can be mustered to support my claim that Gertrude’s weighting is
improper, and that her position is unreasonable.  Reasonableness is a matter of
justification.  The relevant question is whether her claim that she places a higher moral
value on her car would not only explain her actions but justify them to those harmed? 
However, the claim simply makes her actions understandable from the perspective of
rationality.  It does not justify her actions.  In addition, as reasonableness is an
intersubjective standard of justification, to be reasonable Gertrude must take into account
what others may or may not accept as a basis for assessing an objects moral value.
Alternatively, if she admits that the car is not as valuable as the child’s life, but
reaches a moral judgment that she ought to save the car, something in her calculations has
gone awry.  Not only is her action irrational, it is unreasonable.  Gertrude may also
appropriately weigh the alternatives, reach the correct moral decision as to what she ought
to do, but fail to act accordingly.  Lastly, she may offer a more substantive argument for
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her choice to save her car.  Let us assume that she also believes that human life is
inherently valuable and ought to be respected and preserved; however, she hates red-
heads and thinks that they all deserve to die.  Thus, the red-headed child ought not be
saved as a matter of morality.  Her belief in the sanctity and value of human life is
inconsistent with her belief that red-headed children deserve to die.  Without further
argument, Gertrude is unjustified in her belief that red-headed children deserve to die. 
This inconsistency renders her choice of action unreasonable.
From the previous discussion, it should be apparent that a standard of reasonable
deniability has certain advantages.  Under such a standard one is justified in rejecting an
objection to one’s position that does not require the same epistemic certainty required by
a standard of wrongness.  For this reason the adoption of such a standard is likely to
prove useful in the resolution of certain moral debates.  In the end, however, I believe that
the conditions I identify for a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention are
reasonable and thus cannot be rejected.  In addition, I believe that I am correct, even if I
am unable to demonstrate that my possible detractors are unreasonable.  This may, in the
end, be all that I can hope to attain.
3.3The Constitutive Elements of a Moral Obligation of Humanitarian Intervention
The first task in identifying the conditions under which no one could reasonably
deny that a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention exists is to delineate the
constitutive elements of such an obligation.  For an obligation of humanitarian
intervention to count as a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention it must be able to
accommodate the elements delineated.  In determining what the constitutive elements are
I look first to Wesley Hohfeld.  Hohfeld understands the constitutive elements of a norm
 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conception as Applied in143
Judicial Reasoning (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1978), pp. 35-36.
 Ibid., pp. 35-36.144
 Richard B. Brandt, “The Concepts of Obligation and Duty,” Mind, New Series,145
Vol. 73, No. 291 (July, 1964), 374-393, 375-376.  See also A. John Simmons, Moral
Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979)
(that he is accepting Brandt’s distinction), p. 11.
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or rule by looking to the relations of which it is comprised.   Specifically, what is the143
content of the relationship that defines the norm, and what is the scope of the norm?  In
addition, as moral obligations are supposed to play a normative role in our practical
deliberations, to fully understand a moral obligation one must also understand its nature
and strength. 
3.3.1 Content and Scope
According to Hohfeld the content of a norm is constituted by the substance of the
normative relationship that exists between those whose relationship is defined by the
norm.   Conversely, the scope of a norm is constituted by those agents whose normative144
relationship is defined by the norm.  I will separate the questions of scope and content,
but I intend that they be understood as two parts of a whole.
Before proceeding, I would like to note that there are a number issues that I am
avoiding.  First, I do not make a distinction between duty and obligation.  Richard Brandt
claims that our ordinary usage of “obligation” and “duty” indicate that the two terms are
not equivalent and that each attach to different agents and have different bases.   I am145
concerned with the function moral demands play in our practical deliberations, and I do
not find any reason to conclude that our usage of such terms in ordinary language effects
the fact that they serve similar roles in our practical deliberations.  In addition, as it has
 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs,146
33, No.2 (2005), pp. 113-147.
 Nagel, p. 126 (that he rejects the “cosmopolitan” conception of global justice147
and prefers a “political” conception of global sovereignty which requires institutions and
under which the reach of justice is limited to those who participate in or are governed by
the institution).
 Ibid., p. 125.148
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become the common language for those discussing rights and obligations, I am relying on
Hohfeld’s categorization and terminology for my analysis of a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention.  Hohfeld defines obligations by reference to duty.  To follow
Brandt on this terminological matter would render the Hohfeldian framework ambiguous
and ill-suited for its intended purpose. 
Nor do I address Thomas Nagel’s concern over the possibility of global justice.  146
I argue that the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention can be considered to be a
matter of justice.  Nagel, on the other hand, contends that justice is dependent on the
existence of certain social and political institutions, and that the demands of justice are
owed only to others who participate in or are governed by such institutions.   Despite his147
rejection of universal global justice, he does not deny that other moral obligations may
exist that are based upon the moral minimum we each owe to one another.  Nagel calls
such obligations “basic humanitarian duties.”   As a practical matter, the difference148
between Nagel and myself on this point seems largely terminological.  I will offer reasons
for thinking that justice includes such basic humanitarian duties, but the defense of a
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention does not depend on this proposition being
correct.
Returning to the discussion of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention,
 Cicero, On Obligations, P. G. Walsh, tr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,149
2000).




 Ibid. pp. 7-9.154
 Ibid., pp. 9-10.155
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what is the content of a moral obligation?  In answering this question, a good place to
start is with Cicero’s discussion of obligations as his understanding, though vague, is
particularly relevant to the task at hand.   For Cicero, understanding the content of a149
moral obligation involves two aspects.   First, there is the conceptual question, what is150
an obligation?  And second, the practical question, what is the function or role of an
obligation? 
According to Cicero, in answer to the first question, moral obligations fall into
two categories – the intermediate and the absolute.   An intermediate obligation is a151
“plausible reason” for action.   An absolute obligation is that which is right, the right152
thing to do.   A moral obligation of humanitarian intervention has elements of both153
intermediate and absolute obligations.  It is a special type of reason for action, but it is
one far more demanding than just a plausible reason.  
Moral obligations, for Cicero, are derived from one of four virtues.   Of154
particular interest to this discussion are those obligations derived from the virtue of
community.  The virtue demands that we give each his due, either as a matter of justice or
beneficence.   A moral obligation of the sort with which we are concerned is an155
 Hohfeld, p. 35..156
 Ibid., p. 36.157
 Ibid.158
 Ibid., pp. 36-38, 44-45.159
 Ibid. pp. 44-45.160
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obligation based upon giving each his due.  The vagueness in Cicero’s account makes a
more specific delineation of the content of a moral obligation difficult.  As Hohfeld has
demonstrated, obligations are complex, and in order to understand their content one must
assess and understand the normative elements which comprise the norm in question.  156
Looking to Hohfeld for more clarity, Hohfeld offers a detailed classification of the
core elements of norms divided into jural correlatives and jural opposites.   It is the jural157
correlative with which I am most concerned because it is the correlative which defines the
norm.  For Hohfeld, the correlatives were duty and right, privilege and no right, power
and liability, and immunity and disability.   It is important to note that the first two158
correlative relations are concerned with the relations themselves and the second two are
concerned with an agent’s ability to change the existing normative relations. 
To understand the nature of a moral obligation in Hohfeldian terms, we must first
ascertain whether a moral obligation is a privilege or a duty; and second what the nature
of the jural correlative is.  Despite the fact that Hohfeld seems to take the meaning of duty
to be a given, one can discern from his discussion that a duty, as opposed to a privilege, is
binding.   For Hohfeld, a privilege is a lack of a duty.    One who has a privilege is free159 160
to do, or to do otherwise, and the reasons for or against an action governed by a privilege
are “ordinary” in the sense used by Cicero.   A moral obligation is a demand on one’s
 Ibid. pp. 36-38.161
 Ibid. pp. 50-51.162
 Ibid. p. 58.163
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practical deliberations that deserves consideration distinct from that given to an ordinary
reason.  In Hohfeldian terms, an obligation must be a duty and not merely a privilege.   
The jural correlative of a duty is a right.   Regarding the correlative right, it is161
not clear that Hohfeld means this as a claim right.  Under a claim right, the individual
holding the right must exercise the right for it to give rise to a correlative duty.  In this
case, we would be talking about a power, something Hohfeld thinks is distinct from a
right.   It is true that a power can give rise to a duty and its correlative right, but this is162
different from the right that exists as a correlative to an extant duty.   As the content of a163
moral obligation is constituted by a Hohfeldian correlative relationship of a duty and a
right,  the right would justify a demand that the duty correlative to the right be fulfilled;
however, the right need not be exercised for such a duty to exist.
In Hohfeldian terms, the specific content of the moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention consists of a duty to intervene militarily into the internal affairs of a
sovereign state to prevent a humanitarian crisis from occurring or to stop it once it has
begun, and a correlative right held by those who are suffering to demand such action on
the part of the duty-bearer.  In addition, and though this may seem excessive, the moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention is moral and humanitarian in nature.  With
regards to the content of the obligation, what this means is that the relationship is a moral,
as opposed to a practical or legal, one, and that the relationship is based on distinctly
humanitarian concerns.  The former characteristic may be more readily understood, as for
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the distinctly humanitarian nature of the obligation, this means that the obligation to
intervene is for reasons related to the suffering of individuals as individuals.  For the
moment this description of the humanitarian nature of the obligation will suffice, but I
hope to make it more clear as the discussion proceeds.
Delineation of the scope of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is a
fairly simple matter, especially in light of the fact that the content has been determined. 
The scope of an obligation is constituted by the parties to the normative relationship
governed by the obligation – who owes the obligation and to whom is it owed.  The
obligation to intervene is borne by states individually and the international community as
a collection of duty-bearing states, and it is owed to the individuals or groups of
individuals who are suffering due to the actions or inactions of their governments. 
Though it may be obvious, the correlative right to intervention is held by those
individuals who are suffering from some moral offense against their persons. 
One might wonder why the duty is borne by sovereign states as opposed to
individuals.  I will discuss this in greater detail below, but I take it to be a limitation on an
obligation that one must be able to accomplish what the obligation demands for it to be
the case that one is under the obligation.  Humanitarian intervention can only be
accomplished by a collective cooperative effort of a large scale, an effort individuals as
individuals cannot accomplish, but of which states are capable. 
3.3.2 Strength
An obligation is a relationship between obligor and obligee.  To understand the
constitutive elements of an obligation one might think that all that need be identified is
the content and scope of the obligation, leading one to question the relevance of the
 Cicero, p. 5 (that obligations provide moral guidance derived from the164
conceptual aspect of the obligation).
 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, p. 36.165
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identification of the strength of the obligation.  One of the reasons I chose to begin this
analysis with a discussion of Cicero’s understanding of obligations is that Cicero
understood that there are two fundamental aspects of an obligation, the conceptual and
the practical.   Understanding the former may take us a long way to understanding the164
constitutive elements of an obligation, but if we fail to account for the latter, we will have
a less than complete understanding of the obligation itself.  The practical aspect of an
obligation is concerned with the role an obligation ought to play in our practical
deliberations.  To understand the strength of an obligation we must understand its role in
our practical deliberations.
Under the classic account of practical deliberation, we as rational creatures, when
confronted with the question of what we ought to do in a particular circumstance,
consider the relevant reasons for and/or against particular actions.  The goal of such
deliberations are to determine “what ought to be done on the balance of reasons.”   The165
metaphor of balancing reflects the idea that reasons have a weight, and that the weightier
reason (or set of reasons) should determine how we ought to act in a particular
circumstance.  Under this classic account of practical deliberation, reasons are all first-
order reasons, some weightier than others, and practical deliberation is merely a matter of
balancing such reasons to determine what ought to be done.  Thus, the strength of a
reason is a matter of comparative value or weight.
However, as Joseph Raz has argued, there are a number of phenomenological
 Ibid.166
 Ibid.167
 Ibid., pp. 35, 46-47.168
 Ibid., p. 35.169
 Ibid., pp. 46-47.170
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reasons for rejecting the idea that practical deliberation is concerned solely with the
weighing and balancing of reasons of a single order.   Raz contends that there are both166
first and second-order reasons, and that the second-order reasons are often exclusionary in
their effect.   Thus, according to Raz, there are two aspects of the strength of a reason,167
its nature and its weight.  I will adopt the Razian framework for understanding practical
deliberations for a number of reasons.  In addition to the phenomenological reasons Raz
relies upon, the Razian framework more readily accommodates the Hohfeldian
understanding of a moral obligation.  Also, the framework governing the practical
deliberations of states in the international arena is more easily understood if thought of in
Razian terms.  
To fully understand the Razian account of practical deliberation one must
understand how conflicts of reasons are dealt with under the Razian account.  Conflicts
between reasons of different orders are resolved by a calculation different from the
resolution of conflicts between reasons of the same order.   First order reasons are168
reasons for or against action, and conflicts between them are resolved by balancing the
respective weights of the reasons at issue.   Second order reasons are reasons for or169
against the consideration of first-order reasons, and conflicts between second-order
reasons are also resolved by the balancing of their respective weights.   The resolution170
 Ibid.171
 Ibid. (that “in most situations [the second-order reason’s] weight is not in172
question.  It prevails in virtue of being an exclusionary reason.”), p. 79.
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of conflicts between first and second order reasons is more complicated.  The function of
a second-order exclusionary reason is to preclude from consideration certain first-order
reasons either for or against an action.  Thus, as Raz notes, the conflict will almost always
be resolved in favor of the second-order reason.  171
A complete understanding of the strength of the moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention involves an understanding of both its nature and weight as a reason.  Despite
this, in discussing the strength of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention my
focus will be on the nature of the obligation to the exclusion of a discussion of its weight. 
One consideration in favor of this approach is derived from the discussion of the various
conflicts that arise between reasons and the manner by which such conflicts are resolved. 
The first thing that one must determine in the case of a conflict is the nature of the
reasons subject to the conflict.  Are both first-order?  Are both second-order?  In either of
these scenarios the resolution is a matter of determining the balance of reasons through an
assessment of the relative weight of the reasons at issue.  However, if the reasons to the
conflict are of different orders, then if the first-order reason is within the scope of the
second-order reason’s exclusionary effect it will be precluded from consideration and its
weight rendered irrelevant.  172
An additional reason for focusing on the nature of the reason to the exclusion of
its weight can be discerned from the following consideration.  With regard to the
identification of the constitutive elements of the moral obligation of humanitarian
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intervention only a discussion of the nature of the obligation is necessary to the
discussion of the strength of the obligation.  In seeking to identify the constitutive
elements, I am trying to identify its existence conditions, a conceptual matter.  Practical
deliberation is based upon a particular logical structure.  Under the Razian account that
structure involves reasons of different orders.   From the perspective of practical
rationality, understanding the existence conditions for determining what counts as an
obligation requires that one understand where an obligation fits in the logical structure
which governs practical deliberation.  The weight of a reason is a matter of substantive
value and not logical structure.  The nature of a reason, on the other hand, is defined by
the role a reason plays in that logical structure, thus determining the nature of an
obligation is more relevant to the task at hand.
Lastly, unlike the weight of a reason, the nature of a reason can be understood in
isolation from other reasons.  The nature of an obligation does not depend on anything
other than the logical role it is to play in our practical deliberations.  Is it a first or second
order reason?  The weight of a reason, on the other hand, is relative.  It can only be
understood in relation to other reasons of the same order.  Thus, a definitive identification
of the weight of a reason would be a practical problem as the relative weight of a reason
will vary in each instance in which it arises.  Though there is no explicit discussion of the
weight of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention much can be inferred from
the discussion in the succeeding sections of this chapter.
At first glance it may seem that an obligation is merely a weighty first-order
reason to act in accordance with the demands of the obligation.  A moral obligation does
have a first-order component, but it seems infelicitous, if we take the existence of such
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obligations seriously, to say that the first-order aspect completely explains the nature of a
moral obligation.  Consider the following example.  Imagine that an individual (Albert)
promises to help (Beatrice) move a large stone out of Beatrice’s field.  The day arrives for
Albert to fulfill his promise.  He recognizes that the promise gives him a first-order
reason for helping Beatrice, but in his deliberations he weighs that reason against the fact
that someone has just offered him two tickets to see his favorite cellist perform at the
local park in a once a year event.  When combined with the many other reasons against
helping Beatrice, Albert decides to go to the concert.  He sees Beatrice the next day.  She
asks for a justification, and Albert provides an elaborate spreadsheet of his calculations –
because that is the kind of guy Albert is.  He demonstrates to Beatrice that his weighing
of the relevant first order reasons clearly leads to the conclusion that he ought, all things
considered, to have gone to the concert and refuses to apologize to Beatrice for anything
because he acted as he ought to have.  
I hope that the reader finds that Albert’s conduct and explanation leave something
to be desired.  Albert is correct in his conclusion that the promise includes a weighty first-
order reason to fulfill the demands of the promise, but he fails to recognize that the
resultant promissory obligation also has a second-order component.  It precludes from
consideration certain first-order reasons, such as those that may arise when one offers you
a competing and pleasant alternative.  A promissory obligation is a second-order
exclusionary reason, as well as, a first-order reason.  
One alteration in our story may help one understand this exclusionary component
of moral obligations.  Imagine that Albert had visited Beatrice to seek her release from
the promise.  Albert again presents Beatrice with the spreadsheet, and tries to get her to
 Ibid., pp. 46-47.173
 Ibid., p. 77.174
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concede that a weighing of the first-order reasons indicates that Albert ought to go to the
park and see his favorite cellist perform.  To his surprise, she does see that the first-order
reasons weigh in favor of Albert going to the performance, but that she still thinks Albert
ought to fulfill his promise because many of the reasons cited by Albert are simply not
relevant in light of the promise made.  This response by Beatrice makes perfect sense to
me, and I don’t believe that Albert would be justified in feeling resentment against
Beatrice.  
A moral obligation is both a first-order reason to act in accordance with the
demands of the obligation, and a second-order reason to exclude from consideration
certain first-order reasons against acting in accordance with the demands of the
obligation.  The strength of the second-order component of a moral obligation will
depend upon its weight relative to other second-order reasons,  and the strength of the173
first-order component will depend upon the relative importance of the values served by or
basis for the obligation.   174
3.3.3 Basis
We can conclude, from the discussion of the constitutive elements of a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention, that an obligation must have the following
characteristics to count as such an obligation:
1. In order to accommodate the content, it must be a positive obligation to
intervene that has its basis in reasons that are distinctively moral and humanitarian
in nature; 
 It has been suggested to me that an alteration in this condition is required. 175
Namely that militarized charities or NGOs could bear the obligation in the same way that
states can.  The factual basis for this claim has been the action of the International
Brigades during the Spanish Civil War.  I am open to this suggestion.  For the present,
however, I will limit my discussion to states and the international community.  My
reasons are largely methodological.  My project is concerned with defending a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention that could be defended against the possibility of
reasonable rejection.  We do not have militarized NGOs, but we do have states with the
capacity to effectively engage in humanitarian intervention.  The need to create the former
would make what is required more burdensome and harder to defend.  There are
additional concerns related to the value of international peace and security, as well as
other moral hazards that may be worthy of consideration.
 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing176
Company, Inc., 1979), Ch. II, pp. 7, 11.
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2. To accommodate the scope, it must be borne by states individually and the
international community as a collection of duty-bearing states,  and it must be175
owed to individuals or groups of individuals; and 
3. To accommodate the nature and strength, it must be both a second-order
exclusionary reason to preclude from consideration first-order reasons against
acting in accordance with the demands of the obligation, and a first-order reason
to act in accordance with the demands of the obligation.
The fact that we can conceive of such an obligation fails to justify a claim to its existence. 
First, one might contend that there is a utilitarian justification for a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention.  According to Mill, an action is right and morally
obligatory if it tends to promote overall utility.   For Mill, as for other utilitarians, the176
utilitarian principle is determinative of what is morally required of an agent.  At first
glance, a utilitarian justification seems promising.  One could certainly imagine
circumstances under which utility would be promoted by intervention; consequently,
according to the utilitarian principle one would be morally obligated to intervene.
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There are, however, a number of reasons why utilitarianism fails to provide the
necessary justification for a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention.  First, though
utilitarianism could provide a plausible basis for a moral obligation to intervene in
particular cases in which utility would be promoted, it does not provide a basis for a
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention.  The humanitarian nature of the utilitarian
obligation is only a contingent fact.  Protecting individuals from suffering is only relevant
if it promotes utility.  One could imagine a situation in which a utilitarian obligation of
intervention arises, and then alter the circumstances slightly and instead of intervening an
agent would be morally obligated to allow the preventable suffering of individuals to
continue if that would promote utility.
Second, the moral obligation of intervention justified by the utilitarian principle
would fail to accommodate the scope of the moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention.  The moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is relational in nature.  It
is held by certain agents and is owed to individuals.  Utilitarian obligations are not owed
to anyone.  The obligation is to promote utility.  If an individual or group of individuals
happens to benefit from the fulfillment of the obligation then so much the better for them,
but they do not have a basis for a demand against the bearer of the obligation that the
obligation be fulfilled.
The failure of the utilitarian principle to accommodate the scope of a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention is most clearly understood when utility can be
served equally by either of two actions.  Imagine that an agent is faced with performing
action A or action B.  The actions are equivalent from the perspective of the utilitarian
principle.  Either produces the same amount of utility.  A involves intervention to stop the
-80-
suffering of an individual.  B involves no intervention.  The agent can choose A or B in
fulfillment of the demands of the utilitarian principle, but the individual who would be
helped by A does not have the rational basis to demand an intervention.  At best, they
have a basis for a request that intervention occur. 
Lastly, if an obligation of intervention is to count as a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention it must act as a second-order exclusionary reason and a first-
order reason to act.  A utilitarian moral obligation of intervention is not a reason, first or
second-order, to be entered into the deliberations of an agent, rather it is the outcome of
such moral deliberations.  For the utilitarian there are no prior existing obligations that
count as reasons to be included as inputs into the practical deliberation of an agent.  The
only moral obligations to act are those that would promote the most utility.  Certainly,
none of the foregoing reasons for rejecting utilitarianism as a basis for a moral obligation
of humanitarian intervention undermine the plausibility of a utilitarian justification for
intervention, but they do demonstrate the inability of utilitarian theory to justify the
relevant type of obligation.
The utilitarian may, conceding the inability of utilitarianism to directly justify a
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention, argue that the utilitarian principle is a
secondary rule governing a multitude of primary rules which are intended to fulfill the
dictates of the secondary rule, and our actions should be guided by the primary rules
which are justified by the fact that if they are followed they have a tendency to promote
 Ibid., pp. 23-25.177
 For a brief but informative discussion of rule consequentialism, including rule-178
utilitarianism, see Brad Hooker, “Rule Consequentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/consequentialism-rule/>.
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utility.   This version of utilitarianism has come to be known as rule-utilitarianism.   177 178
A moral obligation of intervention based on a rule-utilitarian justification would
likely run as follows: utility would be promoted if, as a general rule, intervention occurs
when certain circumstances arise.  The rule utilitarian justification fails to justify a moral
obligation with the necessary content for much the same reason as simple or act
utilitarianism.  A moral obligation of intervention may be justified by the specific primary
rule at issue, but the moral justification remains the promotion of utility, and
humanitarian concerns related to the suffering of individuals are only ancillary as the
utilitarian demand is to promote utility.
Taking the other characteristics of a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention
out of order, a rule utilitarian justification for a moral obligation of intervention arguably
satisfies the third characteristic.  Primary rules can conflict.  In such situations the
conflicting rules act as second-order reasons precluding certain first-order reasons from
consideration and they are first-order reasons to engage in a particular act.  The utilitarian
principle is the ultimate arbiter of such conflicts, which may give credence to the claim
that rule-utilitarianism must, on at least some occasions, collapse into act utilitarianism. 
Nonetheless, the rule utilitarian obligation of intervention performs the appropriate role in
the practical deliberations of an agent. 
An example may help to elucidate the point I am trying to make.  Imagine that
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each of the following primary rules tends, when followed, to promote utility:
1. All other things being equal, one has an obligation to obey the law; and
2. All other things being equal, one has an obligation to disobey arbitrarily
discriminatory laws.
For the rule-utilitarian, when primary rule 1. is not in conflict with other primary rules it
is determinative of what an agent ought to do.  However, it may be the case that primary
rules conflict, as primary rule 2. would conflict with primary rule 1. in any society
governed by arbitrarily discriminatory laws.  In such circumstances neither rule can be
determinative.  It is in such cases of conflict that rule-utilitarian primary rules serve the
appropriate role in an agent’s practical deliberations.  They are entered into the practical
deliberations of agents as both second-order exclusionary reasons and first-order reasons
for action.  Which is determinative of what an agent ought to do is determined by the
degree to which either rule promotes utility - the strength of the rule from the utilitarian
perspective.
A rule-utilitarian obligation of intervention would, however, lack the second
characteristic of a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention.  Much like a moral
obligation of intervention based on simple utilitarianism, the obligation justified by rule-
utilitarianism would not give rise to a justified claim to intervention by those who would
benefit from the intervention.  It would lack the relational component of a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention.  The obligation is not owed to the beneficiaries
of the obligation.  It is not owed to anyone.  The rule would be to intervene under certain
circumstances, and the obligation to intervene would be based on the rule.
A rule-consequentialist could, however, respond that the rule requiring
 Sumner (that providing individuals with choice-protecting rights is the best179
way to promote welfare), Ch. 6.
 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 13.180
 Ibid.181
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intervention should provide those who benefit from the intervention with a claim to the
fulfillment of the moral obligation of intervention.  The underlying justification would be
that providing the beneficiaries of the rule with a right to intervention would render the
rule more effective, and thus better able to promote welfare.  This provides a
consequentialist, if not utilitarian, reason for focusing on a rights-based justification for a
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention.179
I now turn my attention to another possible justification for the moral obligation
of humanitarian intervention.  With respect to the justification of a moral obligation to
provide greater aid to the impoverished of the world, Thomas Pogge argues that we need
only look to the uncontroversial obligation we each bear not to harm others.   The180
obligation, according to Pogge, is based on each individual’s right not to be harmed.  181
Thus, the violation of an individual’s right not to be harmed gives rise to the rectificatory
obligation borne by those who harmed or contributed to the harming of the individual to
rectify the harm caused.  
One could imagine a similar argument being made to justify a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention.  If an agent harms or in some way contributes to the harm of
an individual or group of individuals then that agent has a rectificatory obligation to
alleviate the suffering and stop the harm.  If, however, an agent does not contribute to the
  Ibid.  See also Richard A. Epstein, “A Theory of Strict Liability,” 2 The182
Journal of Legal Studies (1973) (that there can be no legal duty to require that an
individual be required to aid those who are in danger from a harm that the individual did
not create), pp. 160-189.
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harm then they have no obligation to abate it.   In other words, if I am not harming you182
nor contributing to the harm that you are suffering, then I have no obligation to help you. 
But if I am harming you or contributing to the harm you are suffering then I do have an
obligation to abate the harm you are suffering.  If the only way to abate that harm is to
intervene, then fulfilling the obligation would require intervention.  
But is a rectificatory moral obligation to intervene a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention?  If we return to the three characteristics constitutive of a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention, the rectificatory obligation would seem to be
able to accommodate the second and third.  Regarding the second, scope-related,
characteristic, there seems to be no principled reason as to why a rectificatory obligation
could not arise between a state and an individual or group of individuals. 
As to the role a rectificatory obligation would play in the practical deliberations of
an agent, unlike a simple utilitarian moral obligation to intervene, a rectificatory
obligation would be a reason for action to be considered in an agent’s practical
deliberations as opposed to an outcome of those deliberations.  Thus, it is, at the very
least, a first-order reason for action.  Rectificatory obligations also act as second-order
exclusionary reasons.  Take, for example, the law of negligence in the United States. 
Much of tort law is built around the idea that we each have duties not to harm others. 
When one agent engages in unreasonable or negligent behavior and causes another to
suffer an injury, under the law the negligent party has a rectificatory obligation to
 I have borrowed the name of the fictional state from an episode of the West183
Wing.
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compensate the injured party for the harm suffered.  The fact that the negligent party may
have been planning on using the funds now dedicated to compensating the injured party
for morally valuable projects is precluded from our consideration of whether the injured
party should be compensated.  I am not making a judgment as to the justifiability of such
rectificatory obligations, rather I am identifying the role such obligations would play in
our practical deliberations when and if they do arise.
Can a rectificatory obligation accommodate the required content of a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention.  When it does arise, a rectificatory obligation
would obligate the bearer of the obligation to act, and it would be based, at least in part,
on the suffering of those to whom the obligation is owed.  Thus, it would be both positive
and based on moral concerns that are humanitarian in nature.  What troubles me,
however, is the following.  Imagine that Kundu,  a small state, is engaged in a genocide183
against a particular ethnic minority within its borders.  Kundu has few resources, exports
very little to the outside world, and none of the aid it has received is being used to
perpetrate the genocide.  If the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is to be
based on a right not to be harmed and the rectificatory obligation that arises when that
duty is violated then, in this instance, there would be no moral obligation to intervene as
no agent outside of Kundu had contributed to or caused the harm being suffered.  The
rectificatory obligation would be borne by the genocidaires.
This imagined circumstance involving a non-existent state may not be likely to
occur, but it is the very possibility of such an occurrence that is troubling and which leads
 Sumner, pp. 174, 189-198, 201-203.184
 Ibid.185
 Ibid., p. 191.186
-86-
me to believe that something is lacking from a rectificatory justification for a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention.  For an obligation to be a humanitarian
obligation, it should be directly implied by the suffering of an individual and not
mediated by the violation of a prior existing duty not to harm.  A rectificatory obligation
is an obligation to compensate for a past or present wrong that one created or to which
one contributed, and not an obligation arising directly from the suffering of individuals. 
This is not to deny a role for rectificatory obligations.  If one contributed or caused the
harm being suffered, then one has an additional obligation.
Despite the fact that neither utilitarianism nor the principle of rectification are
capable of justifying a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention, both theories lend
support to human rights as a basis for such an obligation.  L. Wayne Sumner has argued,
that there are consequentialist reasons for a rule treating people as if they had rights.  184
Sumner argues that due to human fallibility and limited cognitive resources we are better
able to promote welfare in the long-run if we constrain our decision-making procedures
by adhering to certain rules which prevent us from assessing the welfare-promoting
qualities of each individual course of action.   As Sumner states,185
However, being also aware of our commitment to the goal of
maximizing welfare, we have reason to fear the temptation to make
the attempt might be irresistible on each particular occasion.  In
order to defeat this temptation we will do well to pre-commit
ourselves by announcing from the outset a requirement of
acceptability for protocols whose function is to constrain acting on
the basis of the cost/benefit test.186
 Ibid. (“Since we have settled on the model of rights as protected choices ...”),187
p. 203.
 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U. S. Foreign Policy, 2188 nd
Ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 13-20.
 Ibid., pp. 21, 37-38.189
 Ibid., p. 19.  Sumner makes a similar argument regarding the periphery of the190
core of rights.  One might think of basic rights as the periphery that is necessary for the
core to be fulfilled.  See Sumner, p. 202.
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One such rule should be the inclusion of rights, and specifically choice protecting human
rights.   As a consequence, if Sumner is correct, then there are consequentialist, if not187
entirely utilitarian reasons for focusing our enquiry on the analysis of such a rights-based
account.
Pogge, on the other hand, is more clearly focused on human rights as a basis for
an obligation to act.  However, Pogge’s right not to harm and rectificatory principle as a
basis fail to account for the distinctively humanitarian nature of the moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention.  Nonetheless, what the right not to be harmed and the principle
of rectification demonstrate is the ability of a rights-based account to accommodate many
of the structural characteristics of a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention. 
3.4 The Basic Right to Physical Security as the Basis for the Moral Obligation of
Humanitarian Intervention
But what would such a rights-based account look like?  Here I will rely, to a great
extent, on Henry Shue’s understanding of a “basic right,”  and specifically the basic188
right to physical security.   For Shue, a basic right is a right the existence of which is189
necessary for the enjoyment of all other rights.   So, if we have any rights at all, we must190
have basic rights.  The right to physical security is a basic right because it is essential to
the enjoyment of any other right.  As to the specific characteristics of a basic right, a
 Shue, p. 13.191
 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 13.192
 Shue, pp. 37-38.193
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“moral right provides (1) the rational basis for a justified demand (2) that the actual
enjoyment of a substance be (3) socially guaranteed against standard threats.”   Thus,191
the right to physical security would provide the right holder with the rational basis for a
justified demand that their physical security be socially guaranteed.
One might ask at this point, what distinguishes the right to physical security from
the right not to be harmed.  There must be a difference if the right to physical security is
to support an obligation with the distinctively humanitarian nature that the right not to be
harmed could not.  The most striking difference between the two rights is related to the
core of each right.  The core of the right not to be harmed is a negative obligation to
refrain from harming others.   This negative obligation can give rise to a positive192
obligation to act, but only via the principle of rectification and after the right has been
violated.  The core of the right to physical security has both a negative obligation not to
harm and a positive correlative obligation to insure that the physical security of others is
protected.   As a matter of practical effect, the right not to be harmed will give rise to a193
positive obligation to act in fewer cases. 
Turning now to the issue of whether a basic right to physical security can support
a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention, to accommodate the scope of a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention, the basis must support an obligation owed by
states to distant others.  Thus, the specific question that must be answered is whether the
basic right to physical security held by distant others can serve as the rational basis for a
 Ibid., p. 18.194
 Ibid., p. 19.195
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justified demand that states act to socially guarantee the physical security of those distant
others against standard threats?   Here I will offer an argument explaining how states
could bear such obligations and demonstrate that a number of the more common
objections fail to preclude this possibility.
As Shue notes, basic rights are “the morality of the depths.”   Basic rights are the194
moral minimum to which each of us is entitled, and the very least that we are owed from
all others.  We can justifiably demand of each individual, with the capability to do so, that
they act so as to socially guarantee the enjoyment of the substance of such rights against
standard threats.  This may appear to be a substantive claim in need of an argument, and
to a certain extent it is.  In the present analysis, my goal is to defend the ability of Shue’s
understanding of basic rights to provide the theoretical foundations for a moral obligation
of humanitarian intervention, and from that perspective this is not a substantive claim. 
For the moment, I will set aside the defense of the claim.  
The social guarantees to which an individual is entitled may be provided by the
formation of institutions like governments or legal systems.  Such institutions would then,
as part of their justification for existing, be required to provide the requisite socially
guaranteed protection.  Individual obligations correlative to basic rights do not, however,
end at a state’s boundaries.  Basic rights are held by each individual and held against all
others.   It is important to note that this should not be confused with the claim that basic195
rights and their correlative obligations are absolute, just that their demands and the role
they ought to play in the practical deliberations of agents is not limited by political
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boundaries. 
In many instances to demand that individuals as individuals fulfill such
obligations to distant others would be unjustified for a number of reasons.  Efforts by
individuals would be inefficient and likely futile.  The coordination demanded for such an
endeavor to be successful would prove to be overly burdensome and potentially
unreasonable.  What is needed is collective action on the part of a sufficient number of
obligation bearers capable of providing the requisite socially guaranteed protection
demanded by the right.  There are a number of reasons for thinking that states are the
appropriate institutions for the task.  First, assuming that the only way to fulfill the
obligation to provide the social guarantees for the protection of the physical security of
individuals is through forced intervention, in the contemporary world states have a
monopoly on the military capabilities necessary to be successful in such an endeavor.  In
addition, in the international arena states and the governments that control them mediate
the relations between distant peoples.  Therefore, if any one people, as individuals or as a
collective, owe obligations to another, then states are already well-situated to carry out the
task.  Thus, there are practical reasons and reasons based on the structure of international
relations for states to be the de facto bearers of the obligation to provide the necessary
social guarantees.  Lastly, to be most effective, the actions of states in their efforts at
intervention will require coordination among the states themselves; providing an
additional reason for states to act collectively – reasons for the international community
to act as the bearers of the obligation.
There are a number of common arguments intended to demonstrate the practical
or conceptual impossibility of states bearing such obligations to distant others.  Here I
 David Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),196
pp. 122-132.
 Ibid., (that the right to self-defense must have either an analogical or reductive197
basis), p. 123
 Ibid., pp. 122-127.198
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will demonstrate that even if such arguments are correct they do not imply that states
cannot be the bearers of obligations to distant others.  David Rodin offers a critical
assessment of the various ways in which states could possibly be argued to be the bearers
of rights or duties.    Rodin’s primary concern is with arguments seeking to justify a196
state’s right of self-defense.  I am more concerned with the flip side of a state’s normative
status: can a state bear moral obligations?  I believe, however, that much of the
skepticism about the possibility that states can bear moral obligations to distant others can
be found in the various arguments assessed by Rodin.  
For Rodin, there are two ways to explain the normative status of states in the
international arena.  First, if a state is to be the bearer of obligations or rights its basis
must be found in either reductive or analogical reasoning.   I will not spend much time197
on the substance of Rodin’s rejection of such arguments because he misses a third
alternative that can explain how states could be the bearers of obligations.  
Under the analogical argument states have rights and responsibilities in the
international arena because they are like individuals in domestic society in morally
relevant ways.  However, as Rodin points out, such analogical arguments cannot support
a state having rights or obligations as a state.   Rather, if a state is to have such rights198
and responsibilities it is going to have to be based on the rights and responsibilities of
those who inhabit the state – such rights and responsibilities will need to reduce to an
 Ibid., pp. 127-132.199
 Ibid., pp. 131-132.200
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aggregation of the rights and responsibilities of the individuals who inhabit the state.  199
Rodin, however, demonstrates, at least for a state’s right of self-defense, that a state’s
right to self-defense cannot be based on such a reductive strategy because the right of
individual inhabitants to self-defense would not often imply a right on the part of states to
pursue a defense of the state.   Similarly, with regard to intervention, it is not likely that200
one could justifiably demand of an individual as an individual that they intervene to
provide the social guarantees necessary for a distant person to be able to enjoy physical
security.  So, if a state’s obligations are to be based on the obligations of its inhabitants
how could one justify such an obligation under a reductive strategy?
Rodin’s argument is mistaken, however, in the claim that the only alternative is a
reductive strategy.  The obligation of states to intervene to provide distant others with the
requisite social guarantees can be derived from the obligations individuals have to those
distant others.  This is different from the reductive strategy because it recognizes that
states are capable of accomplishing tasks that individuals are not.  Thus, a state may
actually have obligations beyond those which are held by individuals, but they are derived
from the obligations borne by individuals.  
Each individual has the obligation to provide every other individual with the
social guarantees necessary for the latter to enjoy their physical security against standard
threats.  Fulfilling this obligation may on occasion require intervention.  In cases where
intervention is required, due to the practical limitations facing individuals, the
coordination problems that would hinder the effectiveness of individual efforts to provide
 Gerald Elfstrom makes a similar argument.  See Elfstrom (that in the201
international arena governments serve as “mechanisms” for individuals to fulfill their
obligations to distant others), p. 163. 
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such social guarantees, and other pressing demands that might override the individuals’
obligations, the demand that individuals intervene cannot be justified.  As a collective,
however, the inhabitants of a state would often be able to fulfill their obligations to
distant others with little cost to themselves.  
States are the institutions that represent their inhabitants in the international arena
and which mediate their inhabitants interactions with distant others.  A function of states
is that they serve to coordinate the efforts of their inhabitants to solve collective action
problems.  As the institution which mediates the interaction between its inhabitants and
distant others to which individuals owe an obligation, there is a derivative instrumental
justification for states to be the bearers of the obligation to intervene.  201
This derivative strategy depends on individuals having obligations to distant
others.  Henry Shue outlines two arguments that are intended to demonstrate that
individuals only have obligations to their fellow inhabitants.  The first argument is based
on the claim that one’s obligations to others is based on being members of a community
of sentiment – that one’s obligations are based on the personal relationships that one
shares with others.   The second argument is based upon the claim that one’s obligations202
to others is based on membership in a community of principle – that one’s obligations are
owed to those with whom one shares goals or a commitment to certain principles.   203
One reason I have for rejecting these arguments is that it would mean that we are
 Ibid., pp. 131-139.204
 Ibid., pp. 142-144.205
 Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States” (that states should stay out of each206
other’s business because only the government of a people can know what is best for that
people), 
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permitted to harm others if they are outside of our community, an implication which I
take to be morally absurd.  I will assume, however, that there may exist obligations based
on one’s membership in either a community of sentiment or a community of principle. 
What remains to be demonstrated, if the arguments are to be successful in supporting
such “compatriot priority”,  is that all moral obligations one owes to others are204
exhausted by the obligations that are reliant on membership in such communities.  The
fact that we, as individuals, may have additional moral obligations to those with whom
we share our lives or to those with whom we share principled commitments, projects or
goals, does not demonstrate that we do not have obligations to those outside of such
communities.
There are also at least two practical or instrumental objections to attributing moral
obligations to distant others to states.  One such argument is outlined by Shue and is
based on what he calls the “comparative-advantage theory of government.”   In this205
argument, it is acknowledged that individuals have obligations to distant others, but it is
argued that the obligations, if they are to fall on any state, should fall on the state in which
those to whom the obligation is owed live.  The underlying reason is instrumental in
nature.  It is claimed that those most familiar with the local conditions are best suited to
fulfill the obligation, and for that reason each state should be the bearer of obligations to
its own citizens.   206
 Luban, “Romance of the Nation State,” pp. 395.207
 Elfstrom, p. 143.208
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As David Luban has pointed out, this is an empirical claim that lacks support in
the real world.   Even if this underlying claim were true, it does not imply that a state207
cannot have obligations to distant others, only that the state in which individuals reside is
the primary holder of obligations owed to such individuals.  In addition, the
circumstances under which an obligation of humanitarian intervention is likely to arise
are instances in which the state is either an active participant in whatever is providing the
threat to the physical security of individuals, or is ineffective in its efforts to fulfill its
obligation to provide the requisite social guarantees.  Under such circumstances, it would
be unreasonable to rely on an argument that the government of that state is in a privileged
position to know or do what is best.
Gerald Elfstrom presents a practical objection to the claim that states can bear
obligations to distant others.   The specific concern raised by Elfstrom is that208
nationalism exists and that it may be a barrier to the development of the political will
necessary for the populace to support a state in fulfilling its and its inhabitants moral
obligations to distant others.   I have two responses to this concern raised by Elfstrom. 209
First, the fact that the individual inhabitants of a state refuse to recognize their moral
obligations casts a shadow over the moral character of those people, and does not in any
way undermine the existence of such obligations.  
But I take the heart of Elfstrom’s concern to be a more complicated matter.  His
concern is with the practical resolution of a real world moral tragedy – in his case, global
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distributive justice and global poverty.  Thus, if we are serious about solving the problem
and not merely pointing out the relevant moral characteristics of the problem, then we
will have to acknowledge such practical barriers and identify potential solutions.  Though
certainly not a fully developed resolution to this practical dilemma, I believe that
nationalism and the national identity that it is based upon can be used to motivate
individuals to support the fulfillment of their moral obligations to distant others.  If such
obligations are framed, not as an imposition of outsiders on the populace of a state, but
rather as a matter of national interest or national pride, then nationalism may serve as a
motivational tool.  This does not mean that the humanitarian nature of the situation is
rendered clandestine, but rather that the humanitarian aspects become the focus.  It is a
point of pride for a state and its inhabitants to live up to its and their moral obligations.  It
is a virtue to be pursued, not a burden to be avoided.
From the previous discussion we can conclude that there is good reason to believe
that the basic right to physical integrity would imply an obligation that would
accommodate the scope of a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention.  However,
throughout the discussion of the ability of a rights-based account to accommodate the
scope of a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention, I have assumed a particular
content of the obligation.  Thus, the next question to be addressed is whether the basic
right to physical security implies an obligation that accommodates the content of a moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention.  Answering this question requires that we first
identify, with greater specificity, what a right to physical security is a right to.  
Under the account I am pressing, the content of an individual’s basic right to
physical security would be a justified demand to have one’s physical security socially
 Shue, pp. 30-31.210
 Ibid., p. 31.211
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guaranteed against standard threats.  The keys to explicating the content of the moral
obligations implied by the basic right to physical security lie in determining what counts
as a standard threat to physical security and what duties or obligations are correlative to
basic rights. 
It is important, in understanding what counts as a standard threat, to understand
why we ought to distinguish a standard threat from a possible threat.  This is a matter of
the breadth of the content of the right.  Specifically, what is it a right to, and from which
threats do individuals have a justified demand of socially guaranteed protection?  As
Shue points out, the socially guaranteed protection can’t be against all threats to the
substance of the right because such a demand would be too burdensome, and though not a
logical absurdity it would cast doubt on the right itself since the demand is supposed to be
justified.  210
But what exactly is a standard threat?  If a right is the basis for a justified demand
on the actions of others, the threats from which individuals are entitled to socially
guaranteed protection must be those from which such protection can be “justifiably
demand[ed] of others.”   Shue identified a number of considerations that should matter211
in our assessment of whether the demanded protection from a threat would be justified. 
Standard threats to the substance of a right, and those from which protection should be
socially guaranteed, are those that are “most common,” “serious,” “typical,” “eradicable,”
and “remediable.”   212
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Though instructive, this list of properties is in need of refinement.  From the five
properties listed by Shue one can derive three specific conditions for what counts as a
standard threat.  First, the claim that to be a standard threat a threat must be eradicable
and/or remediable are specific instances of a more general principle that the threats which
one is justified in demanding protection from are threats from which protection can be
effectively provided.  A threat from which protection cannot be provided cannot count as
a standard threat as the demand could not be justified since the effort expended would be
futile. 
Second, a standard threat for Shue must also be typical and/or common.  Shue
can’t simply mean that one does not have a right to socially guaranteed protection against
threats to the substance of a right that rarely occur.  For it is often those rare occurrences
that are the most glaring examples of a failure to provide the necessary social protection
for the substance of a right.  Instead, if we look again to the underlying claim that for a
right to be effective the demanded protection must be justified, requiring that the threat be
common or typical would serve an epistemic role.  One could not justifiably demand that
the substance of one’s rights be protected against an unknown threat.  Thus, the threat
must be known or, at least knowable.  What the known or knowable threats to the
substance of a right are will depend, to a great extent, on the substance of the right itself.
Shue also contends that the threat must be serious.  I am not certain why
seriousness is not contained in the prior properties of a standard threat.  It would seem
that any known or knowable and remediable threat to a basic right is serious.  A serious
threat would likely be one that is a direct and actual threat to the substance of the right.  It
would be one that is either intended to prevent the enjoyment of the substance of a right
 Ibid., p. 33.213
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or with a high probability of preventing such enjoyment.  A non-serious threat would be
one that is not intended to prevent the enjoyment of the substance of a right and there is a
low probability that it would result in the prevention of such enjoyment.
In addition, Shue contends that what may count as such a threat is likely to change
as times change.   For example, in a bygone era, smallpox may not have counted as a213
standard threat to health as it was not remediable by the medical techniques of the time. 
However, as medicine and the understanding of such diseases advanced a cure for
smallpox became a reality, and arguably the threat of smallpox became a standard threat.
There is one additional and important aspect of a standard threat that I think Shue
fails to recognize.  If standard threats to the substance of a basic right are those from
which one is justified in demanding socially guaranteed protection, the threat from which
one is entitled to protection cannot be morally justified.  If the threat in question is
morally justified, then it is morally permissible.  This would give the agent engaging in
the threat a moral entitlement to engage in the underlying behavior.  It would, at the very
least, be paradoxical to say that a basic right gives the right holder a rational basis for a
justified demand of socially guaranteed protection against a threat that the threatening
moral agent has a moral entitlement in which to engage.
Thus a standard threat to the substance of a right is one against which protection
can be provided, it must be known or knowable, the relationship between the threat and
the substance of the right must be direct and either intended to prevent the enjoyment of
the substance of a right or with a high probability of preventing such enjoyment, and the
threat must not be morally justified.  Ambiguity in the concept of a standard threat
 Ibid., pp. 16-18.214
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remains, and though the conditions delineated provide some guidance, a more precise
understanding of what counts as a standard threat is in need of further explication.  I will
not engage in that project here, as the line drawn need not be precise for my purposes.  If
there exist threats to physical security that would give rise to a moral obligation to
intervene that are clearly standard then there is no need to worry about the ambiguous
fringes of the concept.
Understanding what counts as a standard threat only provides one with an
understanding of one aspect of the content of a moral obligation implied by basic right. 
One is to be protected against standard threats, but in what way?  As Shue argues, a basic
right implies a moral obligation that the substance of a right be socially guaranteed – a
right holder must be able to enjoy the substance of the right as a matter of entitlement,
rather than as a matter of luck or beneficence.   Thus, for a basic right to be fulfilled one214
must actually have the substance of the right provided and protected by social institutions. 
Determining whether an obligation of intervention would be implied by the basic
right to physical security requires that we first understand what counts as a standard threat
to physical security.  Harm to an individual inflicted by other human agents would seem
to be an obvious candidate.  Such harm is certainly a threat from which socially
guaranteed protection could be provided.  It is the type of threat that is known or
knowable.  By its very nature, such harm would be a direct threat to the physical security
of right holders.  However, it is the case that in many instances harm or the threat of harm
to the physical security of a right holder may be justified.  Thus, we must distinguish
between justified and unjustified threats of harm.  
 Joseph Raz, Engaging Reasons: On the Theory of Value and Action (Oxford:215
Oxford University Press, 1999), footnote 4, p. 22.
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For the purposes of the present project, a complete discussion of the difference
between threats to physical security that are justified and threats that are not justified
would be needlessly lengthy and complicated.  An action is justified if it is based upon a
particular type of reason, namely one that renders the action in question morally
permissible.  It is important to understand that my present reference to reasons is not
concerned with the reasons people take themselves to have, or reasons that provide an
explanation for an agent’s action – subjective reasons.  Rather, I am referring to a
conception of objective reasons – reasons as relations between facts in the world and
agents.   Reasons that justify an action or attitude are based on the normative215
relationship between the agents involved.  For a reason to justify an agent harming or
threatening harm to another’s physical security it must be based on the fact that the
agent’s harming or threatening harm to another’s physical security is necessary to protect
something of sufficient moral value.  In other words:
To be justified in harming or posing a threat of harm to a holder of the basic right
to physical security it is necessary that:
1. The harm or threat of harm to the physical security of others is necessary to
protect something of sufficient moral value; and
2. Only that much harm or threat of harm as is necessary to serve 1. is permitted.
A harm or threat of harm to the physical security of a holder of the basic right to physical
security would be unjustified if it failed to meet either of the two identified conditions. 
Such an unjustified harm or threat of harm would be a candidate for a standard threat to
physical security.  These two conditions are not likely to exhaust the necessary and
 One could argue that not only must the moral value being protected be of216
sufficient moral weight, but that the person being harmed or threatened with harm must
be the cause or be contributing to the threat to the moral value being protected.  For an
example, see David Rodin’s discussion of “innocent aggressors”.  David Rodin, War &
Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 80-83.
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sufficient conditions for harm or a threat of harm to be justified, but they should suffice
for my present purposes.216
Regarding the content of the obligations implied by the basic right to physical
security, at least two relevant questions remain.  First, is the basic right to physical
security capable of implying an obligation to intervene?  Second, would that obligation be
distinctively humanitarian?  I will deal with the latter question first.  An obligation that is
distinctively humanitarian is, at the very least, one that is based on the suffering or
circumstances of individual moral agents, and is one in which the requisite normative
relationship between obligor(s) and obligee(s) is basic and does not depend on the
fulfillment of additional moral conditions.  Lastly, to be distinctively humanitarian, the
obligation cannot be directed at the promotion of some alternate moral good.  Rather, it is
an obligation to the individual moral agent qua individual moral agent and not for some
other purpose.  
Basic rights are held by individual moral agents, the obligations implied by basic
rights are directly implied by those rights without the need for any additional mediating
principles, and the obligations implied by basic rights are directed simply at the
fulfillment of the demands of the right and are not directed at the promotion of any
alternate moral value.  Obligations implied by the basic right to physical security meet all
three conditions, and as a consequence, are distinctively humanitarian. 
Returning to the first question raised above, is the basic right to physical security
 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, pp. 37-45.217
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capable of implying an obligation to intervene?  The short answer is yes.  Under the
appropriate circumstances, if providing the socially guaranteed protection demanded by
the right to physical security required intervention, then there would exist an obligation to
intervene.  This, however, begs the question, “What are the appropriate circumstances?” 
Identifying the “appropriate circumstances” will depend on the identification of a
standard threat to physical security which requires intervention for physical security to be
socially guaranteed.  I will not propose such a standard threat now; rather, at the end of
this chapter I will assess whether the genocide in Rwanda would count. 
Whether the basic right to physical security is capable of implying an obligation to
intervene of the requisite nature remains to be discussed.  The key to understanding the
nature of an obligation implied by a basic right is to be found in the fact that a basic right
serves as a rational basis for a justified demand that the substance of the right be socially
guaranteed against standard threats.  It should be readily apparent that if a moral
obligation to intervene is implied by the basic right to physical security, it would, at the
very least, be a first-order reason to intervene.  But, is such an obligation a second-order
exclusionary reason?
There are a number of reasons for accepting the conclusion that the obligation to
intervene implied by the basic right to physical security is a second-order exclusionary
reason.  First, Joseph Raz has proposed a phenomenological test for assessing, as a matter
of descriptive fact, whether we treat a particular reason as a second-order exclusionary
reason.   According to Raz, we can determine whether we are treating a reason as a217
second-order exclusionary reason if the balance of first-order reasons directs that we
 I need to find the origin of this example.218
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perform one action, but as a result of our practical deliberations we conclude that we
ought not perform that action or that we ought to perform another action because one of
the reasons is not simply to be balanced, rather it affects the very first-order reasons that
are to be balanced resulting in a different practical conclusion.
An example will likely help to elucidate the test.  Imagine that there is a stop sign
in the middle of the desert.   You are traveling late at night and the chance that you are218
going to be caught if you fail to heed the stop sign is practically nonexistent.  The stop
sign places you under a legal obligation to stop.  Thus, you have a first-order reason to
stop, but you have a number of countervailing first-order reasons to continue on without
stopping.  We can assume that your first-order reasons for not stopping (it is late, you are
late and in a hurry, there is no one else around, etc...) outweigh your first-order reasons
for stopping.  You, however, choose to stop.  In your explanation, you say that the fact
that you had a legal obligation to stop rendered certain reasons irrelevant to your
consideration of how you ought to act.  If you choose not to stop, we may understand why
– you are acting on your first-order balance of reasons – but, provided the law was not
contradicted by a countervailing moral consideration, we would be justified in criticizing
you for failing to adhere to the obligation.  In this instance, we are treating the obligation
to stop as a second-order exclusionary reason.  
It is likely that an obligation of humanitarian intervention would pass this
phenomenological test.  This, however, is merely a descriptive account explaining the
phenomenology associated with a second-order exclusionary reason.  It is a post facto
explanation rather than a way to understand how we should treat an obligation to
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intervene when we are engaging in practical deliberation.  It may be relevant that this is
how we do treat such moral demands, but it cannot be determinative of how we ought to
treat them.  I would like, therefore, to offer additional reasons for accepting the claim that 
obligations are second-order exclusionary reasons.  
The first consideration is an argument that our considered moral judgments about
the nature of obligations reveal that they are to be treated as second-order exclusionary
reasons.  Let us begin with the following question: If I have an obligation to (X) why
should that be thought of as a second-order exclusionary reason?  
Scenario 1: Let’s assume that the obligation to X is an ordinary first-order reason
for action, a first-order reason to X.  This would mean that whether or not one
ought to X is a matter of weighing.  If the countervailing reasons against X’ing
outweigh the obligation to X, then one ought not X.  
One problem with thinking about obligations as first-order reasons for action is that the
countervailing reasons against X’ing may be entirely practical.  Recall the example of
Albert and Beatrice.  It would at the very least be odd to say that a moral obligation to do
something can be defeated by purely practical reasons, short of practical impossibility,
against the performance of the action.  
One might respond that obligations are simply very weighty first order reasons.  I
am not sure why we should believe this.  Imagine that the obligation to X is an obligation
of reciprocity to help a neighbor finish a project.  There is little left to be done, but the
neighbor is expecting and relying upon your help.  It is not clear why we should think of
this obligation as exceptionally weighty, unless we believe that there is something distinct
about obligations.  Yet, it would be wrong to fail to fulfill the obligation for reasons of a
 Cicero, Book One, pp.5, 23.219
 Ibid., p. 23.220
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purely practical nature, even if those practical considerations appear to be as, if not more,
weighty.  
Scenario 2: Let us assume instead that the obligation to (X) is a second-order
exclusionary reason precluding certain first-order reasons against X’ing from
consideration in the practical deliberations of states, and a first-order reason to X. 
In this case, the obligation to X is weighed against other second order reasons and
it is only those first-order reasons that are not precluded by the exclusionary effect
of the obligation that are weighed at the first-order.
Let us return to the example of the reciprocal obligation to help your neighbor.  If your
neighbor claims that you are under an obligation, then he is claiming that at least some of
the purely practical reasons for failing to fulfill the obligation are precluded from
consideration.  Pursuant to this understanding of the nature of obligations, one could see
why a weak first order obligation could still have the effect one thinks it ought to have. 
Admittedly, if the obligation to X is a significant moral obligation whether it is a first
order reason or a second-order reason may be irrelevant when factored in to our practical
deliberations.
If we look to Cicero’s discussion of obligations, we find an early assessment of
the role obligations are supposed to play in our practical deliberations.   Specifically,219
they are reasons for acting in accordance with the demands of an obligation even in the
face of interests that command otherwise.   If we look to more contemporary accounts220
of legal, conventional, and moral obligations, the claim to their status as obligations is
 Raz, Practical Reason, pp. 139-141.221
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supposed to grant them a second-order exclusionary role in our practical deliberations. 
Take, for example, the obligations of judges in a legal system.  Provided the case being
decided by a judge is one to which a law applies, judges in a legal system are under an
obligation to apply the law.   What this means, according to Raz, is that a judge “regards221
himself as justified in acting on some reasons to the exclusion of others.”   222
Simply stated, our considered moral judgment reveals that one aspect of
obligations is that they are second-order exclusionary reasons.  The objection can only be
that obligations don’t exist, and not that this is not how they work.  Thus, if the basic
right to physical security does, under the appropriate circumstances, imply a moral
obligation of intervention, then that obligation is a second-order exclusionary reason
precluding certain first-order reasons against intervention from consideration.
The rejection of this somewhat strong claim about the nature of all obligations
does not imply that the obligation of humanitarian intervention is not a second-order
exclusionary reason.  Assuming such a rejection, there are at least two arguments that can
be pressed in response.  First, if it can be demonstrated that all obligations correlative to
rights are exclusionary reasons, then the obligation of humanitarian intervention implied
by the basic right to physical security would be such an obligation.  Alternatively, one
could provide an argument that directly addresses the obligation of humanitarian
intervention implied by the basic right to physical security.
In either case, we need to look to the role we take rights to play in our practical
deliberations.  I take it as fundamental to our understanding of the claim that one has a
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right that we believe we have an entitlement to the substance of the right.  If I claim that I
have a right that Y does X, then I am claiming that I am entitled to Y X’ing and that Y is
under an obligation to X.  When claiming such a right, I am not claiming that Y’s
obligation to me is merely a reason for Y to X, I am claiming that Y must X unless some
other moral reason for action outweighs Y’s obligation to me to X.  I am claiming that the
obligation Y owes to me precludes her from even considering certain reasons in her
practical deliberations over whether she ought to fulfill her obligation to me – that certain
reasons against X’ing are simply irrelevant.
Assuming that I am correct in my claim that I have a right to X held against Y,
then if Y were to fail to X and offered no other reasons for the failure other than practical
reasons short of practical impossibility, then Y simply does not understand what it means
to be the bearer of an obligation that is correlative to a right.  If, on the other hand, Y’s
failure was due to the fact that Y (believed that she) had a competing moral obligation that
outweighed her right-based obligation to me, her failure would be justified if she properly
weighted and weighed the competing moral claim. 
If, however, one is not convinced of the claim that all obligations correlative to
rights are second-order exclusionary reasons, I may yet succeed if I can demonstrate that
there are good reasons for believing that the obligation of intervention implied by the
basic right to physical security is such a reason.  If we assume that human rights exist,
which we must if we are to determine what role human rights ought to play in the
practical deliberations of other agents, they cannot simply be ordinary reasons for action. 
If they were simply ordinary reasons for action one would be able to deny another’s rights
if a sufficiently weighty countervailing first-order reason were to arise.  By their very
 Ibid. pp. 46-47.223
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nature human rights act as constraints on the practical deliberations of those who bear the
correlative obligations.  But how?  A human right precludes others from considering
certain reasons for action.  Specifically, it precludes others from considering certain
reasons against the fulfillment of the obligation correlative to the basic right.     
It is important to note, however, that second-order exclusionary reasons are not
limitless.  They have limits in both their strength when compared to other second-order
reasons and in the breadth of the first-order reasons they preclude.   It could be the case223
that another countervailing second-order reason outweighs the second-order exclusionary
reason in question, or that there are certain first-order reasons against the action that the
obligation in question supports that are also outside the reach of the exclusionary aspect
of the obligation.  The relevance of these limitations will become more apparent when I
assess whether this basic right to physical security would have implied an all-things-
considered moral obligation of humanitarian intervention in the Rwandan genocide.
3.5 Charity or Justice
There remains at least one substantial objection to a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention.  More specifically, it is an objection to the role I claim such an
obligation should have on an agent’s practical deliberations.  I have, to this point,
assumed that all moral obligations are univocal in at least one sense – all other things
being equal they demand consideration in one’s practical deliberations.  However, it is
often claimed that some obligations are perfect and others imperfect, and it is only the
former that carry such normative weight.  I am arguing that the moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention demands consideration.  Many contend that obligations to
 Onora O’Neill, “The Great Maxims of Justice and Charity,” Constructions of224
Reasons: Explorations of Kant’s Political Philosophy (1989), pp. 219-221.  See also
Allen Buchanan, “Justice and Charity”, Ethics 97 (1987), pp. 558-75, 561-562.  The
proponents of such a view range across philosophical and ethical commitments. 
 O’Neill, “The Great Maxims,” pp. 219-221.225
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distant others are, by their very nature, imperfect obligations that admit of a wide range of
discretion and as such are incapable of making the requisite demand on an agent’s
practical deliberations.
3.5.1 Explaining the Objection
The objection being considered is based on the claim that the source of an
obligation is determinative of its nature and strength, and the role it ought to play in the
practical deliberations of an agent.   The underlying argument would proceed as224
follows:
Premise 1: Only complete obligations make non-discretionary demands on an
agent’s practical deliberations.
Premise 2: Only matters of justice, special relationships, or promises can give
rise to complete obligations.
Premise 3: Only negative obligations can count as matters of justice.225
Premise 4: The moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is based neither
on a promise nor a special relationship, and is a positive obligation.
Conclusion: The moral obligation of humanitarian intervention cannot be
complete, and therefore does not make non-discretionary demands
on the practical deliberations of agents.
In the discussion that follows, I will, for the sake of argument, concede the truth of
Premise 1, and I will accept the claim that the moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention is based on neither a promise nor a special relationship.
In the argument presented above, Premise 3 sets a standard that defines the
 O’Neill, “The Great Maxims,” pp. 219-221.  See also, Robert Nozick, Anarchy,226
State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974), pp. 32-34, 47.  And see, Pogge,
World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 13.
 O’Neill, “The Great Maxims,” pp. 219-221.  See also Sandel, pp. 1-7.  And see227
Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 118-
172.
 O’Neill, “The Great Maxims,” pp. 224-225.228
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boundary of justice.  It is argued that the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention
falls outside that boundary and for that reason cannot be a matter of justice; and as a
consequence, is not capable of being complete and thus cannot make the requisite
demands on an agent’s practical deliberations.  There are two bases for the claim that only
negative obligations (obligations of non-interference) can count as matters of justice. 
First, as many libertarians claim, to require more would be a violation of an individual’s
rights of self-ownership.   Second, as Onora O’Neill points out, for many liberals the226
premise is based on the claim that positive obligations require a conception of the “good
for man” or the “good life” to which we do not have epistemic access, thus no basis for
action.    Consequently, we can’t require that an agent act on them.  227
With regard to Premise 2, its basis can be found, at least in part, in the discussion
of the underlying basis for Premise 3.  Obligations of justice are complete because they
are determinate with regards to the scope and content of the obligation.   Negative228
obligations (obligations of non-interference) are argued to be inherently determinate as
they require that each of us refrain from doing certain things to every other.  O’Neill, I
believe, rightly points out that this does not make them determinate in the abstract, but
only in their actual application, and that the determinacy of such obligations will admit of
 Ibid., p. 224.229
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degrees.   I will, however, for the sake of argument, accept the claim that obligations of229
justice are inherently complete.  In addition, Premise 2 is based on the claim that
obligations to aid that are not based on a promise or special relationship are inherently
and irreparably incomplete.  There are two potential bases for such a claim.  First, as was
discussed above, due to the plurality of conceptions of the good life and lack of epistemic
access as to which is correct the content and scope remains indeterminate.  Second, even
if we can determine what the good life is, we are unable to determine how to promote it
for any given individual and upon whom such an obligation should fall. 
3.5.2 Defending the Completeness of the Moral Obligation of Humanitarian
Intervention
My reply to this potential objection is comprised of two distinct but related
responses, either one of which could serve as the basis for a separate reply, but should
also be understood jointly.  In the first response, for the sake of argument, I will accept
the truth of Premise 2, and argue that the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention
should be considered to be a matter of justice, and thus capable of being complete.  In the
alternative, in the second response, I will accept the truth of Premise 3, and argue that
positive obligations (to aid, of charity, of beneficence) can be complete and that the
source-based distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations should be rejected.
Assuming Premise 2 is true, the next premise in the argument against the claim
that consideration of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention in our practical
deliberations is nondiscretionary is that only negative obligations – obligations of
noninterference or obligations to refrain from acting – count as matters of justice.  Taken
 Shue, pp. 18-22.230
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together these two premises imply that only negative obligations are nondiscretionary.  In
the response that follows, I am challenging the claim in Premise 3 that only negative
obligations can count as matters of justice.  
Justice, I take it, is the moral minimum to which we are each entitled.  With this
conception of justice in mind, if the moral minimum to which we are each entitled
implies, either directly or indirectly, a positive obligation then the claim that being a
negative obligation is a necessary condition for being a matter of justice fails and certain
positive obligations may then make nondiscretionary demands on our practical
deliberations.  Here, I will deal explicitly with the basic right to physical security and the
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention which it implies.
If we understand an entitlement to X to mean that one has a claim on others to
have X provided, then this would mean that if X was part of the moral minimum to which
we are entitled that X must be provided as a matter of justice.  If we are entitled to
anything at all we are entitled to our physical security.    As a consequence, the physical230
security of each individual must be provided as a matter of justice.  In some cases
fulfilling this obligation may require intervention.  Thus, the moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention implied by the basic right to physical security as a matter of
justice may directly imply a positive obligation to intervene.
One might object to this argument in, at least, two ways.  First, it could be claimed
that the obligation to provide physical security cannot be a matter of justice because it is a
positive obligation to act.  Positive obligations require a particular conception of the good
life to which we do not have epistemic access, and thus cannot serve as the basis for a
 This is very similar to the argument Shue puts forward regarding our231
understanding of basic rights.  See Shue, 21, 37-38. 
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justified demand on others.  As an objection, what is being claimed is that there are no
epistemically unproblematic conceptions of the good life, and to require one to aid
another based on a particular conception of the good life cannot be demanded of another
and thus cannot be an action to which one could be entitled.  If  it can be shown that a
particular obligation to aid is not epistemically problematic then it would seem that this
objection would fail.
The obligation under consideration is an obligation to aid in only the most
minimal sense.  Specifically, it is an obligation to protect individuals from an unjustified
threat to their physical security.  Does this require having an epistemically problematic
conception of the good life?  It would seem that even the claim that the only justified
obligations are those which demand non-interference are intended to protect individual
conceptions of the good life.  If that is the case then there is something implicitly valuable
about people being able to act upon their own conception of the good life.  If their
physical security is threatened, then they will be unable to do so.  This does not involve
an epistemically problematic conception of the good life, rather it is a necessary condition
of any conception of the good life that an agent’s physical security be protected.   Thus,231
our presumption should be that action to protect the physical security of others is
fundamental unless it is demonstrated in a particular case that this is not the case. 
The alternative objection is much more problematic for the line of argument I am
presently pressing.  The objection would challenge the claim that an entitlement of justice
 John Hospers, “What Libertarianism Is” from Tibor R. Machan, ed., The232
Libertarian Alternative: Essays in Social and Political Philosophy (Chicago, IL: Nelson
Hall Company, 1974), pp. 3-20.  See also Shue’s discussion of the libertarian conception
of justice.  Shue, p. 19.
 Hospers.  See also Nozick, pp 32-34, 47.  And see Pogge, World Poverty and233
Human Rights, p. 13.
 Emphasis in original.  Nozick, p. 47.234
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to X is to have X provided.   Rather, an entitlement to X as a matter of justice simply232
means that others refrain from interfering with your pursuit of X.  This objection can’t be
based on concerns of incompleteness, as I have demonstrated that such problems will or
can be resolved.  This line of objection is based on a substantive claim about the nature
and limits of the demands of justice.  Essentially, it is the claim that to require more than
noninterference would unjustifiably infringe upon the rights to liberty of those upon
whom the obligation would fall.   233
This objection is based upon the proposition that rights to liberty are virtually
absolute, meaning that only under the most exceptional circumstances can they be
infringed upon.  As Nozick claims with regard to the right of self-ownership, “It will be
as if an absolute side constraint prohibits their being sacrificed for any purpose.”   If,234
however, rights to liberty are not so demanding, one could claim that an obligation to act
is a matter of justice either because it outweighs the right to liberty, or it is outside the
reach of the right to liberty at issue.  
The underlying conception of rights to liberty as absolute should be rejected for
the following reasons.  First, if all such rights are absolute, then we have no means by
which we can resolve conflicts of different types of rights, for example a conflict between
one person’s right to liberty of action with another’s right to dispose of their property as
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they see fit.  In addition, a conception of rights as absolute gives rise to the practical
absurdity that we are forbidden from forcing a person to part with a portion of their
property even if doing so would save lives.  It may be the case that it would be an
unjustified demand on your right to liberty if I were to claim that you had to sacrifice your
life for mine, but this is not what is being claimed.  Rather, the claim is that I am
demanding that you sacrifice resources to support an army in stopping others from taking
my life.  I have not discussed the issue of conscription in order to fulfill the moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention, and I will not do so here.  It is an interesting
question, but one that I am avoiding as it bears little on the claims I am defending here.
Another reason for rejecting the conception of rights underlying this objection is
that those making the objection are focused on only one half of the binary relationship
that defines the normative implications of the demands of justice.  The demands of justice
imply negative obligations, but those obligations are based on the entitlement to
noninterference held by individuals.  In many cases an individual’s right to bodily
security – an entitlement of justice to not have their bodily security interfered with – is
violated.  In such cases it is not enough to look only to the fact that the obligations
directly correlative to the right are negative.  The right of noninterference gives rise to an
obligation on all others to insure that the right of noninterference be fulfilled – it is still an
entitlement to not have one’s bodily security interfered with.  Fulfillment of this
entitlement will in some cases require intervention because the right to noninterference
when violated requires positive action to stop the violation and to insure that the right not
continue to be violated.  To argue otherwise would lead to the unreasonable proposition
that one only has a claim of assistance against those who are violating his / her rights. 
 Shue, p. 18.235
 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms,  p. 21.236
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There is one additional objection which must be noted (if not responded to
satisfactorily). One may, in the end, deny that a basic right to physical security is a matter
of justice.  In that case, those obligations that it implies cannot be matters of justice and if
the source of an obligation determines whether consideration is discretionary or not, then
such obligations would not need to be considered in our practical deliberations.  This
objection, if correct, would imply that there are no matters of justice for if there are any at
all, the basic right to physical security must be one as it is necessary to the enjoyment of
all others.  As Henry Shue notes, the function of the basic right to physical security, as
well as other basic rights, is “to provide some minimal protection against utter
helplessness to those too weak to protect themselves.”     If those making this objection235
persist all that I can offer in response are the arguments already made and my concurrence
with Shue’s belief that “few, if any would be prepared to defend in principle the
contention that anyone lacks a basic right to physical security.”236
Turning now to the second response, arguing in the alternative, I will accept the
truth of Premise 3, but argue that one ought to reject premise 2.  The underlying claim
that supports the objection being considered is that the source of the obligation
determines the nature and strength of the obligation.  Matters of justice are perfect and
matters of charity are imperfect.  This distinction is too blunt, and I will argue
misconceives the relationship between completeness and justice, and that properly
understood the relevant considerations entail that the moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention implied by the basic right to physical security is, under the appropriate
 O’Neill, “The Great Maxims,” pp. 224-225.237
 Buchanan, pp. 558-75, 561-562. 238
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circumstances, a perfect as opposed to an imperfect obligation. 
I concede that there is a distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations. 
What needs to be discerned, however, is the basis for such a distinction.  How are we to
determine whether an obligation is perfect or imperfect?  A perfect obligation is
complete, an imperfect obligation incomplete.   So what is required for an obligation to237
be complete?  One might think that for an obligation to be complete each of its
constitutive elements must be identified with sufficient clarity.  This is partially correct. 
To be complete one must be able to identify with sufficient clarity the scope of the
obligation and its content.  Completeness, however, does not depend on the identification
of the nature and strength of the obligation; rather the completeness of an obligation is
relevant to our determination of the nature and strength of an obligation. 
A complete (or perfect) obligation is one which admits of little or no discretion. 
But discretion in what?  A complete obligation admits of little or no discretion in our
consideration of the obligation in our practical deliberations.  If we know the scope and
content of the obligation with sufficient specificity, and the obligation is one that places
moral demands on us then we must consider it in our practical deliberations.  Those who
contend that the source of an obligation is determinative of an obligation’s completeness,
must explain how the source of an obligation can preclude us from determining to whom
the obligation is owed, who bears the obligation, and what it is an obligation to do.
One might object that a complete obligation is an all-things-considered moral
ought, and that only matters of justice can satisfy such a condition.   What that would238
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mean is that only those obligations that outweigh and override all other obligations in our
practical deliberations are complete.  If that is what is meant by a complete or perfect
obligation, then I will concede that the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is
not complete, but then neither are most moral obligations that are often take to be
complete, no matter their source.  Such an obligation would have to be absolute and
indefeasible.  Such obligations may exist, but they are not going to be the type of
obligation that we typically think of as being complete.  The obligation not to lie, not to
kill, not to harm are all obligations in which the scope and content of the obligation is
determinate, and thus one is required to consider such obligations in their practical
deliberations.  But none these obligations are complete if what we mean is that they
always override or outweigh or override other obligations.
I think a more charitable understanding of what is meant by completeness is that
an obligation is complete if ceteris paribus it would be determinative of what an agent
ought to do.  If this is a correct understanding, then there is no principled reason to think
that only matters of justice could fulfill such a role unless obligations of justice are the
only ones from which the scope and content of the obligation can be identified with
sufficient clarity.
One might contend that as a matter of fact, most if not all obligations of justice are
perfect in just the sense being described and most if not all obligations of charity are
imperfect in just the sense described, and that this gives us good reason for the
distinction.  I will assume the truth of this possible claim for the sake of argument.  It,
however, does not provide a principled reason for distinguishing perfect from imperfect
obligations based on their source.  At best, it provides us with a heuristic reason for
 This is an often raised objection to Singer’s principle in “Famine Affluence and239
Morality.”  Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, pp. 231-232.  Some
versions of this objection include the following: Samuel Scheffler, “Relationships and
Responsibilities”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 26 (1997), pp. 189-209; and see Garrett
Hardin, “Life Boat Ethics” from Psychology Today (September, 1974).
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presuming that obligations of justice are perfect and obligations of charity imperfect.
Another objection that may be raised against the possibility of obligations of
charity being complete is that an obligation of charity is problematic according to the
objector because its content is going to vary from person to person because there is no
universal conception of the good life, and we have no way of knowing what is good for
each individual agent we encounter.  Thus, the content of the obligation lacks sufficient
clarity.  In addition, the scope of an obligation of charity cannot be identified with
sufficient clarity.  It is either too broad or too narrow.  In any particular case it would be
unclear to whom the obligation is owed, or from whom help could be justifiably
demanded.  On the other hand, if the obligation is owed by each of us to everyone who is
in need, the obligation becomes too burdensome and our lives and life goals are sacrificed
for the good of others which in the end due to the plurality of subjective conceptions of
the good life may actually do more harm than good.239
If we think that obligations should only be thought of in isolation from the
everyday circumstances in which they arise, then it may be the case that obligations to act
are incapable of being complete.  However, it would seem that if our concern is with the
effect an obligation should have in our practical deliberations about what we ought to do,
then we must consider the circumstances under which an obligation arises.  To assess the
nature of an obligation in isolation from other relevant considerations, especially moral
ones, would undermine the understanding that we are seeking to attain.  If there is a single
 Weinrib.240
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instance in which an obligation of charity when viewed in light of the surrounding
circumstances would identify with sufficient clarity the scope and content of the
obligation then it is possible for an obligation of charity to be complete and thus perfect.  
If such an obligation can be demonstrated to exist one can conclude that it is not the
source of the obligation that determines whether the obligation is complete.  Rather, an
obligation is complete if under the surrounding circumstances the scope and content of
the obligation can be identified with sufficient clarity.
One example of an obligation can be found in Ernest Weinrib’s argument for a
duty of easy rescue.   In short, Weinrib argues that under certain conditions one is240
morally obligated to aid an individual who is in need of rescue.  In response to the
complaint that a moral duty of rescue would be incomplete due to the fact that, in
isolation, one cannot identify with sufficient clarity the scope and content of the
obligation, Weinrib assesses the obligation not in isolation, but set in a particular
circumstance.  Specifically, Weinrib argues that in an emergency situation in which a
single individual is at risk of serious harm and another individual could help and is the
only one capable of helping, the nature of the emergency will identify with sufficient
clarity the content the scope of the obligation.  In this case, the obligation that in isolation
was incomplete is rendered complete when viewed in light of the relevant surrounding
circumstances.
It must be admitted that obligations of charity will be amenable to such
circumstantial reconstruction to varying degrees.  As a consequence, even if the
possibility of such an obligation does exist, it merely allows for the possibility that the
 O’Neill, “The Great Maxims,” pp. 224-225.241
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moral obligation of humanitarian intervention could be such an obligation.  It remains to
be determined whether there is a conceivable circumstance in which the basic right to
physical security would imply an obligation to intervene in which the content and scope
of such an obligation is identified with sufficient clarity.  I will set this question aside for
a moment and return to it again in my assessment of the Rwandan genocide, as I believe
that the Rwandan genocide and its surrounding circumstance was just such an event.  
Onora O’Neill offers an interesting but underdeveloped resolution to the problem
of incompleteness.  O’Neill argues that one can resolve the problem of incompleteness of
an obligation of charity through the institutionalization of the obligation.   In short, by241
institutionalizing the obligation we would, by convention, match those in need of aid with
those who are capable of providing it, thus resolving one aspect of the problem of
incompleteness – scope.  O’Neill fails to recognize, however, the fact that the
institutionalization of an obligation of charity does not address the other fundamental
complaint that the content of obligations of charity cannot be identified with sufficient
clarity.  
There are two problems with the claim that the institutionalization of an
obligation of charity would identify with sufficient clarity the content of the obligation. 
First, in order to institutionalize an obligation and match those in need of aid with those
capable of providing it one must know the content of the obligation in advance, as that is
what is being institutionalized.  The content is indeterminate, according to the
incompleteness objection being addressed.  Institutionalization does not resolve this
indeterminacy.
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Someone might contend that since the institutionalization of the obligation is
conventional, we can choose whatever content of the obligation we want.  This would,
however, miss the point of the objection and also gives rise to the other flaw in this
institutionalization based resolution.  From the perspective of conventional systems what
we can institutionalize is limited only by practical concerns.  What we want from the
institutionalization of a moral obligation requires more.  The question is not what can we
institutionalize, but what are we justified in institutionalizing.  Thus, from O’Neill’s
argument we can take away the following lesson.  Once we have identified, with
sufficient clarity, the content of a moral obligation of charity, we can, through the
institutionalization of the obligation, identify with sufficient clarity the scope of the
obligation by matching those in need with those capable of helping. 
The argument begs the question, whether the content of the moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention can be justified independently.  As I have argued above, I
believe it can.  From a rights-based perspective, if we are to have any rights at all we must
have basic rights.  The most fundamental basic right is a right to our physical security for
without physical security one is incapable of enjoying their other rights as rights.  In
addition, if there is anything that is common among conceptions of the good life it must
be physical security.  For without the certainty that physical security provides, the
possibility of a good life (by any measure) is greatly undermined.
I have been considering the objection that the moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention implied by the basic right to physical security, since it is not an obligation of
justice, admits of a wide range of discretion in our practical deliberations about how to
discharge the obligation.  The concern at the heart of the objection is that obligations to
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act admit of a wide-range of discretion, either because they are not complete or, assuming
the source-dependent argument is correct, that they can’t be matters of justice.  I think the
former concern is valid, that an incomplete obligation admits of a wider range of
discretion in our consideration of the obligation in our practical deliberations.  However, I
hope to have demonstrated that there are good reasons for believing that the basic right to
physical security and the obligations it implies are matters of justice; or in the alternative,
that an obligation to act can be rendered complete either by the circumstances under
which the obligation arose, or by the institutionalization of the obligation. 
3.6 Defending the Basic Right to Physical Security
To this point my argument has been conditional.  If one accepts the existence of
the basic right to physical security, or human rights at all, then there may exist
circumstances under which it would be unreasonable to deny that a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention exists.  I have yet, however, to offer an argument for the
existence of the basic right to physical security.  There are, however, good reasons for our
acceptance of the claim that such a right does exist.
First, we act and speak as if the basic right to physical security exists.  Though not
determinative of the question of whether the basic right to physical security exists, it
evinces a widely held belief in the existence of such a right.  In the domestic realm our
legal, political, and social institutions are concerned, at least in a large part, with the
promotion and protection of individuals’ rights to their physical security.  Upon reflection
it seems to be a fundamental proposition that a community that is unable, or chooses not,
to protect its inhabitants’ physical security is one that is morally deficient.  
In fact, our political rhetoric is not so much concerned with whether such a right
 Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 56-57.242
 For a compilation of such international legal and political documents see Ian243
Brownlie and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill,eds., Basic Documents on Human Rights (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002).
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exists, but how best to serve that right, and a condemnation of those that fail to do so.  In
H.L.A. Hart’s terminology, we have taken the “internal perspective” on the existence of
the basic right to physical security.   We are committed to the protection and promotion242
of physical security through the formation and maintenance of social institutions, we
engage in a critical dialogue with others that is built around such commitment, and we
criticize any who (or accept criticism ourselves if we) fail to fulfill the demands of the
basic right to physical security.
We can also look to the international political arena for evidence in support of the
belief that such a right exists.  The creation of treaties and conventions dedicated to the
promotion and protection of human rights evinces a belief in, if not a commitment to, the
existence of the basic right to physical security.   Here too the political rhetoric243
surrounding basic rights to subsistence and security takes as its starting point the
existence of such rights.  It is from this basic premise that critical discussions and
criticism proceed.
One may recognize that there is widespread consensus as to the existence of the
basic right to physical security, that there is not only rhetoric but action in accordance
with the belief that the basic right to physical security exists, but deny that the right in fact
exists.  The denial is likely to take either of two forms.  One might claim that the basic
right to physical security does not exist in the form proposed by Shue upon which I have
relied.  An example of such a denial would be Pogge’s claim that rights are rights to non-
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interference.  An alternative form of denial may come from those who deny that rights
talk is based on anything real.
As to the former, I have already addressed why I believe the claim that correlative
to rights are only negative obligations ought to be rejected.  Thus, if one believes (as
Pogge does) that there are human rights, then I believe that one is committed to the
acceptance of the existence of certain basic rights, including the basic right to physical
security.  
The alternate form of denial can be further disaggregated.  One may be claiming
that there is a moral minimum to which we are each entitled, but the moral minimum
should not be thought of in terms of rights and correlative duties - denying the existence
of a basic right to physical security, but not the existence of morality.  On the other hand,
one may simply be pressing a skeptical story, that morality does not exist apart from our
conventions about what it is.  
If one is a committed skeptic, then there is little I can offer except the following. 
First, our conventions seem to indicate that basic human rights are a part of our morality. 
Second, if one believes that lives can go better or worse, it must be the case that one way
in which a life can go worse is by having one’s physical security threatened when the
prevention of and protection from such threats is possible.  One would likely desire the
protection from such threats for oneself.  In addition to the fact that consistency would
demand the same for others, such protection is likely to be best accomplished through
social institutions that provide such protection for all.  The more who are outside such
social institutions the greater threat they pose to those inside. 
As to the first form of denial, I believe the same considerations that lead many of
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us to believe that there is a basic right to physical security should lead others to its
functional equivalent.  If there is a basic moral minimum, a set of obligations that we owe
to others, a line below which one should not be allowed to fall provided we are capable of
fulfilling the obligation or preventing the fall, one’s physical security would surely be a
part of that moral minimum.
3.7 Conditions from the Objections of the Skeptic, the Communitarian, 
and the Instrumental Argument
The moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is not an all-things-considered
moral obligation to act.  To say that it makes a non-discretionary demand on our practical
deliberations, or in this case on the practical deliberations of states, does not mean that
whenever it arises we ought to act on it. Therefore, in order to understand when we are
morally obligated all-things-considered to act on the moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention we must understand what other moral conditions must be met and what other
moral considerations must be accounted for in our practical deliberations – that set of
conditions under which no one could reasonably deny that a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention exists.  
In identifying these additional conditions, I begin by looking back to some of the
previously discussed objections to the permissibility of humanitarian intervention. 
Though none imply the impermissibility of intervention, each is based on relevant
considerations that should be accounted for in our assessment of whether, in any
particular case, the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is an all-things-
considered moral ought. 
The identification of such additional conditions will serve two purposes.  First, if
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we are to understand under what conditions the moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention should be considered to be an all-things-considered moral ought, then as a
matter of practical deliberation it would need to outweigh or preclude other relevant
countervailing moral considerations.  The additional conditions to be identified below are
the most likely countervailing moral considerations.  Second, as noted at the outset of this
chapter, the project being pursued is, at least in part, a justificatory one.  If I am
successful in accounting for the underlying concerns of those who object, on theoretical
grounds, to the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention, continued objection on
their part would be unreasonable.    
3.7.1 The Skeptic
What conditions can be derived from the objections of the skeptics?  Skeptical
objections comes in various forms and from various quarters.  Though the skepticism to
which each is committed ranges from an outright denial of the possibility of normative
theory at the international level to a claim that the obligations of international ethics
placed on states are drastically weaker versions of their domestic counterparts, the tie that
binds the various form of skepticism together is the priority they assign to the interest of
the state.  Essentially, the skeptic claims that humanitarian intervention is morally
impermissible or practically irrelevant because the only effective obligations a state can
have are to itself or to its own inhabitants.  It can never have an effective external
obligation – obligation to distant others.
However, as discussed above, the mere fact that governments have internal
obligations does not preclude states from having external obligations.  The strongest
justification for the skeptic’s claim is that a state is to serve the interests of its inhabitants
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and that acting to aid distant others sacrifices fulfillment of the internal obligations a state
has to its own inhabitants to the weaker external obligations it may have to distant others.  
So what do we learn from the skeptical objection to the moral permissibility of a
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention?  What the skeptic does rightly point out is
that in many cases external obligations will require a state to sacrifice, at least to a degree,
some of the resources instrumental to the fulfillment of its internal obligations.  In some
cases, the sacrifice required will be too great, and the moral obligation to intervene will
be outweighed by the relevant internal obligations at issue.  Thus, an additional condition
on an all-things-considered moral obligation to intervene is that if too much is sacrificed
internally it would be reasonable to reject the moral obligation to intervene.  Obviously,
this leave open the question as to what counts as too much.  However, this is not a
question that can be answered in the abstract, but will require the careful consideration of
the relevant aspects of a particular circumstance.
3.7.2 The Communitarian
The relevant aspect of the communitarian objection to the moral permissibility of
a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is the claim that cosmopolitan theories,
like the one I am pressing, fail to properly acknowledge or account for the moral value of
community.  The value of community comes from its necessary relationship to the pursuit
of moral and political self-determination of a people.  The value is such that it ought to be
protected against the outside imposition of political systems or substantive moral values. 
What we learn from this objection is that, as a general proposition, community
does have value, and ought to be considered in our practical deliberations over our moral
obligations in the international arena.  This, however, does not preclude the possibility
-130-
that under the appropriate circumstances an all-things-considered moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention exists.  The value of a community as a relevant countervailing
consideration against the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention will depend on
the existence of only a single community in the state in question, on whether a
community of the relevant sort exists, and on the degree to which the community in
question fulfills the functions which justify our ascription of value to a community.  
The mere fact of community and the fact that intervention will interfere with or
undermine the community will not automatically outweigh the moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention implied by the basic right to physical security.  One could,
however, reasonably reject an all things considered moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention if a community of moral significance is being threatened and the rights
violations at issue do not warrant the harm caused to such a community.  
3.7.3 The Instrumental Argument
The instrumental argument is that international relations are governed by the state
system, and a fundamental tenet of the state system is that the sovereignty of states should
be respected.  Such respect includes the right of each state to be free from intervention. 
The state system, and the respect for state sovereignty upon which it relies and demands,
is instrumental to the provision and maintenance of international peace and security.  It is
the instrumental relationship between the protection of state sovereignty and international
peace and security that renders humanitarian intervention morally impermissible.
The instrumental nature of this argument is key to understanding its limitations.  I
will assume that international peace and security is worth protecting – hardly a
controversial assumption.  First, since the claim is that states ought to refrain from
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intervening into the internal affairs of other states to insure that international peace and
security is maintained, if in any particular instance international peace and security is
actually served by intervention or if intervention would not upset international peace and
security then the concern over international peace and security is not a reasonable basis
for an objection to intervention.
Second, since the prohibition on intervention is justified by its instrumental
relationship to the provision and maintenance of international peace and security, the
demandingness of the prohibition against intervention will depend on the degree to which
adherence to it tends to serve the goal of international peace and security.  Thus the
demandingness of the prohibition is not absolute but conditional on the instrumental
relationship upon which its justification is based.  
Lastly, the instrumental argument assumes, but fails to demonstrate, that
international peace and security – the peace and security between states – are the only
relevant moral values to be considered.  When properly understood international peace
and security are instrumental values.  The value attributed to international peace and
security is justified by its instrumental relationship to the provision and protection of the
rights of individuals and their communities.  It is certainly possible that in some cases the
maintenance of international peace and security will stand as an obstacle to the protection
and / or promotion of the fundamental values upon which the justification of the value of
international peace and security is based.  In such cases international peace and security
lacks the moral force which would in turn justify the prohibition against intervention.
Assuming the value of state sovereignty to the state system and the instrumental
value of the state system to international peace and security, it would be reasonable for
 Samantha Powers, pp. 461-473.244
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one to presume that, ceteris paribus, states ought to refrain from intervening militarily
into the internal affairs of other states.  This presumption could be rebutted if it could be
shown that the maintenance of peace and security between states is an obstacle to the
fulfillment of the values that the maintenance of international peace and security is
supposed to serve, that international peace and security is outweighed by some other
relevant moral consideration, or that in any particular instance international peace and
security is either not implicated or is being served by intervention.  Thus, one could
reasonably reject an all things considered moral obligation of humanitarian intervention
in any case in which the presumption is not rebutted.
3.8 Additional Conditions from Practical and Epistemic Concerns
There are a number of other concerns which may be raised against the moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention which have yet to be discussed.  In her discussion
of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, Samantha Powers identifies as the most salient the
concerns over perversity, futility, and perfidy.   None, however, is an absolute objection244
to the permissibility of intervention, nor are they objections to the possibility of an
obligation of intervention.  Rather, they should be viewed as cautionary tales, warning of
the moral hazards that may result from certain practical or epistemic problems associated
with intervention, and as such they may serve as the bases for a reasonable rejection of an
all things considered moral obligation of humanitarian intervention. 
3.8.1 Identification of Additional Practical and Epistemic Concerns
There are at least two distinct ways in which the concern over futility is related to
the possibility of an all-things-considered moral obligation of humanitarian intervention. 
 Ibid., pp. 463-466.245
 Ibid., pp. 461-463.246
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First, futility is a concern related to any claimed obligation.  If one’s actions would be
futile in achieving the goal at which they are directed, it would be reasonable for one to
reject the claim that one had an obligation to engage in such actions.  In the common
parlance of moral philosophy, the concern over futility is related loosely to the
proposition that ought implies can. Thus, it would be reasonable for one to reject an all
things considered moral obligation of humanitarian intervention if the intervention was
likely to be futile.
The concern over futility also relates to an all-things-considered moral obligation
of humanitarian intervention in a more specific way.  The criticism is that by their very
nature humanitarian concerns can never be served by military action as military action is
anathema to such concerns.   However, in many instances one could not at the same245
time maintain that one is committed to the humanitarian values upon which the basic
right to physical security relies, and claim that military intervention is inherently
contradictory with that right.  Military intervention may be the only way to protect and /
or respect the right.  So understood, the argument from futility would not provide the
basis for a reasonable rejection of a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention. 
Rather, what is likely meant by those who claim that military action can’t serve
humanitarian purposes is that the risk that more harm will be caused by military action
than will be prevented is too great.  This concern is what Powers calls the concern over
perversity.   Those who raise the concern over perversity claim that we are not able to246
predict with certainty the short or long-term results of an intervention.  The risk of
 Ibid., pp. 466-468.247
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worsening the situation by military intervention and causing perverse results is too great;
therefore, we should refrain from intervening.
The concern over perversity does not provide the basis for an absolute prohibition
on intervention, but it highlights an epistemic uncertainty of moral significance that faces
those deciding whether to act on a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention.  What
are the likely consequences of the intervention?   In addition, the concern over perversity
is a relevant consideration in one’s assessment of how the intervention ought to be
prosecuted and what must be done afterwards.  However, the question of whether an
intervention should occur is distinct from the question of how it ought to be prosecuted, a
discussion of which must be saved for another occasion.  Nonetheless, it would be
reasonable for one to reject an all things considered moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention if it is likely that the intervention will worsen the situation.
The concern over perfidy is based upon the possibility that an oppressed group
may either exaggerate the nature of the oppression and violence it is being subjected to, or
that it may actually use violence to provoke retaliation and a humanitarian crisis in an
effort to draw the international community into an internal conflict by creating the need
for a humanitarian intervention.   The concern over perfidy is based upon the claim that247
the more we engage in humanitarian intervention, and the more acceptable it becomes,
the more such abuses will occur.  Like any slippery slope argument, it is only as good as
the reasons underlying each slip in the slide.  This is not to say that such concerns are
unwarranted.  But we need to understand the basis for the supposed slide.  It is not just
that more interventions will occur, but that those who are provoking the retaliation which
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in turn leads to the intervention are being rewarded.  Again, this is not a concern over the
justifiability of a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention, rather it is a concern over
how the intervention is prosecuted.
I am not entirely sure why this should stand as an objection to intervention on
behalf of the innocents whose rights are being violated.  The obligation require that those
whose rights are being violated be provided the necessary social guarantees against
standard threats to their security.  If that means they need to be protected from both sides,
then so be it.  Nonetheless, I will accept, for the sake of argument, the underlying
concern.  Thus, one ought not reward provocateurs, as doing so may encourage others to
employ a similar violent strategy.  As such, one could reasonably reject an all things
considered moral obligation of humanitarian intervention if, as conducted, the
intervention would reward the provocateurs.
3.9 Conclusion: A Moral Obligation to Intervene in Rwanda
From the previous section one can infer that the following make up that set of
conditions under which no one could reasonably deny that a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention exists:
1. The circumstances must be a violation of the basic right to physical security
thus giving rise to the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention;
2. Fulfillment of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention does not
require the obligation bearing state to make substantial internal sacrifices;
3. Intervention would not irreparably harm the existence of a community of moral
significance;
4. Intervention would not unjustifiably compromise international peace and
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security;
5. Those bearing the obligation are capable of effectively fulfilling the obligation
of humanitarian intervention; 
6. Intervention would not worsen the situation that the intervention is intended to
resolve; and 
7. Intervention would not undermine the presumption against intervention or
reward provocateurs who use violence in their efforts to cause the circumstances
that trigger humanitarian intervention.
It is important to note that the conditions are conjunctive.  It will not be sufficient if all
but one are met.  Condition 1. determines whether a moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention exists and must be considered in a state’s practical deliberations.  Conditions
2. through 7. must be met if the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is to be an
all things considered moral obligation to act the existence of which no one could
reasonably deny. 
3.9.1 The circumstances must be a violation of the basic right to physical security 
thus giving rise to the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention
In Rwanda during the genocide of 1994, if you were a Tutsi or moderate Hutu
with Tutsi-sympathies you were constantly under the threat of violence against your
person, including the threat of death.  If anything is a standard threat to physical security
the threat of unprovoked and unjustified violence against one’s person is such a threat. 
The basic right to physical security provides the rational basis for a justified demand that
one’s physical security be socially guaranteed against such threats.  Provision of such
socially guaranteed protection would have required that the Hutu extremists conducting
the genocide be stopped.  Since the government was supporting the genocide, outside
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intervention would have been necessary to the provision of such socially guaranteed
protections.  The first condition is met.
3.9.2 Fulfillment of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention does not
require the obligation bearing state to make unreasonable internal sacrifices
Some might argue that had intervention been pursued the commitment of
resources necessary to effectively accomplish the goals of the intervention would have
caused an unjustified sacrifice of the internal obligations of states.  To stand as a reason
upon which a reasonable rejection could be based, it must have been the case that the
sacrifice required would have such an unjustifiable impact on the internal obligations of
each state individually and the international community as a collection of duty-bearing
states.  
According to Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, the leader of the United Nation’s Peace
Keeping force in Rwanda at the time of the genocide’s commencement, a force of 5000
well-armed soldiers with the necessary logistical and military support could have stopped
the genocide and provided the necessary conditions for the resumption of the Arusha
Accords, which would have provided Rwandans with the necessary socially guaranteed
protection of their physical security.  Various African nations had volunteered to man the
intervention.  All that was needed from the international community was the logistical
and military support.  The claim that this would have required substantial and
unjustifiably large internal sacrifices by states is simply false, and for this reason such a
claim would fail as the basis for a reasonable rejection of an all-things-considered moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda.
3.9.3 It must be the case that the intervention would not irreparably harm 
a community of moral significance
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The first question to be addressed with regard to this condition is whether
Rwanda, during the genocide, counted as a community of moral significance.  If it did not
one need not assess this condition further as it was not deserving of protection.  To be a
community of moral significance, and thus deserving of protection against intervention,
we must be able to identify the community in question and it must fulfill and protect the
rights of its inhabitants.  It is clear, that in the case of Rwanda during the genocide there
was no such community, and the community that would have been protected by
nonintervention were the Hutu extremists engaged in the systematic violation of the rights
of Rwanda’s inhabitants.  
In addition, the intervention would have served to reestablish the implementation
of the Arusha Accords which would have promoted and protected a community of moral
significance.  Thus, the claim that intervention in Rwanda would have irreparably harmed
a community of moral significance would fail as the basis for a reasonable rejection of an
all-things-considered moral obligation of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda.
3.9.4 It must be the case that international security is not unjustifiably compromised by
the fulfillment of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention
Prior to the genocide the Rwanda Patriotic Front and the Rwandan government
had entered into a peace and power-sharing agreement, the Arusha Accords, which was
intended to bring peace, not only to Rwanda, but to the region as a whole.  The renewal of
violence by the Rwandan government under the control of the Hutu extremists
undermined the Arusha Accords and international peace and security.  Military
intervention and the reestablishment of the Arusha Accords would have increased
international security, not undermined it.  In addition, as a matter of historical fact, the
genocide created millions of refugees, who poured into neighboring countries, further
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destabilizing the region.  Thus, the claim that intervention would have undermined
international peace and security is belied by the facts; and as a consequence, fails as the
basis for a reasonable rejection of an all-things-considered moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention in Rwanda.
3.9.5 It must be the case that those bearing the obligation are capable of effectively
fulfilling the obligation of humanitarian intervention
The obligation to provide the socially guaranteed protection of physical security
against standard threats was borne directly by individuals.  It would be reasonable for one
to reject the claim that individuals qua individuals were under an obligation to conduct an
intervention as their effort would likely be futile.  However, states are the instruments by
which individuals are capable of coordinating their efforts and fulfilling such obligations. 
States individually, or the international community as a collection of duty-bearing states,
could have provided the logistical, political and military support necessary for the
intervention to be successful.  As a consequence, the claim that the effort would have
been futile would fail as the basis for a reasonable rejection of an all things considered
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. 
3.9.6 It must be the case that intervention would not worsen the situation 
that the intervention was intended to resolve
One might claim that when intervention was finally attempted through Operation
Turquoise, the French forces actually made the situation worse, and so it would be
reasonable to conclude that intervention would have made the situation worse no matter
when it was attempted or by whom.  Such an assertion is belied by the facts.  The French
had waited until the Rwanda Patriotic Front had essentially stopped the genocide, and
then the French operated under the assumption that both Tutsis and Hutus had engaged in
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mass killings despite the fact that French government officials knew otherwise.  If
Operation Turquoise teaches us anything it is the need to act quickly in the case of
genocide and  that the international community must have a real commitment to the
intervention and its humanitarian goals.
3.9.7 It must be the case that the intervention would not undermine the presumption
against intervention or reward provocateurs who use violence in their efforts to cause
the circumstances that trigger humanitarian intervention
The Rwandan genocide began amidst an effort for peace.  The provocation was
the result of unprovoked violence against innocent civilians by the genocidaires.  This
does not even fit the case of perfidy.  In addition, according to Dallaire, the Rwanda
Patriotic Front refrained from military action until it was absolutely clear that the
international community was going to do nothing.  The presumption against intervention
was clearly rebutted in this case and the facts of the situation would have highlighted the
fact that only in extreme cases would military intervention be used.  Thus a charge of
perfidy would fail as the basis for a reasonable rejection of an all-things-considered moral
obligation of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda.  
3.9.8 Conclusion
In conclusion, there existed an all-things-considered moral obligation to intervene
in Rwanda in 1994 to prevent the genocide from occurring or to stop it once it had begun. 
Each of the relevant conditions has been met, and as a consequence there is little basis for
a reasonable rejection of the claim that such an obligation existed.  I recognize that this
demonstrates a doubt on my part as to the success of the argument.  I believe that I have
demonstrated that it would be unreasonable for one to reject that a moral obligation of
humanitarian intervention existed as an a–things-considered obligation in the case of
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Rwanda.  But, admittedly, I have not, nor do I think I have the mental capacity to, account
for the multitude of arguments that have not been considered.  Nonetheless, even if such
an argument exists, I remain convinced that our better considered moral judgment, based
on the arguments I have presented and critiqued, should lead us to the conclusion that an
all-things-considered moral obligation of humanitarian intervention is possible, and that it
did exist in the case of Rwanda.
 Charter of the United Nations art. 2 paras. 1, and 4.248
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CHAPTER 4 – THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
OPERATIVE IN 1994: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
Article 2
The Organization [the United Nations] and its Members in pursuit of the
Purposes stated in Article I, shall act in accordance with the following
Principles:
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members.
....
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.248
4.1 Introduction
I have argued that the international community, as a collection of duty-bearing
states, bore an all things considered moral obligation of humanitarian intervention to
prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda.  Intervention, however, did not occur.  What
went wrong?  One reason for the failure was not a matter of morality per se; rather the
prevailing view at the time was that the rules governing the practical deliberations of
states (the normative framework of international relations) precluded states from
considering the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention in their practical
deliberations.  In this chapter, I will set forth what I have found to be the most widely
discussed arguments in support of the claim that states ought not consider such moral
demands in their practical deliberations.  I will then critically assess those arguments.  In
the end, I conclude that none of the arguments are capable of justifying a principle of
practical deliberation with such an exclusionary or preclusive effect.
  For a discussion of the special importance of this problem to political249
philosophers, see Onora O’Neill, Faces of Hunger (London: Allen & Unwin Publishers
Ltd, 1986), Ch. 7.
 O’Neill, Faces of Hunger, p. 123.250
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4.2 The Importance of Interdisciplinary Efforts in Political Philosophy 
Before proceeding I would like to make a general comment about the nature and
importance of this aspect of my project.  The role of the political philosopher is
complicated by the inherently interdisciplinary nature of the field of study.  We must walk
between the philosophical and the practical.  We use our analytic skills to critically assess
the theoretical underpinnings of claims made or positions taken in politics, ethics, law,
and international relations.  To have success in this endeavor, we must, for any particular
problem, be able to converse in the conceptual language of one discipline, then another,
and back again.   249
My focus on the right of nonintervention as it relates to the practical deliberations
of states is based in part on the desire to have an impact on the way states act in the
international arena.  To have such a desired effect, one must begin with the practical
deliberations of agents.  With that goal in mind, I find Onora O’Neill’s discussion of the
challenges that face one seeking to effect the practical/ethical reasoning of other agents to
be insightful.  O’Neill claims that “[w]hat is needed is a theory of obligation which is not
only universal and critical but accessible to the relevant agents and agencies.”   250
It is the notion of accessibility that is of particular relevance to my project.  The
critical assessment of the normative framework of international relations must be
accessible to those whose decisions are governed by it.  For that reason, my approach has
been to identify the arguments pressed by those who seek to defend the right of
 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge:251
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 3.
 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (Cambridge:252
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 75.
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nonintervention, and critically assess those arguments on the terms presented.  Taking
O’Neill’s concerns to heart, I am in need of a common grounding from which the critical
analysis can proceed.  The discussion in this chapter is intended to bridge the
terminological gap between these related but distinct disciplines.
4.3 The Normative Framework of International Relations, State Sovereignty 
and the Right of Nonintervention
To begin, one must have an understanding of what I mean by the normative
framework of international relations.  The normative framework of international relations
(also referred to as the “normative framework”) is constituted by the principles that
govern the practical deliberations of states.  There are two aspects of the normative
framework which must be discussed – the scope of the framework and the content of its
governing principles.  There are many who argue that the scope of the normative
framework is constituted and exhausted by sovereign states.  In his discussion of the role
of human rights in international relations, David P. Forsythe has noted that “it has been
widely believed that the state, not the individual is the basic unit.”   As to international251
law Michael Byers notes, 
States are usually considered to be the only holders of full legal
personality.  In principle, all States have the same degree of legal
personality, and in that sense all States are formally equal.  252
Finally, but less approvingly, Charles R. Beitz has pointed out that the presumption that
states are the only relevant actors in international relations is taken to be necessary in
 Beitz, pp. 36-37.253
 Forsythe, p. 3.254
 See Janis,  p. 157.  See also Treaties of Peace Between Sweden and the Holy255
Roman Empire and Between France and the Holy Roman Empire (Peace of Westphalia,
October 14, 1648), 1 C.T.S. 119-356.  The Charter of the United Nations also provides
some guidance here, as Chapter 7 interventions are conducted to preserve or establish
international peace and security.  And see Smith (that establishment of sovereignty
converted chaos of pre-Westphalian world into order)p. 274.
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contemporary international political theory.  253
As to the content of the normative framework, “the core principle has been said to
be state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states” – a right of
nonintervention possessed by all sovereign states held against all other sovereign states.  254
How exactly state sovereignty is related to non-interference will be discussed below.
The conflict between the normative framework of international relations and the
moral obligation to intervene in Rwanda should be apparent.  The moral obligation to
intervene in Rwanda was based upon the basic human right to physical security held by,
and correlative duties borne by, individuals.  Since the scope of the normative framework
extends only to sovereign states, the concerns of individuals as individuals were beyond
the scope of the normative framework.   Thus, violations of the Rwandan Tutsis’
individual rights to physical security were not, in and of themselves, relevant reasons for
states to consider in their practical deliberations.
More readily apparent is the conflict between the right of nonintervention and the
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention.  Under the normative framework, the only
generally accepted exceptions to the right of nonintervention are threats to international
order.   If the internal actions of a state pose a threat to international order, then255
intervention may be permissible to protect international order.  Violations of the basic
 Hobbes, Chs. 17-18.256
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right to physical security, which would trigger the moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention, would not necessarily pose a threat to international order.  Thus, when the
basic right to physical security is being violated but international order is not threatened,
intervention is not justified under the normative framework. 
Though the normative framework is in the process of changing, many hold fast to
the basic principles which led the international community to choose not to intervene in
Rwanda.  To determine what went wrong in Rwanda in 1994 and to insure that it not
happen again, one needs to understand the nature of the normative framework operative
in 1994.  In particular, one must understand the notion of state sovereignty relevant to
international relations, the right of nonintervention, and the various relationships that are
thought to connect the two.
4.3.1 State Sovereignty
Under the normative framework of international relations, the possession of
sovereignty by a state is presumed to entail the possession of certain rights and privileges
in relation to other states.  One such right, and the one most central to this discussion, is
the right of nonintervention.  But how could the possession of sovereignty grant a
political organization an entitlement to oppress, exploit, and even kill its own inhabitants
without the fear of interference from other states? 
To answer this question one must understand what it means for a state to have
sovereignty.  I will begin with the classical account provided by Thomas Hobbes as it
serves as the starting point for much of the contemporary discussion of sovereignty.  256
The sovereign comes into existence and is granted such powers through the creation of a
 Ibid., Ch. 17, pp. 111-115.257
 Ibid., Ch. 20, pp. 135-139.258
 Ibid., Ch. 18, p. 114.259
 Ibid., Ch. 18, pp. 115-120.260
 Robert O. Keohane, “Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in261
Sovereignty,” from, Holzgrefe and Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal,
and Political Dilemmas, p. 282.
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social contract.   What is important to Hobbes is that the “commonwealth” created 257
provide internal peace and security from outside interference.   These are the necessary258
and sufficient conditions for the political organization in question to be sovereign.  As
Hobbes states,
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to
defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of
one another and thereby to secure them in such sorts as that by
their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may
nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their
power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men,
that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices into one Will
....259
Sovereignty, for Hobbes, is comprised of the powers and rights possessed by the
sovereign.   260
A more contemporary assessment of the classical account is provided by Robert
Keohane.  According to Keohane, “[t]he classic unitary conception of sovereignty is the
doctrine that sovereign states exercise both internal supremacy over all other authorities
within a given territory, and external independence of outside authorities.”   Keohane’s261
statement is an example of Christopher Morris’ recognition that “[i]t is common to
 Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge262
University Press, 1998), p. 172.
 Ibid.263
Roger Scruton, “Sovereignty” from A Dictionary of Political Thought (London:264
The Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 441.
 Morris, p. 14.265
 Ibid, p. 178.266
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distinguish internal and external aspects of sovereignty”.   262
The difference between the relationships that define internal and external
sovereignty helps to explain which is relevant to the normative framework.  As Morris
notes, “[i]nternal sovereignty pertains to the governance of the realm; external
sovereignty, to independence of other states.”   Internal sovereignty is related to the263
internal affairs of a political organization, and the relevant parties to the constitutive
relationship are the governmental institutions of states and those they govern.  264
Under the classical account of sovereignty, a state has internal sovereignty only if
it is the supreme political authority within a particular territory.   So what exactly does265
that mean?  To have internal sovereignty under the classical account, a state’s claimed
authority must be the source of all other political authority within a given territory and the
state must claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within that territory.   As266
internal sovereignty is a matter of internal relations within a state, and the understanding
of the normative framework of international relations under discussion is concerned with
the relations between states, internal sovereignty is largely irrelevant to our understanding
of the relationship between sovereignty and the normative framework of international
relations.
Scruton, p. 441.267
Hobbes, Ch. 18, pp. 115-120.268
 See Morris, p. 41.269
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External sovereignty, on the other hand is concerned with the relations between
states; it is  “an attribute which political bodies possess in relation to other such
bodies.”   As a consequence, the normative framework of international relations is most267
directly related to this aspect of sovereignty.  To understand external sovereignty and the
role it plays in the normative framework of international relations, it is important to
understand the difference between external sovereignty as a descriptive matter and
external sovereignty as an attribution of normative status.  The two notions may, as
Hobbes seemed to think, be inexorably tied together in that having sovereignty in the
descriptive sense made a political organization sovereign which, in turn, served as the
basis for the possession of the rights and duties of which the normative notion of
sovereignty is comprised.   For reasons that I discuss below, I find such an account to be268
untenable.
To possess external sovereignty in the descriptive sense is a matter of meeting
certain factual conditions.  A state possesses external sovereignty if it stands in the
requisite relationship to other similar political organizations – that a state is politically
independent of other states.   On the other hand, under the normative use of the term,269
sovereignty is intended to signify a complex web of rights and duties possessed by
political organizations with external sovereignty; most important to this discussion is the
right of nonintervention.  The normative status ascribed to states that possess external
sovereignty is a conventional matter institutionalized in international relations and
 Hohfeld, pp. 35-39. See also Rodin, p. 18.   270
 Sumner, pp. 11, 13.271
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international law.  Without an argument connecting the two, the normative status
associated with the ascription of sovereignty is distinct from the descriptive satisfaction
of the conditions necessary for the possession of sovereignty.
4.3.2 Right of Nonintervention
The normative framework of international relations is based on the relationship
between external sovereignty and the right of nonintervention.  However, before we can
assess the nature of this relationship, we must understand the right of nonintervention. 
Rights are typically constituted by claims (legal, conventional, or moral) held by one
entity against another which are a source of duties borne by the latter and owed to the
former.  They are, in Hohfeldian terms, jural correlatives.   As a consequence, and as270
was discussed in Chapter 3, the explication of a right will include the identification of the
content, strength, and scope of the right.271
Beginning with the scope, as the right of nonintervention is a fundamental
principle governing the normative framework of international relations it should be
consistent with the scope of the normative framework itself.  In this vein, the right of
nonintervention is presumed to be held by sovereign states, and the correlative duty to
refrain from intervening is also presumed to be held by states, both individually and
collectively.  Under the normative framework of international relations operative in 1994,
the only relevant actors are presumed to be sovereign states. 
With regard to the strength of the right, other than the maintenance of
international order, the right of nonintervention is presumed to be the weightiest second
 For a discussion of second-order reasons, see Raz, Practical Reason and272
Norms, pp. 39-45. 
 For Mill’s discussion of the harm principle see John Stuart Mill, On Liberty,273
from On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 14.
-151-
order exclusionary reason to be considered in the practical deliberations of states.  272
Provided international order is not at stake, the duty to refrain from intervening
correlative to the right of nonintervention is presumed to be a conclusive reason for states
not to interfere in the internal affairs of another state.  It is both a first order reason for
non-interference and a second order reason to exclude from consideration reasons for
action the fulfillment of which would require intervention. 
 Finally, what is the content of the right of nonintervention and its correlative
duty?  The right of nonintervention is presumed to give a right-holding state a claim to be
free from outside interference, and that it be allowed to govern its internal affairs as it
sees fit.  The claimed liberty, though absolute with regard to the internal affairs of a state,
does admit of certain limitations with regard to actions affecting other states.  Under the
right of nonintervention, actions of a state are limited much like the actions of an
individual under Mill’s harm principle.   Similarly, with regard to its internal affairs,273
under the right of nonintervention a sovereign state has a protected liberty to engage in
any action that does not harm another state or threaten international order.
As to the correlative duty, states, as bearers of the duty, are under an obligation to
refrain from engaging in actions that interfere with the protected liberty of the right
holder.  The duty, however, does not require the bearer of the duty to refrain from
interfering when the actions engaged in by the right holder go beyond the protected
sphere of liberty governed by the right of nonintervention.  Thus, the duty demands that
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the duty bearer not intervene in the internal affairs of another state provided that the right
holding state’s actions are not going to harm the duty bearer, or pose a threat to
international order.
The right of nonintervention is a right held by sovereign states to govern their
internal affairs as they see fit free from outside interference, and it gives rise to a
correlative duty borne by all other sovereign states not to consider reasons for action that
would require the violation of another state’s sovereignty.  This is a fairly crude
understanding of the nature of the right of nonintervention; however, the provision of a
more explicit and detailed account would require more space than I can allot here, and for
my present purposes this account should be sufficient. 
4.3.3 The Relationship between the Right of Nonintervention and State Sovereignty
Let us return to the relationship between the right of nonintervention and the
possession of external sovereignty.  Under the normative framework of international
relations, the right of nonintervention is argued to be either implied by or derived from
the possession of external sovereignty.  If the right of nonintervention is to be implied by
the possession of external sovereignty, the general argument must run as follows: 
If a state has the ability to protect and maintain its political independence
then it has a claim held against other states to remain politically
independent without the threat of intervention.  
This can’t be correct.  The ability to do something does not imply a right as a protected
liberty to engage in that action.  It would make no more sense to say that a state has a
right to be politically independent because it has the ability to remain so, than it would be
to say that I have the right to torture puppies because I have the ability to do so. 
One might contend that in assessing this argument I have focused on the wrong
 See Janis,  p. 157.  See also Treaties of Peace Between Sweden and the Holy274
Roman Empire and Between France and the Holy Roman Empire, 1 C.T.S. 119-356.
 Janis, pp. 159-160.275
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notion of sovereignty.  The objection might run as follows: 
Of course, the possession of state sovereignty doesn’t imply the right of
nonintervention.  The possession of state sovereignty is a descriptive fact,
and can not, without more, imply a normative principle.  However, as was
noted previously, in addition to the descriptive notion, sovereignty often
refers to the normative status one state has in relation to other states, and
one important aspect of a sovereign state’s normative status is that
sovereign states have the right of nonintervention.  Thus, the right of
nonintervention is not only implied by the possession of state sovereignty
under this normative understanding, it is constitutive of sovereignty. 
 
I take Hobbes’s understanding of the relationship between being a sovereign and
possessing the rights and duties associated with the normative understanding of
sovereignty to be captured by the argument underlying this objection.  Nonetheless, the
objection would fail as it begs the very question that I am seeking to answer – whether the
right of nonintervention, as an aspect of sovereignty under this normative connotation,
can be justified.  
How else might a state’s possession of external sovereignty imply a right of
nonintervention?  According to Mark W. Janis, the relationship between the right of
nonintervention and external sovereignty arose out of the peace of Westphalia.    Under274
this account, the relationship is the result of a set of legal accords designed to provide
peace and security and is based upon the idea that respect for the external sovereignty of
each state would be the best means to providing peace and security.   Hans Morgenthau275
argues that the right of nonintervention was actually a result of the French revolution and
the claim by the French that under international relations other states were obligated to
 Hans Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45276
No. 3 (April 1967), pp. 425-436.
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refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of France.   Under either account it is276
claimed that the right of nonintervention is related to external sovereignty through
conventional rules, and not by some sort of inherent or necessary implication. 
It might be contended that an implication based on a conventional set of rules
should be sufficient.  However, conventional systems and the rules of which they are
comprised are open to our adjustment or elimination should they prove to be unjustified,
morally or practically.  Such systems require justification with regard to the purposes they
are intended to serve and the rules of which they are comprised.  Consequently, the
existence of a conventional system can’t provide the justification for the principles which
are constitutive of the system itself. 
  This lack of necessary implication should not be taken as a denial of the moral
significance of the right of nonintervention.  Rather, the lack of implicature refocuses the
discussion.  The right of nonintervention is a normative principle that needs to be
justified, and as it is not necessarily implied by the possession of external sovereignty, it
needs to be defended by arguments that explain why the possession of external
sovereignty should entail a right of nonintervention. 
At this point, one might contend that I have abandoned the descriptive project
with which I am at present concerned.  The claim is that my contention that the right of
nonintervention is not implied by state sovereignty is more a matter of conceptual
criticism than simply a description of the relationship that is presumed to exist.  Such an
objection, however, would miss the point.  A failure to recognize the lack of implication
 One example of such an argument might be an argument from autonomy in277
which it is claimed that, like noninterference is instrumentally valuable to individual
autonomy, nonintervention is instrumentally valuable to political independence and state
sovereignty.
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between the possession of state sovereignty and the right of nonintervention, and a failure
to acknowledge the conventional relationship between state sovereignty and the right of
nonintervention would render the descriptive account a mere strawman argument.  In
providing this alternative view of the relationship, the proper focus of analysis has been
identified – the justificatory arguments for the right of nonintervention as a conventional
rule of the normative framework of international relations.
4.4 Justifying the Right of Nonintervention
The justifications offered in support of the right of nonintervention  fall into three
basic categories: arguments from autonomy, arguments from the principle of anti-
paternalism, and instrumental arguments.  In order to avoid confusion, I would like to
note that I am using the term ‘instrumental’ to refer to arguments that are based on the
contention that a right of nonintervention is instrumental to the provision and protection
of international peace and security.  I point this out because many of the arguments to be
discussed are instrumental arguments of one sort or another.277
4.4.1 Arguments from Autonomy
Justifications for the right of nonintervention based on autonomy come in at least
three forms, two of which are based on the domestic analogy.  Beitz, though not a
proponent of the analogical argument, succinctly captures the underlying analogy,
like persons in domestic society, states in international society are
to be treated as autonomous sources of ends, morally immune from
external interference, and morally free to arrange their internal
 Beitz, p. 65-66.278
 Hobbes, Ch. 13, pp. 82-84.279
 Hobbes, pp. 82-86.  See also, David Hume’s discussion of “Justice.”  Hume,280
An Inquiry Section III, pp. 15-38.  For a more contemporary version of the Humean
argument regarding the nature of morality, see David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
 Hobbes, Ch. 13, pp. 85, 86.281
 Ibid., Chs. 15-17.282
 See Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations,283
translated by Richards Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and
Co., 1966), p. 580.
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affairs as their government sees fit.278
One version of analogical form of the argument is founded on the claim that
international relations is like a Hobbesian state of nature.  For Hobbes the state of nature
is a war of all against all.   Morality, as demanding constraint on self-interested279
behavior, does not exist because no individual agent can be certain that others would
respect such demands.   Since in the state of nature no one has reason to abide by a280
moral code that would require them to act against their own best interest, the natural law
that exists in the state of nature is for each individual to act prudentially.   Men join281
together to form societies as a matter of self-interest, and morality is created when the
reigns of authority and power of enforcement are granted to a sovereign through the
formation of a social contract.   If, however, no contract were created and no sovereign282
were to arise, the only guiding principle for individual action would remain prudence.
This form of the argument is based upon the presumption that international
relations is like the Hobbesian state of nature.   There is no sovereign in international283
relations to enforce the demands morality might place on states, sovereign states are like
 Hobbes, Ch. 21, p. 142.284
 Mill, On Liberty, pp. 5-130.285
 See Benn and Peters, pp. 429-431.  And see Vincent, p. 345.286
 Mill, On Liberty, p. 14.287
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individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature, and as Hobbes states, 
every commonwealth, (not every man) has an absolute liberty, to
do what it shall judge (that is to say, what that man, or assembly
that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing tho their benefit.284
As a consequence, the only principles guiding a state’s actions are self-interest and
prudence.  To act otherwise would be irrational. 
It’s hard to see how such an account could imply a right of nonintervention.  In a
circumstance in which a state could benefit by intervening in the internal affairs of
another state it would entail the opposite – that as a matter of self-interest or prudence, a
state would be obligated to intervene.  In fact, under such an account, if self-interest
demanded it, a state would be obligated to engage in an aggressive war.  I will not
consider this argument further.
An alternative, and more promising, form of the argument from autonomy is
based upon John Stuart Mill’s understanding of the nature and value of autonomy to
individuals.   This argument again invokes the domestic analogy.   The central feature285 286
of this account is the recognition that the value of individual autonomy is so important
that it ought not be interfered with.  As Mill states,
In the part [of an individual’s conduct] which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right absolute.  Over himself, over
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.  287
The argument proceeds by claiming that the value of state sovereignty is analogous to the
 See Benn and Peters, pp. 429-431.  And see Vincent, p. 345.288
 See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 87-91.  See also Mill,  “A Few Words289
on Nonintervention.”  
 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 61-62.290
 Michael Walzer, “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention,” Dissent291
(Winter 2002), pp. 29-37, 29-31.
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value of individual autonomy, and as such it ought not be interfered with.  288
The third and final form of the argument from autonomy is not analogical. 
Michael Walzer argues that the right of nonintervention can be justified by appeal to
Mill’s arguments regarding self-determination.   Those familiar with Walzer’s work289
may wonder why I am not discussing the “legalist paradigm.”  Walzer employs the
legalist paradigm to defend a state’s right to defend itself, and not necessarily the right of
nonintervention.   Walzer explicitly recognizes that acts by a state or a government that290
“shock the conscience” may, as an exception to the right of nonintervention, justify
intervention.   I agree with Walzer’s conclusion that we are permitted to intervene when291
events internal to another state shock the conscience of mankind, but find his arguments
and methodology lacking, and his standard unnecessarily demanding and too vague to be
useful.  
A standard that relies on what actually “shocks the conscience” is too reliant on
intuitions and subjective evaluation to serve any useful purpose.  If what Walzer means is
that intervention is permitted when actions internal to another state should “shock the
conscience of mankind,” then an argument is needed to explain why one act should shock
the conscience while another should not.  It is not enough to look to the international
community’s reaction after a genocide.  For, as a matter of historical fact, at the time of
 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 87.  See also Beitz’s discussion of Walzer’s292
argument, Beitz, p. 85.
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the perpetration of a genocide the consciences of a sufficient number of people were not
shocked.   
In addition, Walzer’s argument for the permissibility of humanitarian intervention
is built around the claim that a stringent right of nonintervention is justified and that the
occasions that “shock the conscience” are exceptions to the rule.  One could accept
Walzer’s argument for the right of nonintervention, but reject his claim that it admits of
any exceptions.  
Lastly, Walzer’s standard is disturbingly post hoc, as if the only way we can be
reasonably sure that a horrific event that ought to be prevented is going to occur is to wait
for its actual occurrence. For these reasons, I am focusing on the underlying argument,
but also thought it only fair to recognize that Walzer shares the intuition that
humanitarian intervention is, under certain circumstances, at least permissible. 
Returning to Walzer’s argument, in defense of the right of nonintervention, to be
self-determined 
The members of a political community must seek their own
freedom, just as the individual must cultivate his own virtue.  They
cannot be set free, as he cannot be made virtuous, by any external
force.  Indeed political freedom depends upon the existence of
individual virtue, and this the armies of another state are most
unlikely to produce ....292
For Walzer, the importance of self-determination in political matters gives rise to the duty
on states to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of another state.  As Walzer
goes on to state the value of self-determination gives rise to the
right of a people “to become free by their own efforts” if they can,
 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 88.293
 For a detailed discussion, see Beitz, pp. 83-92.294
 Mill, On Liberty, pp. 83-103.295
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and nonintervention is the principle guaranteeing that their success
will not be impeded or their failure prevented by the intrusions of an
alien power.293
To respect the liberty of the individual inhabitants of another state, the inhabitants of that
state must be allowed to “seek their own freedom” free from the interference of other
states.
4.4.2 Anti-Paternalism as a Justification for the Right of Nonintervention
A second form of justificatory argument for the right of nonintervention is based
upon various arguments against paternalism in international relations.   Much like294
Mill’s contention that paternalism with regards to individual liberty cannot be justified,295
Walzer notes, “[a]s with individuals, so with sovereign states: there are things that we
cannot do to them, even for their own ostensible good.”   One of these “things we296
cannot do to them” is to intervene in their internal affairs.  This argument depends upon
the successful defense of the principle of anti-paternalism in international relations.
The argument from anti-paternalism may be based on Mill’s arguments against
paternalism.  Alternatively, the argument may be based on the contention that the
principle of anti-paternalism in international affairs is justified because it is a value-
neutral principle that recognizes that there are competing conceptions of the good, and
that each sovereign state should be left to choose its own conception of the good from
amongst such competing conceptions.  It is important to note that I am using “the good”
See Benn and Peters, pp. 429-431.297
 See Vincent, p. 345.298
 Benn and Peters, p. 431.   See also Beitz, p. 84.299
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or “conceptions of the good” in a very loose sense.  All that is meant is the moral system
that people accept to guide their behavior.  This could include a conception of the good
that is rights-based.  I believe that my usage is consistent with those whose arguments I
am discussing.
Regarding the first form of the argument, its proponents are S.I. Benn, R. S.
Peters,  and R. J. Vincent.   Their argument in support of the principle of anti-297 298
paternalism is similar to Mill’s argument for the rejection of paternalism as it relates to
individual agents.  As Benn and Peters claim,
The duty of non-interference rests on the assumption that the
claims of a state’s members will generally be better served if they
are left to work out their own salvation.   299
The reasons offered by Benn and Peters are analogous to the reasons offered by Mill to
justify why a state should not interfere with the self-regarding actions of an individual.  300
The justifications can be categorized as either based on the claim that individuals are in
an epistemically privileged position when it comes to what is in their best interest, or that
the harm caused by interference with individual liberty, even if intended to benefit the
individual, will outweigh any potential benefits.  301
According to Beitz, Benn and Peters contend
that intervention in a state’s internal affairs cannot be justified on
paternalistic grounds because the intervening state is unlikely to be
 Beitz, p. 84.302
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impartial and because, in any event, a state is more likely to know
its own best interests than any other state.302
Like Mill’s reasons for rejecting paternalism with regards to individuals, Benn and
Peters’s reasons are contingent, and the success of the argument depends on the truth of
its underlying factual claims. 
The other version of the argument takes two distinct forms.  One is offered by
William E. Hall, and the other by Jovan Babic.  Hall seeks to justify the application of the
principle of anti-paternalism to international relations by first noting that there are
competing conceptions of the good, and that, with regard to individuals, the principle of
anti-paternalism is generally recognized as a neutral position that allows individuals to
pursue their own conceptions of the good.   Hall then invokes the domestic analogy,303
claiming that states in international relations are analogous to individuals in domestic
society.   Therefore, if the principle of anti-paternalism is a principle governing the304
treatment of individuals in domestic society, it is, by analogy, a principle that ought to
govern the way states treat one another in international relations.  
Babic’s argument, on the other hand, does not rely on the domestic analogy. 
Rather, Babic offers an argument rooted in respect for individual human rights.   Babic305
contends that states ought to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other states,
even if such interference is intended to serve the interests of the latter state’s inhabitants,
 Ibid., pp. 53-54.306
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because the former’s “value system” or “definition of ‘good’” is but one amongst a
number of different competing conceptions.   Respect for individual human rights306
requires that states show tolerance for the conceptions of the good chosen by individuals
in other states even if such choices appear to be morally or practically wrong.307
4.4.3 Instrumental Justification for the Right of Nonintervention
The final justificatory argument that I would like to discuss is based on the claim
that the right of nonintervention as respect for the sovereignty of states is instrumental to
achieving the goal of international order.  As Janis has pointed out, the pre-Westphalian
interactions between states were violent and anarchic:
The conflicting allegiances of Europe had contributed to the
terrible toll of confusion, death, and destruction from 1618 to 1648. 
In the mid-seventeenth century many Europeans sought a simpler,
and it was hoped, safer set of loyalties.308
It is argued that the right of nonintervention as respect for the sovereignty of states
converted the chaos of the pre-Westphalian world into “international order”.309
If we look to the UN Charter for some guidance as to what is meant by
international order, one of the fundamental “Purposes of the United Nations” is to
“maintain international peace and security.”   Analogous at the domestic level is310
 Michael Taylor, Community, Anarchy, & Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge311
University Press, 1982), pp. 44-45.
 Ibid., p. 44.312
 Ibid., p. 45.313
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Michael Taylor’s account of social order.   For Taylor, domestic social order “refers to311
an absence, more or less complete, of violence, a state of affairs in which people are
relatively safe from physical attack.”   According to Taylor, it is the desire for social312
order which underlies the Hobbesian social contract.   The analogous desire upon which313
the instrumental argument would be based is the desire by states for international order.  I
will assume that international order and international peace and security are similar
enough to be treated as equivalent for my purposes.
It is important that one also understand what is meant by international peace and
security.  The relevant notion of peace should be consistent with the presumed scope of
the normative framework of international relations that the only relevant actors are
sovereign states.  As such, threats to international peace are threats to the peace between
states.  Similarly, international security refers to the security of a state from aggression or
intervention by other states.  A state is secure if other states refrain or are prevented from
engaging in either aggressive action toward the state or intervention into the internal
affairs of the state.  If states refrained from acting on reasons the fulfillment of which
would require intervention, then international peace and security would, at the very least,
be more likely.
In recent times, other concerns have been introduced.  These contemporary
concerns have less to do with worry over aggressive war, and more to do with the concern
that intervention into the internal affairs of another state may be used as a pretext for
 Hoffmann, p. 19.  See also Smith (that a rule against intervention is necessary314
because the costs of intervention when it should not occur are too high), pp. 284-285
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aggressive war.  As Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out:
in a world of states, sovereignty [and the right of nonintervention]
protects one against outsiders trying to topple the government or to
set up a puppet regime or to impose their views of what is good
and right – hence the particularly strong attachment of countries
recently liberated from colonial rule to the principle of
nonintervention.314
The right of nonintervention is also argued to prevent the possibility of a state using a
humanitarian or other proffered moral justification as a pretext for an aggressive war.  
4.5 Critically Assessing the Justificatory Arguments 
In the remainder of this chapter I will argue that none of the justificatory
arguments succeed.  I will first address the various Millian analogical arguments, from
autonomy and anti-paternalism, and demonstrate that the analogical strategy fails.  I will
then turn my attention to the argument from self-determination offered by Walzer, and the
arguments from anti-paternalism offered by Hall and Babic.  Lastly, I critically assess the
instrumental argument.
4.5.1 Criticizing the Millian Analogical Arguments
For an analogical argument to succeed it must be the case that the grounding
claim or argument is sufficiently similar to the proposition or argument being justified by
the analogy.  As the analogical arguments being discussed rely on the domestic analogy, it
must be the case that individuals in domestic society are sufficiently similar to states in
international relations, and that the relationship between the relevant parties and the
identified properties and principles are sufficiently similar as well.
The grounding proposition of the arguments discussed is that individuals are the
Beitz, pp. 36-37.315
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paramount, if not the only, relevant moral agents in the domestic sphere.  Thus, to be
analogous, states in the international arena must be the paramount, if not the only,
relevant moral agents in the international arena.  One can assume that, as a matter of
convention, states are the only relevant moral agents in international relations.  However,
as was noted above, one cannot rely on the conventions one is seeking to justify to justify
the conventions themselves.  In addition, the claim that states are the only relevant moral
agents in international relations is contradicted by actual practice.  As Charles Beitz has
pointed out, there are a multitude of non-governmental organizations and secondary
associations that are given moral consideration when a state is determining what it ought
to do.  315
What is needed is an argument demonstrating that states ought to be considered
paramount in the international arena.  Any such argument would have to demonstrate that
individual moral agents, when juxtaposed with states, are not of paramount moral
concern.  If we make the assumption that a state’s moral legitimacy is determined by the
degree to which the state serves the interests of its inhabitants, then, in the domestic case,
the moral value of the state can’t be greater than the moral value of the individuals it is
intended to serve.  As a consequence, to support the analogy, one would have to explain
why the value of the individual is trumped by the value of the state at the international
level without relying on the claim that states are paramount in international relations.  
If I am correct, and states aren’t the only relevant moral agents in the international
arena, there are further problematic implications for the analogical arguments.  Common
to both Millian analogical arguments is the claim that an individual’s right to non-
 Mill, On Liberty, p. 83.316
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interference is limited by the rights of other relevant moral agents to be free from harm or
interference.   The rights of states in international relations are limited by the rights of316
other states; however, states are not the only relevant moral agents.  Thus, when a state’s
actions pose a threat of harm to the rights of other relevant moral agents, including
individuals, the state does not have a claim to a right of nonintervention.  In the cases that
would give rise to an obligation of humanitarian intervention, individuals are being
harmed or are being threatened with harm and thus the state cannot claim a right of
nonintervention.
As to the principle of anti-paternalism in particular, according to Mill, with regard
to the individual in domestic society, the principle is justified by the fact that an
individual knows what is in his/her own interest better than anyone else could, and/or that
any interference with the individual’s autonomy is likely to produce a greater harm than it
prevents.   Even if we assume that this is true in the individual case, it would seem to317
have very little empirical support when it comes to states who are violating or allowing
the violation of their citizens’ basic rights.  In addition, in such cases, the advent of mass
communication, globalization and growing intercultural exchange makes the claim that a
state always knows, better than outsiders, what is in the best interests of its inhabitants an
unlikely proposition.   Lastly, in any case where it is clear that the state is acting against318
the better interests of its inhabitants, e.g. failing to respect the basic right to physical
security, the justification fails.  The contingent nature of the justification is incompatible
 Mill, On Liberty, pp. 83-86.319
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with a right of nonintervention.
As to the analogical argument from autonomy, we can accept for the sake of
argument that Mill is correct in his claim that the value of autonomy to individual agents
is inherent.  We can also assume that Mill is correct in his claim that there are actions in
which an individual engages that only effect the individual him / herself.  Since individual
autonomy is inherently valuable, interference with an individual’s exercise of their
autonomy in such self-regarding cases would be an unjustified infringement. 
For the analogy to hold, it must be demonstrated both that the relationship that
exists between sovereignty and the state and autonomy and an individual moral agent are
sufficiently similar; and that the value of sovereignty is sufficiently similar to the value of
individual autonomy.  I will assume that as a matter of convention the first proposition is
true; however, even if we assume that the value of sovereignty to a state is analogous to
the value of autonomy to an individual human agent this fails to entail a right of
nonintervention.  The analogy employed tells us little about what might be implied by
state sovereignty or what its value is.  The argument points out nothing more than that the
relationship that exists between sovereignty and states is analogous to the relationship
that exists between autonomy and individual human agents, it must also be the case that
the value of sovereignty is similar enough to the value of autonomy such that it ought not
be interefered with.  
For Mill, autonomy is a set of capacities possessed by an individual.   It is the319
possession and exercise of such capacities which make the individual’s choice of action
 Ibid.320
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of paramount, if not inherent, value.   The possession of sovereignty by a state is a320
matter of the state possessing certain capacities, viz. the ability to maintain its political
independence.  However, the ability to maintain political independence fails, without
more, to render a sovereign state’s choice of action of paramount, nevertheless inherent,
value.  The ability of a state to maintain its political independence is valuable to the
extent that it serves the interests of the moral agents of which it is comprised.  As a
consequence, sovereignty is only instrumentally valuable.  As such its value can be
neither paramount nor inherent.
4.5.2 Criticism of Walzer’s Argument from Self-Determination
For Walzer, the right of a political community to self-determination is based on
the right held by each individual to create a political community of their own choosing.  321
Thus, according to Walzer the principle of nonintervention is necessary to respect the
right of political communities to self-determination which is itself justified by its
instrumental role in respecting each individual’s right to political self-determination. 
Regarding the right of nonintervention, since for Walzer, the right of a political
community to self-determination is derived from the right held by each individual to
political self-determination, unless it can be demonstrated that the right of individuals to
political self-determination outweighs the basic right to physical security, a political
community’s right to self-determination cannot entail a principle or norm that fails to
respect the other rights held by individuals.  
Additionally, the claim that the right of a political community to self-
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 87.322
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determination implies a right of nonintervention is internally inconsistent.  Since a
political community’s  right to self-determination is based upon the right to political self-
determination held by each individual, the role a political community’s right to self-
determination should play in the practical deliberations of states depends upon the degree
to which respecting that right would serve the underlying individual right.  Consequently,
since the effect of the right of nonintervention is the preclusion of moral considerations
related to the respect or disrespect for individual rights, a right of nonintervention cannot
be implied by the right of political communities to self-determination, at least not as
Walzer understands that right.
Lastly, the right of a political community to self-determination fails to justify a
preclusive principle of nonintervention for much the same reason that the value of
sovereignty  to states failed to justify such a principle.  The principle of noninterference
with individual liberty is derived from the value of individual self-determination which is,
according to Walzer, essential to the development of individual virtue.   Similarly, the322
principle of nonintervention is supposed to be derived from the value of the political self-
determination of communities which is essential to the political development of a
community.  The value of individual development is inherent, whereas the value of the
development of a political community is instrumental and is dependent on the degree to
which the political community actually developed serves the goals and purposes from
which its value is derived.  
So, again, a preclusive principle of nonintervention is not justified; rather we are
left with a reason for not intervening.  In cases where refraining from intervention would
 For a discussion of Hall’s argument, see Beitz, p. 84.323
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further the goals intended to be served by self-determination that reason would be
weighty.  In cases where respecting a political community’s right to self-determination
would undermine the very goals that justify the right, the reasons in support of
nonintervention would be weaker and more susceptible to being outweighed by
countervailing reasons.  
4.5.3 Criticism of Hall’s and Babic’s Arguments from Anti-Paternalism
Hall’s argument is analogical, but what distinguishes Hall’s argument from the
Millian analogical arguments discussed above is that Hall argues that the value of the
principle of anti-paternalism is derived from its value-neutrality.   Such value-neutrality323
is argued to be necessary at the domestic level because it allows individuals to develop
their own conceptions of the good, and by analogy should also govern the interactions of
states at the international level. Hall’s argument fails because it is simply not the case that
all conceptions of the good are equally valuable and deserving of respect.  
To support a preclusive principle of noninterference at the individual level it
would have to be the case that we are not capable of making judgments about competing
conceptions of the good between the various conceptions that individuals adopt.  Due to
epistemic uncertainty over which is correct, there may be a wide range of conceptions of
the good that ought to be tolerated.  However, this does not imply that all conceptions of
the good are deserving of such toleration.  If a conception of the good involves the
violation of others’ basic rights then such conceptions ought not to be tolerated.  Thus,
the grounding proposition that the value of the principle of anti-paternalism to individuals
in domestic society is its value-neutrality fails at the domestic level.
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In addition, the effort to analogize this proposition to the international arena only
magnifies its flaws.  First, even if we assume that individuals can have conceptions or
definitions of the good, the idea that states qua states can have a conception of the good
borders on the absurd.  There may exist a consensus amongst the inhabitants of a state
over a conception of the good, but if the underlying principle of this argument is respect
for the pluralistic nature of the good, then a consensus should in no way define a state’s
conception, as there are those who subscribe to competing conceptions.  More
importantly, in the cases that we are concerned with here, the basic right to physical
security is being violated, and conceptions of the good that involve such violations do not
deserve toleration.
Turning to Jovan Babic’s argument that respect for individual human rights
justifies a principle of anti-paternalism in international relations, first, as noted with
regards to Hall’s argument, there may be a plurality of conceptions of the good, and one
could even admit that one ought to be tolerant of a wide range of such conceptions;
however, this does not imply that no judgments can be made about others’ conceptions of
the good.  Tolerance is only a virtue if we are being tolerant of reasonable differences –
differences based on reasonable disagreement.  If we are concerned with human rights,
conceptions of the good that involve the denial of basic rights are conceptions that are
unreasonable and ought not be tolerated.  When we tolerate atrocity, injustice, or the
violation of basic rights, tolerance is apathy in the face of evil.
In addition, under Babic’s argument, the applicability of the principle of anti-
paternalism to international relations is, like Walzer’s argument regarding the value of
self-determination, based on an aggregation of individual rights.  This argument relies
 Ibid., pp. 52-54.324
-173-
upon the truth of the following claim: that there exists a conception of the good to which
the individuals of a state are committed.   In the circumstances under which there would324
be a moral demand for the violation of sovereignty, it is possible that a majority of the
individuals in the state in question may have arrived at a consensus on a conception of the
good; however, this fails to imply that there is a single conception of the good to which
the individuals of the state are committed.  Babic does raise a number of relevant
concerns, but he fails to support the claim that a principle of anti-paternalism is
appropriate for international relations.    
In either case, a right of nonintervention is not justified by the principle of anti-
paternalism.  Rather, the principle that is justified by anti-paternalism is one that
recognizes that there are numerous conceptions of the good deserving of toleration and to
the extent that a conception is reasonable and does not violate the basic right to physical
security it should be respected. 
4.5.4 Criticism of the Instrumental Argument
We are left to consider the instrumental justification.  The right of nonintervention
is argued to be implied by the claim that respect for state sovereignty is instrumental to
the provision and maintenance of international peace and security.  The success of the
instrumental justification for the right of nonintervention depends on the truth of two
propositions.  First, it must be the case that without nonintervention international peace
and security could not be provided or maintained – that nonintervention is necessary for
international peace and security.  Second, it must also be the case that international peace
and security is either the only relevant value in international relations, or that it is the
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paramount value to be considered.  
First, it would seem to be reasonable to assume that if states were to adhere to a
right of nonintervention, such restraint would make international peace and security more
likely.  This does not imply, however, that nonintervention is necessary for international
peace and security.  There may, in fact, be instances under which adherence to the right of
nonintervention either undermines international peace and security, or in which violation
of the right would not affect international peace and security.  In either of these cases, the
preclusive nature of the right is not justified because the means-ends relationship upon
which the justification depends does not exist.
Some might contend that it is incoherent to claim that intervention for any reason
can either promote or not affect international peace and security.  The underlying claim
would be that, as a matter of simple quantification, before the intervention there was less
violence than after the intervention, and thus more peace and security before the
intervention and less after the intervention has begun.  Such an understanding of what is
meant by international peace and security is mistaken.  The quantity of violence or lack
thereof may be one relevant aspect of international peace and security, but there must also
be a qualitative aspect that is at least as important.  The justness or durability of the peace
should  matter.  Humanitarian intervention could improve international peace and
security, or at least not diminish it, in this qualitative respect.
Second, even if we assume that the right of nonintervention is necessary for
international peace and security, it does not follow that the right of nonintervention is
justified.  For the right of nonintervention to be justified by the instrumental argument it
must be the case that international peace and security is either the only relevant goal to be
 See Smith, p. 274.325
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served in international relations or it must be the weightiest goal to be served.  If it is not
the only relevant goal, then it could be possible that a more fundamental or weightier goal
is served by violating international peace and security. 
However, international peace and security is neither the only relevant goal nor the
weightiest.  International peace and security is pursued for its extrinsic value – it is
valuable because it is a means to the promotion of or respect for other more fundamental
values.  If we look to the underlying motivation for the international community to pursue
international peace and security, it was not for the sake of international peace and security
itself.  Rather, the peace and security between states was being pursued so that
individuals and communities could flourish.   As such, it cannot be the only relevant325
goal to be pursued in international relations.  In addition, since the value of international
peace and security is derived from its instrumental value, it can’t be the paramount or
weightiest goal of international relations.  For this to be the case the instrumental
relationship between international peace and security and the values it is intended to serve
would have to justify the elimination of considerations of those more fundamental values
when such considerations conflicted with international peace and security.
Admittedly, I am assuming that the proposition that international peace and
security is extrinsically valuable is relatively uncontroversial and that my critique is based
upon this assumption.  One might, however, object to this assumption.  It could be
claimed that though international peace and security may have extrinsic value its value is
not solely instrumental – there is value in international peace and security for its own
sake.  Even if this were true it would remain to be demonstrated that international peace
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and security was of paramount value. 
 Hoffmann, p. 19 (that a rule is needed to prevent states from using326
humanitarian concerns as a pretext for aggressive war).  See also Smith, pp. 284-285 (that
a rule against intervention is necessary because the costs of intervention when it should
not occur are too high).
 See Walzer, “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention,” pp. 29-31.327
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CHAPTER 5 - A RECONSTRUCTION OF 
THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
5.1 Introduction
The discussion in this chapter is built around the assumption that for various
reasons the practical deliberations of states need to be governed by rules.   I will offer326
reasons in defense of this assumption below.  The one rule that is no longer justifiable is a
right of nonintervention with an exclusionary effect on the practical deliberations of
states.  However, many of the arguments offered as justifications for a right of
nonintervention were based upon relevant moral considerations for which a rule
governing the practical deliberations of states should account.  In the section that follows
I will explicate what I take to be the most relevant considerations that are gleaned from
the critical analysis of the justificatory arguments, and I will then explain how a
presumption of nonintervention can accommodate such concerns, and why a presumption
of nonintervention ought to be adopted.
But is this really any different from Walzer’s exception to the legalist paradigm
that intervention is permissible if it “shocks the conscience of mankind?”   In the327
preceding discussion of Walzer’s argument from self-determination I noted some of the
reasons I found his methodology, if not his conclusion, problematic.  Notwithstanding
these aforementioned concerns, I do believe that a presumption of nonintervention is
distinct from Walzer’s rule.  First, for Walzer, humanitarian intervention is only
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permissible as an exception to the rule.  It is a circumstance which requires us to violate
the rule.  Under a presumption, the possibility of the permissibility of a humanitarian
intervention is within the purview of the rule.  Second, the “shock the conscience”
standard is post facto.  We are only permitted to intervene if the atrocities have reached
such a horrific level that the “conscience of mankind” has been shocked.  Under a
presumption of nonintervention, one need not wait until the massacres have reached such
levels of barbarity.  In fact, under a presumption of nonintervention, much of the
bloodshed required for Walzer’s exception could be avoided.
5.2 Lessons Learned
One might be concerned that my argument in the preceding chapter is intended to
demonstrate that when it comes to humanitarian intervention the practical deliberations of
states ought to be unencumbered by any rules that are not themselves directly related to
such humanitarian concerns.  Such an understanding would be based on a false choice:
that either the normative framework of international relations is to be governed by a right
of nonintervention; or that the normative framework is to be governed by no rules at all.  I
will argue for an alternative proposition, that a moderate principle ought to be adopted; in
particular, a principle that recognizes the values to be served by nonintervention, but also
allows for other moral reasons for action to receive their proper consideration in the
practical deliberations of states.  
The rejection of the right of nonintervention as the governing principle of the
normative framework is not a rejection of the goals and values to be served by such a
rule.  In fact, perhaps the most valuable lesson we learn from the critical analysis that led
to the rejection of the right of nonintervention, apart from the fact that the rule is not
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justified, is that respect for state sovereignty is not devoid of value.  But the value of
respecting state sovereignty is limited as opposed to absolute, and instrumental as
opposed to inherent two characteristics that lend support to the adoption of a presumption
of nonintervention.
I would like to now turn my attention to the specific arguments discussed and
lessons learned from the critical discussion in Chapter 4.  Beginning with the analogical
arguments (the arguments from autonomy and anti-paternalism) we learn first that the
values and principles relevant to the international arena are not analogous to the domestic. 
Simply extrapolating from the domestic to the international – claiming that states in the
international arena are analogous to individuals in domestic society – fails to account for
the fact that there is a wide array of different moral agents and relationships at the
international level.  Any principle which is expected to govern the practical deliberations
of states in the international arena should recognize and accommodate such complexity.
Second, we learn that the value of respecting state sovereignty is limited, at least
in the same way that respecting the autonomy of individuals and individual choice is
limited rather than absolute.  If respect for an individual’s exercise of his liberty was
absolute, we would never be justified in interfering with his exercise of his liberty. 
However, even Mill concedes that when such exercise of one’s liberty unjustifiably
infringes upon the rights and interests of other relevant moral agents interference becomes
permissible.  Similarly, when the exercise of state sovereignty involves harm to another
relevant moral agent, whether to interfere or not should be treated as an open question. 
Our principle should reflect this limitation on sovereignty.
Considering the argument from self-determination pressed by Walzer, I think it
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reasonable to assume that the political self-determination of a community is valuable;
however, its value is extrinsic.  Political self-determination to a community  is valuable to
the extent that it serves individual political self-determination.  Respect for the
sovereignty of a state is valuable to the extent that it promotes political self-
determination.  Thus, in relation to political self-determination, the value of respecting
state sovereignty is extrinsic. As a consequence, the value of respecting state sovereignty
is dependent, at least in part, on the degree to which such respect would serve the goal of
political self-determination.  I believe that in most cases respecting state sovereignty will
promote both the political self-determination of communities and individual political self-
determination.  The principle governing the normative framework should reflect this
instrumental relationship between political self-determination and state sovereignty.
Turning next to the arguments from anti-paternalism from Hall and Babic, if we
assume that there is epistemic uncertainty over which conception or definition of the good
is correct, and that there is something morally valuable in allowing agents to exercise
their autonomy in choosing a conception of the good, then respecting state sovereignty is
likely to render the ability to make such choices more secure.  Intervention when such
choice is being exercised in a reasonable manner could be considered an unjustified
imposition of one conception of the good for another, an act of unjustified moral
imperialism by the interveners.
However, it is not always the case that neutrality is the best policy in moral
matters.  Nor is moral imperialism inherently wrong.  In some cases, the desire to avoid
moral imperialism and to allow an individual or a group of individuals to exercise their
autonomy in choosing their conception of the good will pale in comparison to the harm
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that would be caused by not intervening – the unjustified violation of the basic right to
physical security being just one example.  Our principle should allow individuals to
choose their conception of the good from amongst the plurality of reasonable conceptions
of the good.
What lessons do we learn from the critical discussion of the instrumental
argument?  Before answering this question, I would like to note that there is something
particularly paradoxical about the instrumental argument.  For various reasons, the
instrumental argument is likely the most compelling of the justificatory arguments.  The
instrumental argument explicitly recognizes the extrinsic value of respecting the
sovereignty of a state.  In addition, the instrumental argument is based on the proposition
that respect for the sovereignty of a state is instrumental to a variety of intuitively
valuable goals of international relations.  However, it is the instrumental nature of the
justification that renders it incapable of supporting a right of nonintervention.  Under the
instrumental argument the most that can be claimed – and one of the lessons we learn – is
that the sovereignty of a state should be respected to the extent that such respect would
actually fulfill the goals upon which the instrumental justification relies.
The specific goals to which the instrumental justification is directed are
international peace and security.  Thus, the value of respecting state sovereignty is
dependent on the degree to which respecting state sovereignty would serve the goals of
international peace and security, which may in turn be dependent on the degree to which
the fulfillment of such goals furthers the promotion of more fundamental values, such as
human flourishing.  Nonetheless, in most cases international peace and security is going
to be a worthwhile, even if not the weightiest, goal to be pursued, and respecting the
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sovereignty of states will in most cases be instrumentally valuable to the achievement of
that goal.  Thus, the principle governing the normative framework of international
relations should account for the fact that respect for the sovereignty of states will often be
instrumental to the achievement of international peace and security.
Lastly, there were a number of other concerns that arose in the discussion of the
justificatory arguments for a right of nonintervention.  Perfidy and pretext to name two.
All are relevant considerations that should be accounted for by the principle governing
the normative framework. 
 5.3 Reasons in Support of a Presumption of Nonintervention
One might, at this point, think that I would argue for a presumption of
intervention in cases in which the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention arises or,
at least, wonder why a presumption at all.  Before proceeding to the defense of a
presumption of nonintervention, there is at least one prior question that must be
addressed.  Throughout I have argued against the one rule that has been presumed to
govern international relations, the right of nonintervention. One might, at this point,
wonder why there is a need for a rule at all? 
The considerations weighing in favor of the adoption of a rule are ones that have
already been discussed at great length, and understanding that I am repeating myself to a
certain degree, I will try to keep such repetition to a minimum.  Without a rule (or set of
rules) of some sort, the relations between states are likely to be chaotic and unstable –
undermining both international order and the conditions necessary for human flourishing. 
If such reasons are compelling, then we need a rule to provide structure to the interactions
between states. 
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In addition to the avoidance of the negative implications that could arise in an
international arena not governed by any rules, the adoption of a rule (or set of rules) will
have a number of positive effects.  A rule governing the behavior of states may not lead to
peace, but it will likely lead to the predictability of behavior and provide a basis for
reasonable expectations on the part of others in the global community.  In turn, such
predictability and stability are likely to promote other valuable ends.  If individuals and
communities know what to expect to a reasonable degree of certainty, then they can set
goals for themselves and engage in efforts at achieving those goals without the constant
fear that the actions of another state will unexpectedly interfere with their plans.  
Neither the need for a rule, nor the advantages of having the international arena
governed by a rule as opposed to having no rule at all, identifies what that rule should be. 
However, what rule is adopted is as important as the adoption of a rule.  If the wrong rule
is adopted the stability and predictability that is afforded by the rule may be oppressive
and exploitive, if not patently unjust.  So why a presumption of nonintervention?  Why
not a presumption of intervention?  Why a presumption at all?
Before offering reasons in support of the claim that a rebuttable presumption of
nonintervention should be adopted, it is necessary that one have an understanding of the
role the presumption would play in the practical deliberations of states.  A presumption is
a rule or principle that governs our deliberations about a particular practical or theoretical
matter.  The role played by a presumption is one of burden-shifting.  A presumption
privileges a particular belief or action above other alternative or opposing options.  The
starting point for our practical deliberations, if we are deliberating about a matter
governed by a presumption, is in favor of the presumed action.  It is not an open question. 
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For the presumption to be rebutted it must be demonstrated that it is outweighed by
countervailing considerations.  The presumption being discussed would privilege the
option of nonintervention; however, the presumption could be rebutted if it could be
demonstrated with sufficient certainty that an injustice is occurring, that the injustice
demands and could be rectified by intervention (of some sort), and the most effective
means to fulfilling the demands of justice is intervention.
The question of why there would be a presumption at all is conceptually prior to
which way the presumption should go; for that reason I will address this question first.  A 
presumption, by its very nature, does not preclude countervailing considerations from
being considered and allows for the possibility that the presumption will be rebutted.  As
such, it provides a common framework for deliberation, and a degree of stability and
predictability.  But since it also allows for countervailing considerations to rebut the
presumption it does not succumb to the same criticisms that are raised against rules that
are exclusionary in nature.
But should the presumption be for or against intervention?  There are a number of
relevant considerations that, when considered, lend support to the proposition that a
presumption of nonintervention ought to be adopted.  Specifically, there are certain
general principles of morality that can only be accommodated by a presumption of
nonintervention.  The presumption of nonintervention is also able to accommodate the
lessons learned from Chapter 4, and is able to protect against the moral hazards
previously identified.
I take it to be a general principle of morality that one needs to justify one’s
interference with the actions of, or harm that one’s actions may cause to, another.  In the
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case of humanitarian intervention, or intervention of any sort employing military means,
the act of intervention is likely to interfere with the activities of other relevant moral
agents.  At the very least it is, by definition being conducted against the wishes of the
sovereign government.  More importantly, since intervention of the sort at issue employs
physical violence to achieve its goals it will likely involve harm to others.  As such, the
act of intervening needs to be justified.  A presumption in favor of intervention places the
burden, not on those interfering with the actions of others or causing harm, but on those
who may be harmed or whose actions are being interfered with.  On the other hand, a
presumption of nonintervention would place the burden on the intervener to demonstrate
the justifiability of the interference or the harm being caused.  Thus, the presumption of
nonintervention is consistent with the moral requirement that such interference be
justified.
One might, at this point, argue that either humanitarian intervention is justified by
or it is not; and whether a justification exists is not going to depend on who bears the
burden of persuasion.  Such criticisms fail to account for the practical reality of the
situation relevant to the discussion.  First, this is a matter of how states should interact
with one another in the global arena, and the question is one of justification to another
party, not simply whether a justification exists.  Second, the question at the heart of the
issue is epistemological and not ontological in nature.  The matter of justification is in
most cases going to be debated.  The question is not whether a justification exists, but in
the midst of such debate what should the status quo be, and who should have to argue
against it.  If the rule is to provide structure to the interactions between states and guide
the behavior of states in those interactions, it can’t simply be to act when one is justified
 Brian Orend, "War", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005328
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/war/>. 
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in doing so.  That is the very issue the resolution of which the rule is intended to govern.
Another principle of morality, and one that can be found in traditional just war
theory as well, is that military force should not be considered as a first option.  It should
be a last resort.   Such a constraint on the use of military force allows for the possibility328
of diplomatic efforts to resolve the problem without violent conflict and the damage it
inevitably causes.  A presumption of nonintervention respects this principle in a way that
a presumption of intervention cannot.  Under a presumption of intervention we are
privileging the option of conflict, thus undermining the last resort constraint and the
diplomatic alternatives for which it allows.
One might object that the circumstances under consideration – the violation of
basic human rights – is such a pressing moral demand that the international community
cannot wait for diplomatic efforts to run their course, and that the reasons which support
the last resort condition are either outweighed or not even relevant.  In most cases,
however, this is what is at issue – whether the circumstances warrant intervention.  As a
consequence, we cannot simply assume that the conditions are such that intervention is
warranted.  Second, if it is patently obvious that the basic human rights of individuals are
being violated, then, all other things being equal, the presumption against intervention
will be easily rebutted.  Thus, a presumption against intervention will, in questionable
cases, allow for the possibility of a diplomatic resolution and avoid unnecessary violence,
but in those cases in which the violation of the basic right to physical security is obvious
the presumption will not stand in the way of quick action.
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Turning now to the ability of a presumption of nonintervention to accommodate
the lessons learned in Chapter 4, one of the most important lessons learned is that the
principle we adopt should acknowledge that the value of respecting state sovereignty is
not absolute.  A presumption of nonintervention privileges respect for state sovereignty,
but it also recognizes the limitations of the value of respecting state sovereignty.  By its
very nature a presumption of nonintervention recognizes the limited value of respecting
state sovereignty.  However, the rule we adopt should also recognize the instrumental
value of state sovereignty.  Much of the discussion to follow will explain how a
presumption of nonintervention can also accommodate this concern.
The principle we adopt to govern the normative framework of international
relations, and specifically the question of intervention, should also be compatible with the
complexity of international relations.  What this means is that the rule adopted should
provide the structure necessary to guide the behavior of states, but also be flexible enough
to accommodate the varied demands on the actions of states including the demands of
morality in the international arena.  With regard to humanitarian intervention, the rule
adopted must provide the basis for reasonable expectations of behavior while recognizing
that in certain circumstances the demands of morality will require intervention.  A
presumption of nonintervention accomplishes both of these tasks.  States can expect to be
free from intervention if they abide by certain basic moral demands – basic human rights. 
Yet, if they violate the basic rights of the individuals inhabiting the state, the state
becomes the possible subject of intervention.  I say the “possible” subject of intervention
because the inclusion of a reason for action in an agent’s practical deliberations does not
mean that the reason will be conclusive.
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Another lesson that we learn from the critical discussion of the justificatory
arguments is that there are good instrumental reasons for adopting a presumption of
nonintervention.  The right of nonintervention arguably serves many important values and
valuable states of affairs – political self-determination, international order, and reasonable
pluralism.  In most cases, respect for state sovereignty will promote international order,
self-determination, and reasonable pluralism, and will not conflict with the moral
demands of basic human rights.  Thus, as a general rule, it would make sense to presume
that state sovereignty should be respected in order to promote those values and valuable
states of affairs.  
In those cases in which the violation of the basic human right to physical security
demands the violation of state sovereignty, the presumption places the burden of proof on
those seeking to challenge the presumption.  It is presumed that the proper course of
action is nonintervention unless those advancing the interventionist cause can
demonstrate that there are sufficient countervailing considerations which show either that
the values associated with state sovereignty or the goal of international order are
outweighed or not relevant to the particular case at issue.
In addition to the specific lessons learned from the critical discussion of Chapter
4, there are numerous epistemological problems with acting on reasons related to matters
internal to another state.  As was discussed previously in Chapter 2, despite their ultimate
disagreement, Michael Walzer and David Luban seem to agree that “the lack of fit
between government and people should be ‘radically apparent’ to justify intervening,
 Luban, “Romance of the Nation State”, p. 395.  See also Walzer, “Moral329
Standing”, p. 214.
 Babic, pp. 64-66.  See also Smith, pp. 284-285. 330
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because intervention based on misperceptions is horribly wrong.”   329
However, if our concern is with the demands of the basic right to physical security
as they relate to matters internal to another state, we need to be certain that what is
triggering the action are violations of the basic right to physical security and not merely a
case of moral imperialism, perfidy, or pretext.  A presumption that places the burden of
proof on those in favor of intervention, would protect against such epistemically based
moral hazards.
There is at least one additional moral hazard associated with interference in the
internal affairs of another state.  Jovan Babic argues that if we were to abandon a
stringent normative principle against intervention and allow for the permissibility of
intervention in the internal affairs of another state in cases where the basic right to
physical security would demand such action, there would be an inevitable slide to the
acceptability of intervention as a tool to pursue state interests in foreign affairs.  330
Slippery slope arguments are only as good as each step in the slide from the intuitively
morally acceptable to the intuitively morally troubling.  Here the presumption of
nonintervention would allow for the intuitively acceptable proposition that the demands
of basic human rights should be accounted for in the practical deliberations of states
without allowing the unfettered slide to a general acceptance of intervention as a tool of
foreign relations.
5.4 Reconstruction of the Normative Framework and Implications
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So, what exactly would the normative framework look like if it was governed by a
presumption as opposed to a right of nonintervention?  The question may be more
complicated than it might at first appear.  It might be the case that one is concerned with
the structure of the practical deliberations of states and not necessarily concerned with the
practical difference between the two alternatives for the  governing principle – the
presumption of nonintervention and the right of nonintervention.  On the other hand, one
might be concerned primarily with such practical implications – what practical difference
does it make to adopt a presumption as opposed to a right of nonintervention? 
Understanding the practical implications is inexorably tied to one’s understanding of the
implications the adoption of a presumption of nonintervention would have on the
structure of a state’s practical deliberations.  
Beginning with the structural perspective first, under the right of nonintervention
certain moral reasons for action, including the moral obligation of humanitarian
intervention, are precluded from consideration if they are related to matters internal to
another state and would require interference with the internal matters of another state.  As
discussed above, there seems to be no justification for the preclusion of relevant moral
reasons from consideration.  Under the presumption, no morally relevant reasons are
precluded from consideration.  
In the figures below (Fig. 1 The Normative Framework for the Practical
Deliberations of States, and Fig. 2 Reconstructed Normative Framework for the Practical
Deliberations of States) the structure of the practical deliberations of states under the right
of nonintervention is juxtaposed with the structure of the practical deliberations of states
under a presumption of nonintervention.  The structural differences implied by the
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adoption of a presumption of nonintervention should be readily apparent.  In Fig. 1 the
right of nonintervention acts as a filter, excluding from consideration certain moral
reasons for action.  However, in Fig. 2 the presumption of nonintervention allows moral
demands on a state’s action to be considered, and whether intervention is what the state






Turning to the practical implications the adoption of a presumption of
nonintervention will have, the most obvious implication is that if intervention is not
precluded from consideration at the outset, there is a possibility that under the right
circumstances what a state ought to do, all things considered, will be to intervene.  Thus,
as a practical matter, under the right of nonintervention, the actions of states would (or
should) never be based on moral reasons that demand interference with matters internal to
another state.  However, under the presumption, it would be the case that in at least some
instances intervention would be based on moral reasons related to matters internal to
another state.
In the final chapter, I will assess the practical difference the adoption of a
presumption of nonintervention would have made in Rwanda.  If the normative
framework was governed by the right of nonintervention, or even if those who had power
to do anything believed that it was so governed, this would explain the international
community’s refusal to intervene.  I will argue that under the reconstructed normative
framework of international relations the international community had an all things
considered obligation to intervene in Rwanda.
Intervening in the internal affairs of another state is not an act that should be taken
lightly.  However, the normative weight that is given to state sovereignty and
international order is often misplaced.  I do not deny the value of either, but do question
the degree to which views that sanctify their value are justified.  A presumption of
nonintervention allows for the value of state sovereignty and international order to be
given their proper weight without unjustifiably denying the basic demands of morality.
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION: AN ALL-THINGS-CONSIDERED 
OBLIGATION TO INTERVENE IN RWANDA
6.1 Introduction
Did the international community, as a collection of duty-bearing states, have an
all-things-considered obligation to intervene in Rwanda in 1994?  Answering this
question has been the overarching goal of this project.  In addressing the question, I have
defended the existence of a moral obligation of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda.  I
have argued that the obligation was owed to the individual victims of the Rwandan
genocide, and that the obligation was borne by states individually and the international
community as a collection of duty-bearing states.  
This, however, was only the first step in addressing the question.  I have
demonstrated that the normative framework, accepted by many at the time of the
Rwandan genocide, precluded such moral reasons for action from consideration in the
practical deliberations of states, and that the right of nonintervention which governed the
practical deliberations of states was unjustified.  In its stead, I have offered a
reconstructed normative framework of international relations under which deliberation
over questions of intervention are governed by a presumption of nonintervention.  Thus,
what remains to be discussed is the application of the reconstructed normative framework
to the circumstances of the Rwandan genocide. 
6.2 Application of the Reconstructed Normative Framework
Application of the reconstructed normative framework is a two-step process. 
First, the delineation of the relevant considerations must be completed before the
reconstructed normative framework can be employed.  Only then can the second step in
the process – the actual application of the reconstructed normative framework to the
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circumstances of the Rwandan genocide – begin.  Thus, it is to the delineation of the
relevant considerations in support of the presumption of nonintervention to which I now
turn.
6.2.1 What are the relevant considerations – when is the presumption rebutted.
As the reconstructed normative framework is governed by a presumption, the
identification of the considerations relevant to the question at hand is a matter of
identifying the conditions under which the presumption would be rebutted.  The relevant
considerations are gleaned from the considerations in favor of a presumption of
nonintervention discussed in Chapter 5.  It is important to note that questions of rebuttal
will, in wider practice, be a matter of degree, but I will argue that as applied to Rwanda
the rebuttal of the presumption can not be reasonably disputed.
The first set of considerations are based upon the valuable states of affairs that are
claimed to be served by the presumption.  First, nonintervention is instrumental to
political self-determination, either individual or communal.  Thus, one relevant
consideration in determining whether the presumption is rebutted is whether those
advocating intervention can demonstrate that political self-determination is not being
infringed upon, or that the infringement is justified.
Another instrumental goal to be served by the presumption of nonintervention is
the protection of reasonable pluralism and protection against unjustified moral
imperialism.  Specifically, intervention should not be the imposition of one conception of
the good for another reasonable conception of the good.  Determining whether this
consideration in support of the presumption has been rebutted is more complex
consideration than it may at first appear.  The advocates of intervention must demonstrate
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either that the bases for intervention are principles or conceptions of the good to which
those whose actions are to be interfered with are also committed, or that the actions
which are claimed to give rise to the demand for intervention are not based on a
reasonable conception of the good. 
One additional way in which a conception of the good can fail to be reasonable is
in its application.  Those against whom intervention is being sought may be committed to
a reasonable conception of the good, and they may believe that their actions are in
accordance with the reasonable conception of the good to which they are committed;
however, if the connection between the conception of the good and the actions they take
in accordance with that conception is not reasonable then the application is unreasonable. 
If the intervention being contemplated in such an instance is based on the very conception
of the good that the targeted individuals are committed to, then intervention would not be
an imposition of another conception of the good, but would actually be in accordance
with the conception of the good to which the targets of intervention are committed.  One
final comment with regards to this consideration, the advocates of intervention must also
demonstrate that intervention is not going to cause more harm than the conception of the
good under attack.  
The final instrumental goal to be served by the presumption of nonintervention is
the maintenance of international peace and security.  First, there is the question of
whether intervention in any particular instance is likely to undermine international peace
and security.  This consideration can be met and no more need be required of the
advocate of intervention if it can be demonstrated that intervention will either have no
discernable effect on international peace and security, or that international peace and
-198-
security will actually be served by intervention. 
However, and as was discussed above, international peace and security is itself of
instrumental value.   It is only valuable to the extent that maintaining international peace
and security serves other more fundamental goals.  Thus, consideration of the effect of
intervention on international peace and security in the determination of whether the
presumption has been rebutted is not simply a matter of assessing whether or not
international peace and security will be undermined by intervention.  If the advocate of
intervention can demonstrate that the goals to be served by international peace and
security will be better served by intervention, even if intervention undermines
international peace and security, then this consideration in favor of the presumption will
have been rebutted.  
One might be concerned that the complexity of assessing the presumption with
regard to the goal of international peace and security identifies an inherent flaw. 
Specifically, the complexity of this consideration, especially if deliberation reaches this
level of analysis, is likely to prove problematic.  First, it may prove problematic because
there may be disagreement over the goals to be served by international peace and security,
and even if there is agreement over the goals to be served there may be differing ideas
about whether intervention serves such goals better.   I do not find this to be a
determinative problem for the presumption.  If anything, it demonstrates that presumption
has some teeth to it, and is not likely to be blown over by the slightest  consideration in
favor of intervention.  In addition, there are likely to be gray areas in which we should not
expect there to be a clear and decisive answer.  Any principle that claims that there are
always easy answers to moral questions related to international relations is one of which
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we should be wary. 
The second set of considerations are those based upon concerns one may have
over any rule that weakens the prohibition on intervention in international relations. 
Specifically, one may be concerned over the possibility of perfidy, that one group is
engaging in actions against the state and provoking retaliation by the state with the
specific goal of enticing the international community to intervene to fight their battle for
them.  In addition, there is a concern over the generation of perverse results, that the
intervention will lead to greater harm and a larger humanitarian crisis than the one it is
intended to resolve.  How can we be certain, or certain enough, that the intervention is not
the result of perfidy?  How can we know with sufficient certainty that intervention will
not simply make the crisis worse?
As to perfidy, the concern is that if intervention is attempted in one case in which
the humanitarian crisis giving rise to and justifying the intervention was caused by
perfidious action, then others will be encouraged, in the future, to engage in such action
to further their causes.  One might think that this should lead us to conclude that the
advocate must demonstrate that the humanitarian crisis that justifies the intervention was
not a matter of perfidy.  Such a standard would, however, place the emphasis on the
wrong aspect of intervention.  The concern ought to be with how the intervention is
carried out, and not whether it is carried out.  For that reason, those advocating
intervention must demonstrate with reasonable certainty that the intervention will be
carried out in such a way that perfidy is not encouraged.
As to the possibility of perverse results, the advocate of intervention must
demonstrate that the intervention will alleviate the humanitarian concern without causing
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a greater one.  This too is a condition that is more complicated than it may, at first,
appear.  Intervention, by its very nature, carries with it, not of necessity but of probability,
the use of violence to accomplish its ends.  Harm will be caused.  Specifically, harm will
be caused to those violating the rights of others.  However, there exists a moral
asymmetry between the violators of rights and the victims of such violation.  I will not
argue that any and all means may be used against the violators, but the concern over
perverse results must be understood to be concerned with harm that may befall those who
the intervention is intended to help.
Before moving on to the application of the reconstructed normative framework to
the circumstances of the Rwandan genocide a clarificatory remark about the nature of the
considerations identified is in order.  One may ask the following:  Are the considerations
delineated necessary conditions for rebuttal of the presumption?  Sufficient?  Jointly, or
individually?  I do not think that each is necessary.  Some are likely to be more important
than others.  For example, the causation of perverse results – the worsening of the
situation for the victims – ought to be a very weighty consideration in the practical
deliberations of a state, and concerns over moral imperialism, less so.  However, if there
were a situation in which the advocate for intervention were able to demonstrate that each
of the considerations in favor of the presumption were rebutted, that would certainly be
sufficient for a determination that the presumption had been rebutted.  
6.2.2 Application of the Reconstructed Normative Framework to the Circumstances of
the Rwandan Genocide
What should have been done in Rwanda?  Was there an all-things-considered
obligation to intervene?  There is a growing consensus that the answer to this question is
an emphatic, “Yes”.  Here, in applying the reconstructed normative framework to the
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circumstances of the Rwandan genocide, I will provide one answer why.  We begin with
the presumption that states ought to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other
states, and with the recognition that there was a moral obligation to intervene in Rwanda
to protect the basic right to physical security held by each individual Rwandan.  We are
now faced with the question, would the presumption have been rebutted?
First, as to the goals to be served by the presumption, would intervention in
Rwanda have undermined the political self-determination of individuals or political
groups?  I must admit that I find the answer to this question obvious.  It would seem
absurd to claim that interference with attempted genocide is an infringement upon the
right to political self-determination, nevertheless an unjustified infringement on that right. 
The genocide itself is a violation of the right to political self-determination held by each
individual victim.  Thus, intervention cannot be a violation of their right to political self-
determination.  Similarly, the genocide is a violation of the right of the Tutsi, as a people,
to their political self-determination, and intervention would serve their right to political
self-determination, not undermine it.
The question then becomes, would intervention undermine the right of the Hutu to
political self-determination?  The right to political self-determination of any individual or
group, to be consistent, must be limited by the same right held by others.  Thus, the right
of the Hutu to political self-determination cannot involve the denial of that right to others. 
As a consequence, their right does not include the right to violate the rights of Tutsis and
Tutsi sympathizers.  
Nonetheless, one might object that the underlying purpose behind the Rwandan
genocide was political in nature – to protect one regime favored by the majority of the
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art.331
IX (1948). 
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inhabitants of the state against the possibility of a Tutsi dominated government – and thus
that it was a matter of political self-determination.  This may be true as an explanation of
the motivation underlying the actions of the Rwandan Hutu, but the fact that the action
engaged in is directed at a political end does not mean that it falls within the protected
sphere of the right of political self-determination.  There are limitations to what one may
do in furtherance of their rights, including the right of political self-determination.  I do
not offer this objection as one that ought to be taken seriously, but rather as one that
demonstrates the absurdity of the proposition that the right to political self-determination
includes a permission to commit large-scale violence against others.
Would intervention in Rwanda have involved, or been an act of, unjustified moral
imperialism?  The consideration in favor of the presumption can be rebutted, either by
demonstrating that the principle under which the intervention is being carried out is one
that is shared by those who are likely to be harmed by the intervention, or that the
conception of the good that is being imposed upon is an unreasonable conception of the
good.  
Rwanda acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide on April 16, 1975, and the only exception that was noted by the
Rwandan government was that they did not consider themselves bound by article IX of
the Convention.   Article IX is a procedural matter related to the handling of disputes,331
and in substance states that disputes over the Convention are to be decided by the
 Ibid.332
 Powers, pp. 336-340, 371-372.333
 Ibid.334
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International Court of Justice.   What the Rwandan government did commit itself, and332
its state to, was the principle that genocide was and remains a crime.  The Rwandans
never withdrew from the convention.  This provides at least one indication that, as a
general proposition about the conception of the good shared by the Rwandan people, they
viewed genocide as morally wrong.
One might claim, however, that what was occurring in Rwanda was not genocide,
not for the various semantic reasons given by many of the Western powers, but rather
because the violence against the Tutsis was justified.  Is there a reasonable system of
moral values or conception of the good that may provide the justification for the killing of
Tutsis and Tutsi-sympathizers?  One argument was that the Tutsi deserved to be killed
because they were less than human, that they were a pest to be eradicated.   One might333
find the claim that they were pests to be a mere metaphor, but the dehumanization of the
Tutsi by the Hutu majority was clear in their propaganda.   We may disagree about334
whether or not a stem cell is a person, or a fetus, or any other non-paradigm human, but it
is unreasonable to claim that men, women, and children are not human because of their
ethnic background. 
There is an alternate moral basis upon which the actions of the Hutu  may have
been based which, at first glance, may appear reasonable.  Namely, it might be claimed
that the Hutu population had a right to defend itself.  They may have believed that the
interim government which was to be installed in accordance with the Arusha Accords,
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and the death of President Habyarimana, were merely the first steps in a reclamation of
power by exiled Tutsis and the Tutsi minority.  Thus, in furtherance of their right to
defend themselves the Hutu may have thought it necessary to exterminate the Tutsi.  
There are at least two ways in which this underlying basis and its application fail
the test of reasonableness.  It is not the principle itself that is unreasonable.  We can
accept, at least for the sake of argument, that political groups are permitted to defend
themselves.  The first failure is related to the factual basis upon which the actions of the
Hutu were founded.  There must have been a threat, or at least a justified basis for
believing that a threat existed for the right to defend themselves to be implied.  There was
no such threat.  Second, even if we assume that the state’s propaganda would have
provided the Hutu population with a basis for the belief that they were being threatened, it
is unreasonable to claim that the Hutu right to defend themselves included the
permissibility to kill every Tutsi – man, woman, and child. 
The last instrumental consideration in support of the presumption is the concern
over international peace and security.  As noted above, the assessment of this
consideration begins with the question of whether international peace and security would
be undermined by intervention.  It would be inappropriate to employ our historical
knowledge of the ramifications on international peace and security of the choice to not
intervene, rather, since our concern is with the practical deliberations of states, we must
assess this consideration from the perspective of states at the time.  
The Arusha Accords, under which a power-sharing government of Rwanda was to
be implemented, was an agreement between the ruling Hutu-led government and the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).  The power-sharing agreement was intended to bring an
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end to civil war and help promote stability and peace in the region.  The genocidal efforts
of the Hutu-led government disrupted the implementation of the Arusha Accords and
from the onset of violence brought instability to the region, and increased the likelihood
of war between various states, including Rwanda and its neighbors.  Assuming Dallaire
was correct, 5000 UN peace keepers with the ability to use force to protect the Rwandan
Tutsis from attack would have halted the genocide and put the Arusha Accords back on
track.  Obviously we can’t know with certainty whether or not such actions would have
served international peace and security, but it seems reasonable to conclude that
widespread massacre of innocent civilians and renewed hostilities in an already volatile
region were no less a threat.
Turning to the instrumental value of international peace and security, it is valuable
to the extent that it serves other more fundamental goals.  One that I have asserted as such
a goal, and which will use as an example here is human flourishing.  Even if we assume
that intervention would not have served international peace and security and may even
have undermined it, if it can be demonstrated that human flourishing or other such goals
are actually served by intervention and are not being served by the maintenance of
international peace and security, then this consideration in favor of the presumption will
have been rebutted.  There are a number of reasons why one ought to believe that
intervention on behalf of the victims of the Rwandan genocide would have promoted
human flourishing far better than the choice not to intervene.  First, as a matter of
probability, unjustified violence against individuals is an unlikely avenue to human
flourishing.  
Second, if we focus on individual human flourishing, the fear and uncertainty that
 Powers, pp. 337-345. 335
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ruled Rwanda during the genocide made it virtually impossible for individuals to flourish. 
As for the Rwandan society, the instability and chaos that erupted and continued
throughout the genocide prevented the society from moving forward.  Recall, that the
genocide broke out just prior to the implementation of the Arusha Accords.  
It would seem that the advocate of humanitarian intervention would have been
able to rebut the various instrumental considerations in favor of the presumption of
nonintervention.  I would now like to turn to the considerations in favor of the
presumption of nonintervention based on perfidy and perverse results.  As to perfidy,
during the first days of the genocide the RPF refrained from reacting to give the United
Nations the opportunity to get the Arusha Accords back on track.  In addition to the fact
that there was no incentive for the Tutsi and the RPF to entice violence, the facts known
at the time indicated that the violence was the result of the activities of the Hutu
extremists, both inside and outside of the government.335
Turning finally to the concern over perverse results, one might point to the fact
that Operation Turquoise had dreadful humanitarian consequences – a refugee crisis,
more deaths from hunger and disease, and more violence in the areas controlled by the
French.  It must be noted, however, that Operation Turquoise was not a humanitarian
intervention to stop the genocide, but an intervention to prevent the growing regional
humanitarian crisis from becoming worse.  It may not even be appropriate to call it an
intervention as the RPF had control of most of the country, had stopped the genocide, and
the greatest beneficiaries of the French activities were the genocidaires.  
But could such perverse results have been avoided?  Again, taking the perspective
 Dallaire.336
 Paul Rusesabagina with Tom Zoellner, An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography337
(New York: Penguin Group, 2006).
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of those deliberating at the time, it is impossible to know with certainty what the
counterfactual outcome would have been; however, there is good reason to believe that
had intervention been pursued early on that the genocide of the Tutsi and the eventual
broader humanitarian crisis would have been avoided.  As noted previously, Lt. General
Romeo Dallaire believed that a small and well-equipped United Nations force would have
been able to stop the killing.  In addition, the genocide was not carried out by a well-
organized military force, rather it was carried out by civilians and civilian militias, and on
many occasions any show of force was sufficient to stop the mobs from carrying out their
genocidal “work”.  For example, a Ugandan official who worked with Dallaire’s UN
contingent, saved many Tutsi lives by simply telling the militias that they could not have
them.   Additionally, in a now famous example, Paul Rusesabagina, the manager of a336
hotel in Kigali, saved thousands of Tutsis by simply refusing to let the Hutu militia into
his hotel.   Thus, it is more likely than not that an intervention in Rwanda to protect the337
basic right to physical security would not have resulted in perverse results.
6.3 Conclusion
So what have I demonstrated?  In this chapter, I have shown that under the
reconstructed normative framework the presumption of nonintervention would have been
rebutted in the case of Rwanda, and as a consequence, there was an all things considered
obligation to intervene in Rwanda.  I readily admit that the historical and counterfactual
nature of this claim renders it somewhat speculative, but, at the very least, I have given a
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plausible explanation as to why the international community ought to have intervened in
Rwanda and not one that is dependent on the historical knowledge of the atrocity.
Even if one denies that the presumption of nonintervention was rebutted in the
case of Rwanda and that there was not an all things considered obligation borne by the
international community to intervene in Rwanda – both propositions I find highly dubious
–  there are a number of other conclusory implications that can be gleaned from this
project.  First, I have defended, from a relatively weak moral principle –  the basic human
right to physical security – further attenuated by other reasonable concerns, the claim that
one can derive that set of conditions under which no one could reasonably deny that a
moral obligation of humanitarian intervention exists.
Second, joining a growing number of commentators, I have argued for a
weakening of the normative force of external sovereignty and a rejection of a normative
framework for the practical deliberations of states accepted by many that is governed by a
right of nonintervention.  In contrast I have offered a reconstructed normative framework,
in which questions of intervention are governed by a presumption of nonintervention that
is able to serve the functional goals upon which the right to nonintervention was claimed
to be justified.  Lastly, I have argued that the application of the weak principle and the
reconstructed normative framework would have dramatic implications for the role of
basic moral concerns in international relations.
There were, however, a number of relevant matters that were not covered.  First,
in furtherance of the justificatory nature of the project I have dealt only with a weak
principle.  The methodological reasons for this choice were discussed at length
previously, but there may exist other moral bases which could include stronger principles
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with wider and more pervasive implications.  A limitation on the second half of the
project is that I only addressed certain theories in support of right of nonintervention. 
There may be others, but I would contend that in light of the arguments presented above,
those who would claim that the right of nonintervention is supported by some alternate
and unconsidered argument bear the burden.  It would also have been useful to assess
other cases in international relations in which intervention has been considered.  It would
be particularly useful to assess situations in which we would think that intervention ought
not occur to see what the application of the presumption of nonintervention tells us. 
Lastly, at the very least, I hope I have raised some interesting questions for those who are
skeptical of global ethics and a role for morality in international relations.
-210-
Bibliography    
Howard Adelman, “Theory and Humanitarian Intervention,” from Michael Keren and
Donald A. Sylvan, eds., International Intervention: Sovereignty versus
Responsibility (Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2002).
Sharon Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights (Cardiff, Wales: University
of Wales Press, 2001).
Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, translated by
Richards Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co.,
1966)
Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2  ed. (New York: Wiley, 1963). nd
Jovan Babic, “Foreign Armed Intervention: Between Justified Aid and Illegal
Violence,”from  Humanitarian Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues, ed.
Aleksandar Jokic (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003). 
Brian Barry, “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective,”  from, Robert E. Goodin and
Philip Pettit, eds., Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 1997).
Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1999).
Charles R. Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon, and A. John Simmons, eds., A
Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader: International Ethics (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1985).
S. I. Benn and R. I. Peters, The Principles of Political Thought: Social Principles and the
Democratic State (New York: Free Press, 1965).
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.  
Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
Luigi Bonanate, Ethics and International Politics (Columbia, SC: University of South
Carolina Press, 1995).
Chris Brown, “International Affairs,” from, Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds., A
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 1995).
Ian Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University
-211-
Press, 2002).
S Basic Documents on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Allen Buchanan, “From Nuremberg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International
Legal Reform,” from Humanitarian Intervention: Moral and Philosophical
Issues, ed. Aleksandar Jokic (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003). 
S “Justice and Charity”, Ethics 97 (1987), pp. 558-75.
Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999).
Charter of the United Nations.
Deen K. Chatterjee, The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, Ethics and Foreign Intervention (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Cicero, On Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Marshall Cohen, “Moral Skepticism and International Relations,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Autumn, 1984), pp. 299-346.
Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, eds., Ethics and International Affairs: Extent &
Limits (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001).
Gustav Daniker, “Intervention as a Challenge for the Military,” from Michael Keren and
Donald A. Sylvan, eds., International Intervention: Sovereignty versus
Responsibility (Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2002).
Michael C. Davis, Wolfgang Dietrich, Bettina Scholdan, and Dieter Sepp, eds.,
International Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (Armonk, NY: M. E.
Sharpe, Inc., 2004).
S “The Emerging World Order: State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention,”
from Michael C. Davis, Wolfgang Dietrich, Bettina Scholdan, and Dieter Sepp,
eds., International Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (Armonk, NY: M. E.
Sharpe, Inc., 2004).
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Oct. 24, 1970.
-212-
Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights: In Theory & Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2003).
Patrick Dunleavy, “The State,” from, Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds., A
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 1995).
Gerald Elfstrom, International Ethics: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, Inc., 1998).
– Ethics for a Shrinking World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
Anthony Ellis, “War, Revolution, and Humanitarian Intervention,” from Humanitarian
Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues, ed. Aleksandar Jokic
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003).
Richard A. Epstein, “A Theory of Strict Liability,” 2 The Journal of Legal Studies 160-
189 (1973).
Toni Erskine, ed., Can Institutions Have Responsibilities?: Collective Moral Agency and
International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
S ed., Moral Concepts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
Mary Gore Forrester, Persons, Animals, and Fetuses: An Essay in Practical Ethics
(Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).
David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Alton Frye, Project Director, Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000).
Stephen A. Garrett, Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of Humanitarian
Intervention (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999).
Raymond D. Gastil, “Beyond a Theory of Justice”, Ethics, 85:3 (1975).
David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).  
-213-
General Assembly Resolution of 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
Dec. 14, 1962.
Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit,  Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997).
S A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 1995).
Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will be Killed with Our
Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998).
 Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran Cronin, eds., Global Justice & Transnational Politics:
Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of Globalization (Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 2002).
Gordon Graham, Ethics and International Relations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1997).
Leslie Green, "Legal Obligation and Authority", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/legal-obligation/>.
William E. Hall, International Law, 8  Ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924).th
Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
Garrett Hardin, “Life Boat Ethics” from Psychology Today (September, 1974).
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994).
S Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
S “Legal and Moral Obligation,” in A.I. Melden, ed., Essays in Moral Philosophy.
(Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1966), pp. 82-107.
S “Are There Any Natural Rights?” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Apr.,
1955), pp. 175-191, 185.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
Stanley Hoffman, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).
-214-
J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” from, J. L. Holzgrefe and
Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and
Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal,
and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Brad Hooker, “Rule Consequentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, URL =
 <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/consequentialism-rule/>.
John Hospers, “What Libertarianism Is” from Tibor R. Machan, ed., The Libertarian
Alternative: Essays in Social and Political Philosophy (Chicago, IL: Nelson Hall
Company, 1974), pp. 3-20.  
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) (La Salle, IL:
Open Court Publishing Company, 1966).  
S A Treatise of Human Nature (1737) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Micheline R. Ishay, ed., The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Essays, Speeches,
and Documents from the Bible to the Present (New York: Routledge, 1997).
Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 3  Ed. (New York: Aspen Law &rd
Business, 1999).
Aleksandar Jokic, ed.,  Humanitarian Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues,
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003).
Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, Mary J. Gregor, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
Robert Keohane, “Introduction,” from, J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
S “Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty,” from, J. L.
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical,
Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Michael Keren and Donald A. Sylvan, eds., International Intervention: Sovereignty
versus Responsibility (Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2002).
-215-
Clea Koff, The Bone Woman: A Forensic Anthropologist’s Search for Truth in the Mass
Graves of Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo (New York: Random House,
2004).
Anthony F. Lang Jr., Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 2002).
Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998).
Lauren E. Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987).
David Luban, “Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo
War,” from, Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran Cronin, eds., Global Justice &
Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of
Globalization (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002).
S “Just War and Human Rights” reprinted in Charles R. Beitz, Marshall Cohen,
Thomas Scanlon, and A. John Simmons, eds., A Philosophy & Public Affairs
Reader: International Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985),
pp. 195-216.
S “The Romance of the Nation-State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol. 9, No. 4
(Summer, 1980), pp. 392-397.  
Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1981).
Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the
Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
L. R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London:
Zed Books Ltd., 2004).
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, from On Liberty and Other Essays (1859) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1991).
S “A Few Words on Nonintervention,” Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. III
(London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1867).
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1968).
Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998).
Jan Narveson, Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice: Essays on Moral and Political
-216-
Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002).
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974).
Onora O’Neill, “Agents of Justice,” from, Thomas Pogge, ed., Global Justice (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2001).
S “The Great Maxims of Justice and Charity,” Constructions of Reasons:
Explorations of Kant’s Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1989).
S Faces of Hunger (London: Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd, 1986).
Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, “Theses on the Theory of the State,”  from, Robert E.
Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds., Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997).
Orend, Brian, "War", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/war/>. 
Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis
of Power and Peace (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1999).
Michael Philips, “Humanitarian Intervention and Moral Theory,” from Humanitarian
Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues, ed. Aleksandar Jokic
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003).
Thomas Pogge, “Preempting Humanitarian Interventions,” from Humanitarian
Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues, ed. Aleksandar Jokic
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003).
S World Poverty and Human Rights (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002).
S “Human Rights and Human Responsibilities,” from, Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran
Cronin, eds., Global Justice & Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and
Political Challenges of Globalization (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002).
S ed., Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001).
S “Introduction: Global Justice,” from, Thomas Pogge, ed., Global Justice (Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001).
Samantha Powers, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New
York: Perennial, 2003).
-217-
John Rawls, The Law of People (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1999).
Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
S Engaging Reasons: On the Theory of Value and Action (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999)
S The Morality of Freedom (New York: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
Joel H. Rosenthal, Ethics & International Affairs: A Reader, 2  Ed. (Washington, DC:nd
Georgetown University Press, 1999).
Alfred P. Rubin, “Humanitarian Intervention and International Law,” from Humanitarian
Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues, ed. Aleksandar Jokic
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003).
Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982)
T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1998).
Roger Scruton, “Sovereignty” from A Dictionary of Political Thought (London: The
Macmillan Press, 1982).
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).
Samuel Scheffler, “Relationships and Responsibilities”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 26
(1997), pp. 189-209.
Henry Shue, “Limiting Sovereignty,” from, Jennifer M. Welsh, Humanitarian
Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
S Basic Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1907).
Peter Singer, “Outsiders: Our Obligations to Those Beyond Our Borders,” The Ethics of 
Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), pp. 11-32.  
S One World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).
S “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:2 (1972), pp.
231-232. 
-218-
Quentin Skinner, “The State,” from, Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds.,
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 1997).
Michael J. Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues” from,
Joel H. Rosenthal, ed., Ethics & International Affairs (Wahsington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 1999).
Roger D. Spegele, Political Realism in International Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
L. Wayne Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986).
Fernando Teson, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” from J. L. Holzgrefe
and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and
Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 93-129.
S A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
S Humanitarian Intervention (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 
Inc., 1996).
Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., Ethics and International Relations: Ethics in Foreign Policy,
Vol. 2 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, Inc., 1985).
Treaties of Peace Between Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire and Between France and
the Holy Roman Empire (Peace of Westphalia, October 14, 1648), 1 C.T.S. 119-
356.
R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1974).
Gregory Vlastos, “Human Worth, Merit, and Equality,” from Joel Feinberg, ed., Moral
Concepts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
S “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention,” Dissent (Winter 2002), pp. 29-
37.
S Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3  Ed.rd
(New York: Basic Books, 2000).
S Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, IN:
-219-
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).
S “The Moral Standing of States,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3
(Spring, 1980), 209-229.
Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Ernest J. Weinrib, “The Case for a Duty to Rescue,” 90 Yale Law Journal 247 (1980).
Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges & Intervention (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2000).
Jennifer M. Welsh, Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004).
S “Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,”
from, Jennifer M. Welsh, Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
C. H. Whitley, “On Duties,” from Joel Feinberg, ed., Moral Concepts (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1969).
Burleigh Wilkins, “Humanitarian Intervention: Some Doubts,” from Humanitarian
Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues, ed. Aleksandar Jokic
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003).
Rudiger Wolfrum, “The UN Experience in Modern Intervention,” from Michael Keren
and Donald A. Sylvan, eds., International Intervention: Sovereignty versus
Responsibility (Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2002).
Veronique Zanetti, “Global Justice: Is Interventionism Desirable?” from, Thomas Pogge,
ed., Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001).
